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Abstract 
Consumer choice has become a key reform trend in the provision of public services in 
Western European welfare states. Research on the welfare effects of choice reforms – 
including greater provider choice for the individual and competition between 
providers – has largely focused on economic evaluations of the extrinsic (outcome) 
effects of choice, thereby leaving its intrinsic, or procedural, value unexplored. The 
overarching objective of this thesis is to investigate the welfare effects of choice in the 
provision of health and long-term care (LTC) and their implications for equity. The 
thesis utilises the subjective well-being approach – incorporating both procedural and 
outcome utility from choice – to measure welfare effects based on quantitative 
analysis of survey data. Welfare effects and equity implications are examined in 
relation to: competition in health care in the English National Health System (NHS); 
choice of care package in the German long-term care system; and individual 
preferences and views of choice as a priority in the provision of health care in three 
NHS countries. The thesis argues that both service characteristics – extent of 
competition, information availability, technical complexity – and individual 
capabilities – ability to process information, capacity to manage transaction costs, 
availability of private support – influence the benefits that individuals derive from 
choice. Results suggest that choice policies have an overall positive welfare effect in 
both health and long-term care. However, while direct evidence of outcome 
improvements is found, the empirical analysis only finds indirect evidence of 
procedural utility. Middle class characteristics, primarily income and education, are 
found to have a positive influence on the benefits of choice, amounting to evidence of 
inequitable facets of choice policies. The middle class further exhibits preferences for 
choice over and above other characteristics of health care systems. Overall, this thesis 
advocates a holistic approach to the analysis of choice, incorporating its procedural 
value and paying particular attention to the equity implications of the choice situation, 
information processing and differences in available options as well as preferences for 
choice. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In many contemporary Western European welfare states, greater individual choice, 
autonomy and responsibility in the way public services are accessed, together with 
greater competition between providers and an enhanced role for private actors, form a 
key reform trend (Jacobs 1998; Leichsenring 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Timonen et al. 2006; Martinsen and Vrangbæk 2008; Pavolini and Ranci 2008). 
Choice reforms are here broadly understood as policies which imply a shift in 
responsibility and decision-making rights from the state – or agents and institutions 
acting on its behalf – to the individual, thereby giving the individual an opportunity to 
choose certain elements of the service they receive. The reforms often, but not always, 
include competition between providers and occasionally privatisation of service and 
financing. The arguments surrounding these reforms, which I discuss as the ‘choice 
agenda’1, emphasise the expected efficiency and quality gains, but also the greater 
equitability (Le Grand 2007a), breaking with the traditionally assumed efficiency-
equity trade-off of welfare reform (Barr 2001; Schelkle et al. 2010). Also emphasised 
are findings from the psychology literature predicting individual well-being gains 
from choice in most situations (Botti 2004; Iyengar 2010). Economic theory not only 
                                                 
1
 The term choice agenda captures the explicit promotion of choice and competition policies on the 
part of both the EU and national governments of Western European countries and the extent to which 
choice is spread as a ‘buzz word’ in welfare reform. Putnam (2002) argues that the developments 
originated in the USA but is seen in all First World countries. This is “the cultural ideal of the 
autonomous, mobile individual” made responsible for choices in health care and education as a tool for 
seeking self-development (Jordan 2006:145). Governments restructure public services following this 
idea allowing choice between providers. The development includes also social democratic countries 
such as Sweden (Rothstein 2001).  
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promotes choice for its potential extrinsic benefits, including greater efficiency and 
better quality, but also for its intrinsic value – the value of choice – in and of itself 
(Dowding 1992; Iyengar and Lepper 1999).  
 
The choice agenda in (Western) European welfare states has been analysed from a 
range of perspectives. The economics literature is mainly concerned with modelling 
efficiency and quality improvements (Bevan et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2010; Cooper 
et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 2012) and equity effects measured as access and take-up of 
choice (Dixon and Le Grand 2006; Barr et al. 2008; Robertson and Burge 2011). The 
sociological and to some extent social policy literature, on the other hand, is mainly 
concerned with equity implications and how the relationship between citizens and the 
state changes when the individual is recast as a consumer of public services (Long 
1999; Clarke 2006; Jones and Needham 2008; Fotaki 2009). Finally, the political 
science literature on choice has discussed the drivers of choice reform, the 
implications for accountability and the changing role of politics in relation to the 
consumerist welfare state (Freeman 1998; Beerman 2000; Pierson 2001; Korpi and 
Palme 2003; Le Grand 2007b; Cooper and Le Grand 2008; Schelkle et al. 2010).  
 
Fusing approaches from economics, sociology and political science, this thesis 
investigates the welfare effects and equity implications of the choice agenda in 
European welfare states. The welfare effects and equity implications are explored 
empirically in the cases of health care and long-term care in a set of Western 
European countries
2
. The thesis framework draws on the subjective well-being (SWB) 
approach and in particular the concept of procedural utility (Frey and Stutzer 2004). 
                                                 
2
 Chapter 2 and 3 use individual country studies of England and Germany whereas chapter 4 
investigates England, Sweden and Ireland. Each of the papers is however set in relation to the broader 
development in European countries.  
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In doing so it incorporates the hypothesised dual benefits of choice: the instrumental 
and the procedural, the extrinsic and the intrinsic. This includes approaching choice as 
an institution governing the relation between the individual and the state and the 
individualisation (or privatisation) this signifies. The equity question is further 
approached from the demand side, questioning the existence of a middle class 
preference for choice.  
 
The aim of this introductory chapter is twofold: to set out the key assumptions, 
debates and methodological considerations within the literature as well as the 
overarching research question that guides the thesis and its three empirical chapters. I 
will first discuss the meanings and practical varieties of consumer choice and the 
particularities of consumer choice in European welfare states. The expected welfare 
effects and interfering aspects are then discussed, on a general level and from an 
equity perspective. The conceptual framework sets out an approach to measuring 
welfare which goes beyond traditional rational choice, incorporating a SWB approach 
motivated by the ideas of procedural utility. The emphasis here is on understanding 
choice as an institution which is likely to affect individual outcomes and generate 
procedural benefits. The overarching research question is then set out with a set of 
sub-questions explored in the respective chapters. Broad case selection and general 
methodological issues are discussed.  
  
1.2 Motivations and objectives  
This thesis is motivated by the role of choice in the changing character of 
contemporary European welfare states, particularly in light of current cost-
17 
 
containment pressures
3
 (Streeck and Thelen 2005). The introduction of choice and 
competition has brought about a change in the organisation, management and 
character of the welfare state. On the one hand this has been debated as an implicit 
move towards a privatisation of risk (Hacker 2005) and retrenchment of the welfare 
state; on the other it is something that “represents a change in the organising principle 
of state welfare” rather than a retreat from the welfare state (Higgs 1998:188). It is in 
Western Europe
4
 where the choice agenda represents a unique change within the 
system – a qualitative transformation of the institutional structure of welfare state 
design. It is within the universal welfare state that the choice agenda truly matters – 
where choice represents a break with the traditional ‘state orientation’ of the provision 
of welfare services and where responsibility has been firmly located in the public 
rather than the private sphere. The choice debate signifies a change in the distribution 
of responsibility – from the state to the citizen – as well as a change in who is 
accountable. Instead of keeping the politicians responsible, the individual, under the 
marketised welfare state, take consumerist action to claim his or her rights (Beerman 
2000; Burström 2009). 
 
The thesis is further motivated by the dominant approach of economics focusing on 
outcome effects in the analysis of welfare policy. Despite the acknowledged 
importance of the intrinsic value of choice (Dowding 1992; Iyengar and Lepper 1999; 
Ryan and Deci 2000; Dowding and John 2009), empirical studies in economics have 
focused on its extrinsic effects, particularly quality, efficiency and, when considering 
                                                 
3
 This is particularly relevant in the European Union (EU) where supra-national treaties constrain the 
economic room for manoeuvre of the member states, and accentuates the need for cost-containment of 
welfare services (Jacquot 2008). 
4
 A detailed discussion of the special role the choice agenda plays in Western Europe compared to 
other countries is elaborated in section 1.3.2 and 1.5.1 below. Western Europe is here taken to include 
European countries which did not belong to the East bloc during the cold war, including continental, 
southern and northern Europe. 
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equity analysis, access and take-up of choice. Finally, this thesis is motivated by the 
debate surrounding the equity implications of choice reforms (Barr et al. 2008; 
Cooper and Le Grand 2008; Dixon et al. 2003; 2006; Van de Ven and Van Vliet 
1992). The empirical analysis is focused on equity effects throughout – testing the 
argument that it is the well-endowed and capable middle class who benefits more 
from choice. The analysis also investigates whether the associated hypothesis that the 
middle class in fact demands choice, as found in the sociological literature on 
consumerism (Clarke 2004; Clarke 2006; Fotaki et al. 2008), can be identified 
empirically.  
 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to investigate the welfare effects of choice 
reforms and their equity implications in the cases of health care and long-term care
5
 in 
Western European welfare states. The process used to achieve this objective is 
illustrated in figure 1. The subjective well-being approach and conceptual overview 
provide the framework in chapter one. Welfare effects of choice and competition are 
explored in chapter two (health care) and three (long-term care), both of which 
include an analysis of equity implications. Chapter four extends the equity analysis to 
address the hypothesis of a middle class preference for choice, while attempting to 
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Common to all chapters is the 
inclusion of procedural utility next to the conventionally analysed outcome utility and 
the empirical investigation of equity implications. Chapter five synthesises the 
preceding chapters and elaborates the implications for policy and further research.    
 
 
                                                 
5
 The case selection of health care and long-term care is discussed in section 1.5. 
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Outcome and procedural utility 
                  Equity implications 
 
Figure 1 – Broad thesis outline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own 
 
1.3 The Consumer Choice Agenda  
This section discusses the concept of the choice agenda, its relevance in European 
welfare states, the current state of the literature on welfare effects of choice and the 
equity debate.  
1.3.1 Defining choice
6
   
Individual centred approaches to welfare provision have become an important part of 
the reform agenda in many Western European welfare states during the latter part of 
the 20th century (Streeck and Thelen 2005). This liberalisation of European welfare 
states can be understood as an umbrella concept for a range of marketisation 
                                                 
6
 This section draws on work previously published in Zigante et al. (2012).   
The consumer choice agenda  
The subjective well-being approach 
 (Chapter 1) 
 
Choice in long-term care 
(Chapter 3) 
Competition and 
choice in health care 
(Chapter 2) 
Preferences for 
choice and the link 
with privatisation 
(Chapter 4) 
Policy and further 
research  
(Chapter 5) 
Aspects of the choice agenda 
20 
 
processes, including choice for individual users, competition between providers and 
privatisation of service provision (and potentially financing). This choice agenda is 
particularly relevant in tax-funded universal welfare states such as egalitarian 
Scandinavia, certain Anglo-Saxon countries and the Mediterranean countries, where 
choice marks a qualitative break with how welfare services have traditionally been 
provided (Esping-Andersen 1990). This stands in contrast with Social Insurance (SI) 
welfare systems where choice is historically institutionalised, for example through 
patients’ direct access to specialists (Kreisz and Gericke 2010). In tax funded systems 
choice reform has been focused on expanding the opportunities for choice of provider 
whereas in SI systems choice reforms have concerned financing: insurance products 
have recently been subject to increasing choice and competition (Costa Font and 
Zigante 2013).  
 
The nature of choice in health and long-term care is complex insofar as it is dependent 
on the institutional structure and traditions of each specific system. Choice is offered 
at different levels and in various settings; I start here with the broad distinction 
between choice in the provision and the financing of health and LTC.
7
 The thesis is 
focused mainly on the choice of provider: hospital; general (or primary care) practice; 
care home; care provider; or other medical facilities. It is in a setting where choice 
between different providers is offered to patients and users that economic theory 
predicts efficiency and quality improvements (Barr 1993) which are however linked 
to a set of assumptions of perfect (or managed/quasi) competition (discussed 
separately below).  
 
                                                 
7
 This section follows Le Grand’s often cited discussion of the range of choices potentially available to 
users (2007). 
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A number of other choices linked to provision are offered. The choice of professional 
- i.e. doctor or informal carer – is constrained by the choice of provider and tends to 
be limited by geographical and managerial factors to a higher extent than choice of 
provider. Availability of informal carers is a key issue in LTC and an inherent 
constraint for LTC reform of both provision and financing. In addition there is the 
choice of service, which in health care often constitutes different forms of medical 
treatment. In LTC, choice of service includes various components of the care 
package, such as social activities, which are more often offered to the user or patient 
in line with a modern approach to care (see discussion in  Coulter 1999). The time of 
treatment can also be a choice, together with the access channel and method of 
communication with health services
8
 (Le Grand 2007a).  
 
Choice of financing – the question of ‘who pays’ – is in practice mainly an issue in 
countries with SI type welfare funding. This is generally in terms of choice between 
insurance funds, either exclusively public or a combination of private and public 
funds (Thomson et al. 2009). The extension of choice from exclusively provision to 
include choice of insurance fund constitutes a key reform trend in SI countries (Frank 
and Lamiraud 2008; Costa-Font and Zigante 2012). In tax funded systems, choice in 
financing generally involves the option of taking up substitutive or supplementary 
voluntary private health-, or less commonly, LTC insurance. Voluntary health 
insurance (VHI) in tax funded systems gives access to certain private institutions, 
often with a more specialised, more personal service that is often acquired as an 
employment benefit (Mossialos and Thomson 2002). VHI is argued to be a way for 
the wealthy to get access to a quality service and withdraw their support from the 
                                                 
8
 Traditionally taken place face-to-face, but is increasingly being carried out over the phone or through 
the internet which is hailed as a way for increasing user engagement.  
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public system, leading to support weakening and the system eroding over time (Costa-
Font and Jofre-Bonet 2008). It has further been argued that the choice agenda may 
lead to an increase in the use of VHI and other varieties of private financing 
(Blomqvist 2004). Long-term care insurance (LTCI) in tax funded systems is 
envisioned to play a more prominent role in the future due to the demographic 
challenge coupled with cost-containment pressures (Pickard et al. 2007).  
1.3.2 The European choice agenda 
The rise of consumer choice in the global economy and its spill-over into the 
provision of welfare is a process discernible in many countries all over the world. I 
argue, however, that the process is particularly pronounced and particularly important 
to consider in the setting of advanced European welfare states which are denoted by 
stable institutions, are relatively well-funded and benefit from well-established 
democratic governance. A certain role can also be attributed to the European Union’s 
spreading of policy across borders.   
 
A liberalised approach to welfare services is not uncommon in developing countries 
where at times the only available services are privately provided. The default provider 
is often the family, community or international donor organisations, where 
responsibility rests with the individuals involved (Zwi et al. 2001). Similarly in the 
US, although highly formalised, responsibility for ensuring that measures are in place 
in case of ill health also rest with the individual (Vogel 2002). These approaches 
mean that a large amount of choice is the ‘default’, and so complemented by the 
absence of a paternalistic state with an historical monopoly on decision making. The 
choice agenda in mature European welfare states on the other hand has brought about 
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a clear shift in responsibility for decision making from the state to the individual and a 
real change in the accountability of the political and the role of citizens. Also the 
countries of Eastern Europe, following transition, have increasingly implemented 
choice policies, for example in education and health care (Kornai and Eggleston 
2001). The recent societal change linked to the transition process has influenced the 
view of the role of the citizen in the new market economy which has in turn been 
found to affect individual well-being (Zigante 2008). The choice agenda of Eastern 
Europe can be seen as a result of policy transfer from West to East, channelled 
through the EU (Lendvai 2008).  
 
The European Union plays a considerable role in the expansion of consumer choice in 
public services, even though welfare policy is not part of the legislative powers of the 
union. The impact of the EU on choice as a part of public service provision is often 
attributed to the horizontal Europeanisation of social policy rather than any outright 
regulation (Jacquot 2008).
9
 Europeanisation is generally defined as the impact of the 
EU on domestic politics and policies through processes of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, ‘ways of doing things’. Radelli 
argues that it should be thought of as an ‘interactive process’, where shared beliefs 
and norms are first defined and consolidated in EU processes and then incorporated 
into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies 
(2003). One of the EU discourses is the focus on the individual. This is reflected in 
the welfare states and welfare services, which are increasingly denoted by choice 
                                                 
9
 Vertical Europeanization on the other hand is denoted by impact from regulatory constraints which as 
discussed below are weak for social policy. Social policy is one of the least developed areas of EU 
integration, negotiated through the Open Method of Coordination, which does not imply binding 
agreements between the member states. The OMC identifies common goals, established indicators and 
benchmarks for assessing progress towards the goals, translates common objectives to national and 
regional policies taking into account national and regional differences, and engages in monitoring, 
evaluation and peer review (European Council 2000). 
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policies of various dimensions; financing, provision and content (European Union 
2006; Greer 2008).  
Increase the ability of citizens to take better decisions about their health and consumer 
interests. This means increasing the opportunities they have to exercise real choice and 
also equipping them with the knowledge they need 
    (EU Health and Consumer Protection Strategy and Programme) 
 
Under such approaches, which are closely aligned with the development and policies 
of the EU, increased emphasis is given to individuals’ autonomy, to free choice, to 
competition in provision and financing and also to the role of private actors (European 
Union 2006).
10
 The EU’s goals within the single market, particularly cross-border 
mobility, have enhanced consumer choice significantly in the member states (Schelkle et 
al. 2010). This is mainly exemplified through the advancement of cross-border mobility 
in health care, education and employment. Particularly in the field of health care, 
Martinsen and Vrangbæk (2008) argue that the EU has had a significant impact. 
Recent reforms constitute the formation of a new institutional legacy representing an 
Europeanised health care model – with a new set of stakeholders, principles and 
structures. Markets, principles of free movement, patient choice and patient rights are 
becoming institutionalised and safeguarded by the EU (Schelkle et al. 2010).  
 
The development of choice policies in public services also coincides with the 
‘modernisation’ agenda of  the EU (Dawson et al. 2004:16), which is argued to be 
driven by the changing social and economic reality of its member states (Burge et al. 
2004). A European social model is emerging which is characterised by softer values 
and the emphasis on individual choice and autonomy in relation to welfare services 
(Radaelli 2003; Kvist and Saari 2007; Greer 2008). Leibfried and Pierson argue that 
                                                 
10
 See for example Communication from the Commission - A renewed commitment to social Europe: 
Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 
COM/2008/0418 final 
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European integration has eroded “both the sovereignty and autonomy of member 
states in the realm of social policy” and that there is a system of shared authority over 
social policy which constrains member states (2007: 43-44). 
1.3.3 Welfare effects of choice – key considerations11 
The welfare effects of choice depend on a range of factors linked to 
institutionalisation, implementation and individual capacity and capability to fully 
benefit from access to choice. Various literatures emphasise the challenges attached to 
valuing different choice situations, such as whether a higher number of similar 
options are better than fewer, more diverse options (Botti and Iyengar 2004; 2006). 
Following this Dowding and John argue that it is highly dependent on the choice 
situation whether choice is seen as an improvement – and advocate caution in the 
expansion of choice in public services (2009). Building on these insights, this thesis 
frames the discussion around three key considerations which influence the relation 
between choice in the provision of health and LTC and individual welfare: the 
character of the choice situation, the level of competition and the role of privatisation.  
 
The choice situation and individual constraints  
All other things being equal, the traditional welfarist argument holds that individuals 
are more likely to maximise their welfare and get an optimal consumption bundle if 
they are allowed to select the items and services they consume (Krugman and Wells 
2006). According to Dworkin, choice “increases the probability that they [individuals] 
will satisfy their desires. People want various things – goods and services, status, 
affection, power, health, security – and their chances of getting these things are often 
                                                 
11
 This section draws on Zigante et al. (2012).  
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enhanced if they have more options to choose among.” (1988:78). These arguments 
reflect the expected instrumental value of choice and builds on assumptions of the 
individual’s capacity to maximise welfare from available choices.  
 
The character of the choice situation matters for the anticipated welfare effects. Both 
factors internal and external to the individual (i.e. we can separate cognitive ability 
and emotion from information availability and transaction costs) are argued to 
influence the benefits of choice. While Schwartz (2004) accepts the welfarist 
argument that more choice is likely to satisfy individual preferences, he argues that 
too much choice, particularly where the choice is of great importance, may have the 
opposite effect on individual welfare. Too much choice can cause stress and feelings 
of regret, increased transaction costs and unnecessary time spent collecting 
information perceived to be necessary for choosing. Clinical experiments show that it 
is only under certain conditions that choice actually improves how people feel about 
themselves. The benefits are generally found to depend on the relative weight of the 
choice, emotional stress and importance of the choice, i.e. the risk of regret (Botti and 
Iyengar 2006).  
 
A central external constraint is information availability, where welfare services often 
are denoted by imperfect and asymmetric information which makes the choice 
situation more demanding for the individual (Simon 1955; Barr 2001: 52-53). For 
example, a choice of treatment in health care constitutes a much more knowledge 
intensive deliberation than choice of social care provision for an elderly individual. 
The extent to which the choice is challenging depends at least partly on technological 
intensity and severity of need. For example; choosing a general practitioner (GP) is 
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likely to be less knowledge intensive than choosing a hospital for surgery. The 
capacity of the professional providing the service and the quality of that particular 
service, are more easily assessed when choosing a GP compared to a surgeon. A GP 
can also be replaced more easily. The severity of need is correlated with the 
knowledge intensity of treatment which further complicates the choice. This leads us 
to a further crucial characteristic of choice; whether it is made repeatedly or on one 
unique occasion and whether the person making the choice has family or friends who 
have experience of a similar choice. In health care, for example, patients rarely have 
the same operation twice, unless the patient suffers from a chronic condition. This 
prevents drawing on previous knowledge when choosing a hospital or a surgeon for 
the procedure (Schwartz 2004). As follows, GPs, family members, professional 
advisors and a range of other actors play a mediating role in the decision making. This 
is a limitation for the research of this thesis; the data has not allowed for 
systematically incorporating the specific character of the choice situation and the role 
of agents involved in the choice as experienced by each individual. In what follows 
the choice situation is discussed on a structural (system or case wide) level rather than 
an individual specific level.  
 
Competition – outcome effects   
A higher rate of competition is hypothesised to lead to improved outcomes in the 
provision of public services. Outcome effects on an aggregate level include efficiency 
of delivery, cost containment and improved health status of the population. Incentives 
fuelled by competition between providers and the ability of clients, customers or 
patients to ‘vote with their feet’ and choose the best provider, leads to improved 
efficiency and quality (Barr 1993). The envisioned end-result is a service of higher 
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quality, more efficient provided. It is however clear that the calibration of the 
choice/competition policy mix is highly sensitive and policies have not always 
generated the desired results (Propper et al. 2006) and also when studies show robust 
results of improved service (Cooper et al. 2011) debates run high.
12
  
 
As alluded to above, the link between choice and competition is not entirely 
straightforward. Not all choice policies imply increased competition between 
providers and it is conceivable, yet unusual, to offer choice between public providers 
without any financial incentives for the providers to compete. Mounting research 
indicates that rarely are public services perfect markets and the result is in most cases 
are various quasi-market
13
 solutions (Forder et al. 1996). An example is the English 
NHS’s internal market in the early 1990s which relied on a quasi-market structure. It 
was found to have improved visible outputs such as length of waiting times, while 
unmeasured quality (AMI mortality) fell in more competitive areas (Propper and 
Burgess 2008). It has been found that the benefits of competition are highly dependent 
on the payment structure and regulations for market entry and exit. It is argued that 
payment systems where money follows individuals’ choices are most conducive for 
efficiency improvements. One example often cited is payments based on diagnosis 
related groups (DRG)
14
 – also known as ‘benchmark’ competition – where providers 
are incentivised to provide a certain treatment cost-efficiently in relation to a fixed 
price and where any additional treatment time or cost is borne by the provider (Street 
and Maynard 2007).  
                                                 
12
 A string of blog posts on the British Politics and Policy at LSE blog debated the Cooper et al. paper 
in March 2012. See for example Pollock et al. (2012).  
13
 See Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) for a discussion of quasi-market structures. Simply put quasi-
markets involve a purchaser-provider split, for example in the NHS fund holders purchased care from 
NHS trusts and District Health Authorities competing for custom.  
14
 DRG payment means that hospitals are paid a fixed amount based on the patient’s diagnosis, not on 
their actual cost of treatment. 
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The role of privatisation 
Choice policies, albeit normally coupled with incentives for competition, are however 
not usually implemented alongside, or followed by, privatisation of the provision of 
public services. When considered as an institution, however, choice can be argued to 
represent a privatisation process, shifting responsibility from the state to the 
individual. The interpretation of choice as an institution is fundamental for the welfare 
analysis of choice through SWB in this thesis and hence the role of privatisation needs 
to be further explored.  
 
Privatisation is commonly understood as the transfer of ownership, of property or 
business, from the state to a privately owned entity. Privatisation is expected to 
generate increased efficiency following the profit oriented management style of 
private business. Private provision of welfare services is commonplace even in the 
most ‘state-oriented’ systems, for example in Sweden (Blomqvist 2004; Anell 2011) 
as well as in the financing of services in many European countries (as exemplified by 
the increased role for out-of-pocket payments (OPP) and supplementary VHI) (Wendt 
2009). The benefits of choice and competition are not, however, dependent on 
privatised provision, and function equally well through inserting market based 
incentives among public providers. Choice policies and privatisation (of provision) 
policies however tend to be grouped together in debates in mainstream media and 
politics alike. It is even argued that increasing choice is likely to be an inherent part 
of, and even lead to, increased privatisation of provision as well as financing 
(Blomqvist 2004). This is not necessarily the case, but if we consider consumer 
choice as an institution that influences the relationship between individuals and the 
state, then a particular type of privatisation can be said to be taking place. 
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A stream of literature at the cross-roads of sociology and politics highlights the rise of 
the ‘consumer citizen’ and a privatised and marketised relation with public services. 
Newman and Kuhlman identify a pan-European discourse built around the 
‘discriminating consumers’ and ‘accountable professionals’ which, they argue, is 
dominating health reform in present time (2008). This discourse identifies a shift 
consisting of a normalisation of the ‘consumer citizen’, where governments pursuing 
a reduction of the state, rely on individuals to be self-governing social agents who 
take on much of the work and risk of decision-making. This implies a move away 
from political accountability to a society of consumerist action (Burström 2009) 
where a key question is argued to be how to secure accountability and quality control 
in a quasi-market setting (Newman and Kuhlmann 2007). Based on the shift in the 
conceptualisation of the citizen as a user of public services Clarke (2004) interprets 
privatisation as the transfer of responsibility from the state to any type of non-state 
actor, be it private market based entities or private individuals. Clarke writes about the 
“double sense of the ‘private’ (as the market and the domestic) […] ‘the two 
privatisations’ in the process of neo-liberal remakings of the public realm” (2004:32). 
Similarly, privatisation can be understood both as a bi-product of choice and 
marketisation, and as an overriding process in its own right (Hacker 2005).    
 
For the analysis of (procedural in particular) welfare effects of choice the 
conceptualisation of privatisation, as a shift between spheres, made by Clarke is 
paramount
15
. Regardless of financing structure – yet particularly relevant in the 
                                                 
15
 The idea of increased focus on individual choice has been discussed as ‘individualisation’, 
particularly in relation to the policies of ‘New Labour’ in England (see for example Borghi and Van 
Berkel 2007). The concept of ‘individualisation’, and similarly ‘personalisation’, are ambiguous in the 
way they are used in various literatures. A common thread however is the focus on practical care 
arrangements, for example the individual managing care or welfare payments such as ‘cash for care’ in 
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universal tax funded welfare states – choice implies a shift in the responsibility for use 
of service towards the individual, altering the character of the relationship with the 
state or provider. This changing environment is likely to affect the benefits that are 
reaped from interaction with public services – positively if we assume empowerment 
gained and negatively if the individualisation breeds feelings of insecurity and loss of 
connectedness. Systematic differences in how these aspects of choice affect 
individuals in different socio-economic groups are likely to give rise to equity 
implications. This is discussed next. 
1.3.4 Equity implications 
The debate on the equity effects
16
 of the choice agenda stem from a well-established 
awareness of inequality in health outcomes and a tendency for the well-off to receive 
a better health service. Hernández-Quevedo et al. (2006) find that for all European 
Union Member States, long-run indices of income-related inequalities in health are 
considerable, and the gaps are in fact widening over time. Equity considerations stem 
from a fundamental tension in publicly funded health care systems; health care 
provision is often denoted by excess demand, requiring rationing by indicators other 
than price, often through waiting times resulting in unequal access (Ubel 2001). It is 
therefore commonly argued that publicly financed health systems, which aim to be 
comprehensive, suffer from an intrinsic conflict between equity and high quality 
(Weale 1998).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
LTC. The concept is more about the individuals’ practical experience than it is the institution 
governing the interrelation between individual and service. 
16
 The concept of equity is one of the core debates of philosophy and economics, relating to concepts 
such as equality, justice, fairness and the associated normative and practical considerations (Rawls 
1972). I will not attempt to cover this great literature at any depth – this section rather lays the ground 
work for the practical approach to measuring equity implications in the empirical exploration.    
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From a theoretical perspective, there is considerable disagreement in the health 
economics literature on what definition of equity, or what principles, should guide 
equity assessments in relation to health care. Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) mention 
equality of utilization, distribution according to need, equality of access, and equality 
of health as possible definitions, derived from a larger pool of principles discussed by 
Le Grand (1982) and Mooney (1983). Braveman and Gruskin argue in favour of a 
measure of health equity that has a clear operationalization (2003). They define equity 
as “the absence of systematic disparities in health” (2003: 254). Various definitions 
tend to be incompatible, and there is disagreement on what should be the governing 
principle. For LTC the equity debate is less emphasised, but can be conceptualised in 
similar ways as for health care. This thesis does not aim to contribute to the 
conceptualisation of equity in health. The empirical approach applied in both cases is 
similar to the ‘equality of health’ principle, but operationalized as equity (or rather 
interpreted as ‘not inequity’) of the change in outcomes (SWB) following reform. An 
equitable effect of choice reform would be one where lower socio-economic groups 
benefit equally, or more, from the reform, compared to higher socio-economic groups. 
The thesis hence does not consider absolute disparities in health outcomes (which are 
strongly correlated to SWB).   
 
It is in light of the deeply ingrained health inequalities that choice has been argued to 
represent an improvement in equity. Choice is said to allow users and patients to 
influence the care situation irrespective of their ability to negotiate with providers, 
voice their displeasure with care, or somehow manage to ‘game’ the health care 
system (Department of Health 2003; Barr et al. 2008). Creating formalised choice 
mechanisms, it is argued, will give every patient the opportunity to choose 
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irrespective of their socioeconomic status (Cooper and Le Grand 2008). Le Grand in 
fact, argues that choice by default tends to produce situations which are inherently 
equitable (1991). This is referred to throughout as the ‘equity argument’ for choice. 
 
On the other hand, choice is thought to harm equity in two ways: first, by 
exacerbating inequalities which stem from differences in users capacity to choose; 
and second, through the providers’ reaction to systematic incentives. Users capacity to 
choose stems from technical or practical barriers; ‘voice’ problems such as 
communication difficulties, language, literacy, assertiveness, articulation, self-
confidence and ability to deal with professionals, cultural and health beliefs and 
behaviour, transport difficulties and travel distance, as well as the time and financial 
costs of travel, family or work commitments (Dixon et al. 2003; 2006). As discussed 
above, the knowledge intensity of the choice situation varies considerably between 
policy areas and types of choices (provider, service, treatment).  
 
Competition and private provision may on its own lead to growing inequalities. 
Providers are argued to be incentivised to ‘cream-skim’ – i.e. to avoid treating 
individuals with more severe health problems, overrepresented in the lower 
socioeconomic groups (Van de Ven and Van Vliet 1992). ‘Cream-skimming’ is more 
likely if providers are paid per episode of care that they deliver and are therefore 
incentivised to select patients who are cheaper to treat. As well-off patients are 
generally healthier, the system may lead providers to avoid the treatment of patients 
from lower socioeconomic groups (Matsaganis and Glennerster 1994). Cream-
skimming causes inefficiencies in the health care system and may lead to inequalities 
stemming from differences in quality of treatment.  
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The equity debate surrounding the choice agenda are often framed around the 
advantages of individuals who are relatively well-off. This thesis refers to this group, 
loosely conceived, as the ‘middle class’17. This is firstly due to its practical appeal. 
The middle class group incorporates individuals with medium income and tertiary 
education or above (operationalised in the respective chapters). This group is thought 
to benefit more from choice reforms due to higher disposable income and the 
knowledge processing skills associated with higher education. Individuals from this 
group rely predominantly on the public system but find ways to use it to their 
advantage. Their income allows them to travel and fund accommodation away from 
home and is often correlated with more flexible work arrangements. Higher education 
tends to enable the individual to better communicate and process information, to gain 
useful connections and possibly also be more used to the bureaucratic procedures of 
public services allows for a quicker and higher rate of access to public health care. 
The group is finally more likely to exit the public system if quality becomes an issue 
(Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2008).  
 
Secondly, the middle class resembles the group which Blomqvist refers to as the 
‘well-off’, and is placed at the centre of her argument about the self-perpetuating 
nature of the choice agenda (2004:152). We are also likely to see even more 
diversified and tailor-made social services if “the logic of stratification (that social 
groups seek to define themselves by separation from others and continuously invent 
new ways of doing so) is likely to create ever-increasing demands for more exclusive 
                                                 
17
 How class is defined is a debate of its own, but class class classifications are often based on income, 
education and the occupation of the household head. Korpi and Palme see class as defined through 
‘membership groups with which individuals identify and the specific subcultures and norms of such 
groups’. This differs somewhat from the definition of class as categories of individuals who share 
relatively similar positions or situations, for example in employment relations (Goldthorpe 2000). 
Definitions are not stable across countries as Banerjee and Duflo discusses (2008) and I return to this 
conceptual and technical issue in chapter 4. 
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and culturally ‘distinct’ service alternatives.” (Blomqvist 2004: 152). The view of 
Blomqvist, that the well-off benefits disproportionately as well as demands further 
choice in public services, is well supported in various literatures and connects with the 
literature on consumerism (Newman and Kuhlmann 2007) where it is argued that the 
‘well-off’ demand a culturally specific service for which choice in public services is a 
convenient fit. Several authors have attempted to make sense of this dynamic, its 
normative appeals and deduce what effect it might have on the role and goals of the 
welfare state (Clarke 2006; Jones and Needham 2008; Fotaki 2009). 
 
Finally, framing the analysis around a broad concept of the middle class has a further 
appeal in that it is placed at the centre of welfare reform in general (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Hibbard et al. 2005; Donnelly 2010) and choice and privatisation reform in 
particular. The middle class is said to benefit substantially from universally provided 
services and benefits – at times even more so than other social groups – due to its 
ability to ‘play’ the system (Goodin and Le Grand 1987). Korpi and Palme (2003) 
have sought to revive the role of class when explaining the welfare state in response to 
Pierson’s seminal new politics of the welfare state (Pierson 2001).  
 
1.4 Conceptual framework  
The approach taken by this thesis is based on the conception of choice as an 
institution affecting the relation and allocation of responsibility between the (welfare) 
state and the individual. It is also based on the view of individual welfare as 
influenced by processes and intangible aspects of life, as well as instrumental 
outcomes.  
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1.4.1 Rational choice and beyond 
The conception of utility and individual and societal welfare has evolved greatly 
throughout the history of economic thought. Individual welfare was understood by the 
early scholars of classical political economy as satisfaction or happiness, a cardinal, 
fully interpersonally comparable measure that could be aggregated to a societal level 
of welfare (Bentham 1789; Mill 1863). Individual welfare was later viewed 
exclusively as utility, assumed to be directly observable through revealed preferences, 
i.e. the consumption choices of the individual (Samuelson 1982). Individuals were 
assumed to be self-interested, rational
18
 choosers who maximise utility, based on 
perfect information, subject to the economic constraints they are faced with. This is a 
key starting point in the political economy literature and follows the position in 
rational choice theory that, all else being equal, more choice is better (Caporaso and 
Levine 1992). If we assume individuals to be rational utility maximising actors, they 
will, provided certain assumptions are met, benefit from having a choice as well as a 
greater number of non-redundant options.  
 
Choice in public services is however subject to unique characteristics and this thesis 
argues in favour of a framework that extends beyond the neoclassical rational choice 
approach. The benefits of choice and competition rely on standard economic 
assumptions being fulfilled and as it stands, the marketised provision of public 
services suffers from market failures (Arrow 1963). Providers often compete on 
quality rather than price – as in tax funded systems prices are generally not seen by 
the user. However, like in quasi-markets, competition based on quality is potentially 
constrained by a lack of transparency of actual quality. Users are often unaware of, or 
                                                 
18
 Technically, rational preferences are assumed to be complete (all can be ranked), transitive (if option 
a is preferred to b, and b is preferred to c, then a is preferred to c) and based on perfect information.  
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claim not to understand or be able to access, quality information (Marshall et al. 
2000). Provider ratings and other indicators are becoming increasingly available; 
however, they are still argued to be insufficient due to a low rate of repetition and a 
high variation in the types of conditions being treated (Hibbard et al. 2005).  
 
Information availability and processing poses a key issue for welfare effects of choice 
(Simon 1955). Information on illness, the technological treatment tools available and 
the knowledge, specialty and skills of medical staff at various providers is not readily 
available to the individual and may be unreliable. In relation to information 
processing, issues are raised over the individuals’ mental capacity to cope with a large 
number of technically complex choices (Denzau and North 1994). Behavioural 
economics contributes to the debate here, approaching utility and human behaviour in 
a setting of bounded rationality due to imperfect information, time and cognitive 
limitations (Thaler 1991). When making decisions under sub-optimal conditions 
individuals are thought to apply ‘short-cuts’ (heuristics) in decision making; they 
simplify the choices in order to apply rational rules for decision making and approach 
the choices with the purpose of ‘satisficing‘ rather than ‘optimising‘ (Schwartz et al. 
2002).
19
 Acknowledging these considerations, the libertarian paternalistic literature 
argues that due to the behavioural difficulties connected with choice, the role of the 
state is always important. However, this does not exclude possible benefits from 
choice, and it can be helpful for the state to define a default option to make the choice 
easier and minimise transaction costs for ‘choice averse’ individuals (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2003). 
                                                 
19
 We can further question what motivates individuals in decision making. Margolis (2007) argues that 
individuals are not only governed by self-interest, as conventionally assumed in the rational choice 
literature, arguing that there are other values that determine behaviour, which should be incorporated 
into economic models. 
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The neo-classical conception of utility lacks a key component that is inherent to the 
benefits of choice: intrinsic value. It has been argued that choice on its own has 
idealistic connotations stemming from liberal ideology, cultural values and an 
intrinsic value of its own (Feldman and Zaller 1992). This would imply that choice is 
valued above and beyond instrumental welfare gains and that by allowing or 
increasing choice, patients’ preferences for health care are more likely to be satisfied 
and individual autonomy and control enhanced (Dowding and John 2009). Arguments 
in favour of the intrinsic value of choice often stem from a view which emphasises the 
broader benefits of individual autonomy. While choice and autonomy are not 
analogous, choice is seen as a necessary condition for autonomy because it is through 
choosing ones’ own course (and hence having choices) that an individual expresses 
his or her autonomy, and because the process of choosing well and effectively 
expressing ones’ autonomy is a learned skill which is acquired only through making 
various choices throughout ones’ life (Dworkin 1988).  
1.4.2 A subjective well-being approach 
The choice of dependent variable is motivated by the general value of SWB as a 
measure which complements conventional welfare analyses such as cost-benefit 
analysis (Mishan 2007), income equivalent estimates (Fleurbaey et al. 2012) and 
contingent valuation methods (Portney 1994) based on restrictive assumptions linked 
to underlying conceptions of what amounts to individual welfare (Slesnick 1998). 
 
The SWB approach responds to critique of the neo-classical welfare concept for its 
exclusive outcome focus. One early critique of the traditional welfare concept came 
from Sen, who argued that a narrow understanding of welfare limited policy analysis 
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and that procedural effects should be taken into account (1982). This question of the 
role of the procedure for individual welfare speaks to the basic character of welfare 
economics. Sen criticised the consequentialist welfarism applied in standard welfare 
economics for its reliance on the premise that actions, policies and rules should only 
be evaluated in terms of their consequences (1987). Behaviour consistent with the 
consequentialist approach is argued to maximise expected utility, which is one of the 
core behavioural assumptions of modern economics (Hammond 1988). Applying 
consequentialism to economics in this way contributes to the narrow outlook on 
individual behaviour typical in welfare economics (Suzumura 2000) and stands in 
contrast with the proceduralist approach. The procedural approach can be compared to 
what is known as procedural fairness in the terminology of Rawls (1972). For Rawls 
the focus was on the fairness of the procedure and the equality of means and power 
over the outcome of core values. The approach does not evaluate the outcome against 
any standard such as understandings of justice or morality; rather, so long as the 
procedure is fair, the outcome can be anything (Peter 2008). 
 
Welfare economic analysis tends to be focused on weighing costs and benefits, 
understood as consumer and producer surplus relying on indicators of willingness to 
pay or the individual’s revealed preferences though consumption choices. However, 
as Portney (1994) points out, an important problem with this approach is that 
individuals’ willingness to pay for public service rarely reflects the actual cost. This is 
particularly problematic when analysing the welfare effects of institutional processes, 
to which the conventional approach of welfare economics is not well suited. In 
valuing intangibles such as how the health care system is organised and how the 
procedure of receiving care is carried out, revealed preferences are not reliable 
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estimates of the actual value of the service (Costa-Font and Rovira 2005). Through 
SWB the welfare effects of intangibles can be valued directly and SWB can be seen 
as a measure of the consumer surplus. 
 
The subjective well-being approach is favoured by certain scholars as well as 
governments for its ability to capture certain aspects of individual utility and the 
individuals’ living situation beyond that of conventional utility measures. SWB is 
increasingly endorsed on grounds of being an intrinsic value – Layard argues that we 
should focus on happiness as it is the end goal of all human existence (2005). The 
increased focus on ‘non-material’ outcomes has gained momentum in recent years – 
possibly influenced by the financial crisis and the resulting austerity measures in 
many countries. Instead of directly or indirectly measuring revealed preferences, the 
focus is shifted to how individuals feel about their living situation. The happiness 
literature developed following Easterlin’s seminal paper (Easterlin 1974)20, which 
found that income and happiness do not correspond to the extent we would expect 
from conventional utility theory. The inclusion of happiness, life satisfaction and 
other types of subjective well-being (SWB) measures in welfare analysis (Layard 
1980; Layard 2006) in a range of literatures has blossomed in later years.
21
 The 
broadening of the welfare concept was first proposed by Sen in the ‘capabilities 
approach‘ and later in formal indexes such as ‘the human development 
index‘ incorporating life expectancy and education (Sen 1993). Sen’s key contribution 
was to incorporate objective indicators other than income in order to provide a more 
                                                 
20
 Stevenson (2008) and Veenhoven and Hagerty (2006) among others have attempted to explain and 
refute Easterlin’s empirical anomaly as a result of data structure rather than a consistent economic 
relationship. The Easterlin paradox however still remains highly cited as one of the founding references 
of the happiness literature.  
21
 See for example Lane (1988), Oswald (1997), Easterlin (2001), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), 
Veenhoven and Hagerty (2006) and  Diener et al.( 2008).  
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inclusive measure of human welfare. This more multidimensional approach to 
measuring human welfare is also evident in the focus on quality of life, particularly 
Allardt’s ‘Having, Loving and Being’ approach (Allardt 1993).  
 
When measuring individual welfare there are several varieties of subjective indicators 
with various levels of specification. SWB is conceptualised as an umbrella concept 
including measures for happiness, life satisfaction and concepts of domain satisfaction 
such as health, accommodation or financial satisfaction. Ratings of happiness are 
distinctive from life satisfaction and the measures only partly correlate – happiness is 
an affective or emotional measure whereas life satisfaction is more of a cognitively 
driven evaluation of the individual’s global life situation (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2002). 
SWB is commonly measured in surveys by simple questions such as ‘How happy are 
you’ or ‘How satisfied are you with your present life’, often measured on a Likert 
scale (Likert 1932). Subjective indicators are by now well-established and the 
‘happiness literature’ has gone so far as to start identifying genes which explain part 
of an individuals’ rating (De Neve 2011). Subjective measures of welfare are 
increasingly seen as a useful alternative to the conventional welfare economics 
approach. 
 
Subjective well-being is measured by letting the individual describe his or her own 
well-being. In doing so it is assumed that the individual is capable of assessing his or 
her own situation in relation to the questions posed and that the answers are 
interpersonally comparable. This requires different individuals to perceive the scale of 
the question in the same way and hence the only thing determining a difference in 
position on the scale is their actual subjective welfare (Ferrier-i-Carbonell 2002). 
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There are many aspects inherent to the measure itself that may bias the SWB-rating. 
The form of the question, the unit of measurement, the timing and overall context of 
the interview and the interaction with the interviewer can all affect the outcome. It is 
worth noting that several variables affecting SWB are hard to observe; for example, 
there is clear evidence that individual assessments of SWB are affected by temporary 
changes in mood, such as after getting married or a win of the national football team. 
These are particularly hard to control for as they also interact with more long-term 
personality traits. Finally, the impact of culture (Diener and Eunkook 2000; Dorn 
2006) and language on SWB is hard to account for, which means that in cross-country 
comparisons these aspects may bias the outcome, although to what extent is currently 
unknown. 
 
The literature has found a range of factors and processes interfering with the 
determinants of SWB and the change over time. Adaptation, or the hedonic treadmill 
as it has also been called, implies that individual subjective well-being is only raised 
temporarily through an increase in a variable positive for SWB such as income. After 
a period the individual gets used to the new level of income (for example) and SWB 
returns to the original level (Burchardt 2005). As mentioned above, SWB is likely to 
be affected by personality traits which are more or less observable and constant over 
time. Moreover, SWB is also affected by relative variables, such as relative income or 
relative status, in terms of a personal reference group. The diminishing marginal 
benefit of income and the imperfect correlation with SWB draws attention to the 
question of relative income instead of absolute income as a determinant of SWB. 
Relative income is important, not just in terms of relative income against neighbours, 
region and country, but also over time. Ferrier-i-Carbonell (2002) found a much 
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higher correlation between the grading of the individuals financial situation in relation 
to others and SWB than between absolute income and SWB. The relative income of 
the reference group that the individual feels he or she belongs to provides a mental 
image of what standard the individual feels entitled to. Economic mobility is 
important in the sense that a perception of equal economic opportunity and the 
possibility of reaching the same level as the reference group generate a higher 
subjective well-being.  
 
The relation of income and SWB also depends on time. If the individual expects 
rising incomes they will tend to value their present situation in a better way. Similarly, 
if the individual is expecting an insufficient pension, today’s SWB level will be 
lower. Individuals are thought to adapt to a – positive or negative – shock after which 
SWB ratings tend to revert to the pre-shock level. This is referred to as the ‘set-point’ 
level of SWB (Clark 2008) which is partly determined by personality and even 
genetics (De Neve 2011). The set-point level of SWB suggests that it is soon after an 
‘event’ that identification of a change in SWB is most likely to be observed. The set-
point theory applied to aggregate level ‘events’ such as a policy change implies that as 
individuals become accustomed to the new environment any initial benefit may 
recede.  
 
Subjective indicators of welfare have been used to evaluate institutional structures or 
policies only in a minor number of studies. The results are relevant to the extent that 
they illustrate various effects of more ‘extensive‘ institutions compared to the choice 
policies here analysed. Veenhoven, for example, found no positive effect on SWB of 
aggregate level of welfare spending (2000), neither in terms of level of SWB nor of 
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distribution or equity of SWB. Ouweneel confirmed Veenhoven’s results (2002) by 
also using social spending as an indicator of size of welfare state. On the other hand, 
Radcliff (2001), in a far more elaborate study which focused on the political 
typologies of welfare states as constructed by Esping-Andersen (1990), found that a 
more expansive welfare state is better for SWB further confirmed by Radcliff (2005). 
The studies finding positive results incorporated more institutional factors – which 
suggest that institutions matter for SWB, at least in the aggregate setting. Finally, 
Bjornskov et al. have found positive effects of formal institutions in a large cross-
section of countries (2008). The studies indicate that there is room for a SWB effect 
of welfare reform and that system wide change can significantly influence individual 
SWB. 
1.4.3 Procedural utility 
The concept of procedural utility connects the happiness literature (Easterlin 1974; 
Oswald 1997; Layard 2006; Stevenson 2008) within economics with the 
psychological literature on procedural justice (Tyler et al. 1997). Common to both 
literatures is the use of self-rated subjective indicators of welfare and the view of 
these measures as an opportunity to better understand the welfare effects of 
procedures and how they relate to welfare effects from outcomes. Frey et al. (2004) 
suggest that procedural utility differs from ‘conventional’ outcome utility due to its 
hedonic nature as ‘utility is understood as well-being, pleasure and pain, positive and 
negative affect or life satisfaction’ (2004: 379). According to Benz, procedural utility 
can be defined as “the well-being people gain from living and acting under 
institutionalized processes as they contribute to a positive sense of self, addressing 
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innate needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness.” (Benz 2005: 7). Dolan et al. 
similarly argue:  
Where procedures generate no intrinsic value, but can be expressed solely in terms of 
their impact on outcomes, they have no direct importance for assessments of social 
welfare. In other situations, where procedures are valued either for their impact on non-
consequential factors or are viewed as inherently valuable in themselves, then social 
welfare cannot be assessed without reference to procedure. Currently, there exists little 
evidence in this regard. (2007: 161) 
The idea that the individual gains well-being from procedures is well established in 
psychological research (Tyler et al. 1997) and has been applied to situations such as 
market transactions, juridical procedures and bargaining.  
 
Procedural utility is said to stem from three broad categories (Frey 2004); from 
‘institutionalised processes’, from interpersonal relations and non-interpersonal 
actions that have intrinsic value for the individual. Firstly, procedural utility is derived 
from institutions, as people have preferences about how allocative and redistributive 
decisions are taken. People may appreciate the market for the freedom of individual 
choice while democracy is appreciated for the equality it provides in political 
decision-making. Utility is gained from living and acting under particular institutions 
over and above outcomes. Secondly, procedural utility stems from (non-interactive) 
individual behaviour, where people have an intrinsically motivated attitude towards 
the action or choice process they are involved in. Thirdly, procedural utility is 
generated though interaction between people, with satisfaction being derived from 
acting in a fair way or independently of the outcome (Frey 2004). The third category 
overlaps with what is primarily in the health economics literature referred to as 
process utility (or process quality) (Brouwer et al. 2005). This related concept is 
essentially focused on the utility derived from the practical process experienced in 
relation to an interaction with service providers and administration.   
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However, it is through the role of institutionalised processes in welfare analysis, 
understood here as ‘the rules of the game‘ (North 1990), that the framework of 
procedural utility can provide new insights into contemporary questions in political 
economy. When procedural utility and the intrinsic value of choice is discussed in this 
thesis, it is done so in reference to the procedural utility gained from institutionalised 
processes – from choice as ‘the rules of the game’. The importance of institutionalised 
processes – what procedural utility is intended to measure – is emphasised by North 
(1990) and Mantzavinos (2001) who argue that institutionalised processes are present 
in all activities of exchange and economic relationships in society. Mantzavinos 
further argues that the wealth of a society depends crucially on how institutions 
channel the economic process, and institutions are argued to provide the filter through 
which diverse settings of social coordination and social conflict are transformed into a 
workable social order (2001: 249).    
 
The role of institutionalised processes in determining individual welfare has been 
increasingly acknowledged in recent years as economic research has come to 
recognise that utility is not only derived from outcomes but also from the way 
outcomes are achieved (Frey 2000; 2002; 2004; Benz 2005). Incorporating procedures 
into the welfare concept has implications for both our understanding and 
measurement of individual welfare; it informs not only how the study of welfare 
economics is approached but also the theoretical understanding of individual and 
societal utility (Hahn 1982; Sen and Williams 1982). The standard cost-benefit 
analysis used to assess welfare effects suffers from clear difficulties in valuing non-
market and intangible goods as well as public goods that merely generate existence 
value (Portney 1994). These difficulties also have implications for the valuing of 
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individual welfare effects with experimental research demonstrating the importance of 
procedures to individual preferences – something which in turn points towards their 
importance in generating individual welfare (Dolan et al. 2007; Bjørnskov et al. 
2008).  
 
There is an extensive literature on what constitutes procedural justice but far less on 
understanding the utility that people gain from procedures (Tyler et al. 1997; Dolan et 
al. 2007). Procedural utility from an institution has been identified in relation to direct 
democracy in Switzerland (Frey et al. 2002) and similarly Benz and Frey found 
evidence of procedural utility from the autonomy of self-employment (2008). Feld 
(2002) investigated how the treatment of tax payers influences SWB. Process utility 
has also been empirically analysed in a number of fields. Webb (2009) finds that in 
the case of a company needing to enforce a pay cut during a recession, utility can be 
generated if the pay cut is communicated well and if staff feel included in the 
decision. Staff may agree to voluntary reductions in work hours or pay to avoid 
redundancies (Webb 2009).
22
 Positive process utility is argued to make people more 
accepting of a negative outcome (Lind and Tyler 1988). Brouwer et al. (2005) 
identified process utility among informal caregivers. In health economics, process 
utility is comparable conceptually to ‘process quality’ capturing how services are 
delivered: the responsiveness of hospital staff, the waiting times and whether the users 
felt that they were treated with respect and consideration (Le Grand 2007a). 
                                                 
22
 In psychology this sits under the ‘self-determination theory’, which identifies autonomy, competence 
and relatedness as essential needs. This displays the individual’s wish to control the environment, to 
organise one’s own actions and be treated as a member of social groups (Ryan and Deci 2000). 
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1.5 Methodology and data  
This thesis combines a literature review spanning across disciplines (economics, 
social policy, political economy and sociology) with an analysis of institutional 
evidence of reform trajectories and institutional change in European countries. The 
thesis further draws on evidence from the quantitative analysis of well-established 
socio-economic surveys, including national survey data from the British Household 
Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), and 
comparative European survey data from the Eurobarometer (72.2).
23
 The value of 
using these surveys lies in their longitudinal structure and the potential to investigate 
policy changes which took place as long as 20 years ago. Each survey provides a 
broad variety of household and individual characteristics such as income, 
employment, education, health and family circumstances. They also offer 
opportunities to identify individuals who have used services subject to choice (on 
which the identification strategy is based). The data is presented in each of the 
chapters and details of variables and sample sizes are available in associated 
appendices.    
 
As discussed in chapters two and three, choice plays an important role in European 
health and LTC systems. Although various literatures offer evidence on the welfare 
effects of this qualitative change in the way services are organised and provided, they 
rarely integrate the benefits of (improved) outcomes with those of the intrinsic value 
of choice. However, it is well acknowledged that choice is likely to provide dual 
                                                 
23
 The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) were supplied by the ESRC Data Archive, the GSOEP 
by DIW Berlin and Eurobarometer surveys All Eurobarometer data files are stored at the GESIS - 
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (Dept. Data Archive for the Social Sciences), available 
through the CESSDA Database (Council of European Social Science Data Archives).  No sampling 
weights are used in this thesis, following Pfeffermann (1993).  
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benefits, even though this has to date been difficult to measure empirically. This gives 
rise to the thesis’s central research question:  
How does institutional change of consumer choice affect individual welfare 
– from changing outcomes and institutionalised procedures – and what are 
the equity implications?  
Three main questions arise from this central research question. The following section 
briefly outlines these questions, how they address gaps in the literature, how they fit 
within the conceptual framework and the main methods, findings and contributions to 
the literature (an overview of these research questions is found in Appendix 1). 
Separate introductions, backgrounds, empirical strategies, results, discussions and 
conclusions are presented in each of the three papers that comprise the thesis 
(hereafter called chapters two, three and four). The first paper estimates the effects of 
competition as well as a larger feasible choice set in health care in the UK. The 
second paper focuses exclusively on the effects of choice and various choice 
constraints in the case of the German LTC provision. The first two papers contribute 
to our understanding of the welfare effects of choice and competition and also their 
consequent equity implications. Paper three approaches the equity question from a 
different perspective than the two previous papers. This paper investigates social class 
specific individual preferences for choice rather than welfare effects directly. It 
further attempts to disentangle the system wide changes brought about by choice as a 
component of welfare reform in NHS type countries.    
 
The cases, health and LTC, are contrasting yet ultimately interlinked; where LTC 
essentially forms a ‘spring-off’ system from the regular health system and relieves 
some of the costs in the health care sector (such as bed-blocking in hospitals).  Health 
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care systems were established early (the German insurance bill under Bismarck 
already in 1883) and are traditionally universal and politically highly salient. In 
contrast, LTC is a ‘new’ area of public policy (Sweden being one of the earliest 
countries where LTC was explicitly separated from health care in the 1950s 
(Fukushima et al. 2010)), and its expansion over the past 20 years has been pushed 
both by socio-economic changes and a strongly growing demand due to the ageing 
population over the past decades as even more so in the years to come.
24
 Furthermore, 
despite general pressures to contain welfare spending, long-term care is one of only a 
few policy areas that are currently expanding. Health care spending meanwhile is 
being constrained in many countries (Lundsgaard 2005; Comas-Herrera et al. 2010b).  
 
The policy areas vary by technological intensity; that is, in terms of the level of 
training and skills required from care providers. LTC can be provided by family 
members (informally) whereas health care is generally only provided in a professional 
setting. Likewise, the technological intensity or knowledge intensity varies 
considerably. Health care is denoted by constrained information availability, 
potentially imposing transaction costs and little opportunity for reversing a choice in 
case of regret. LTC on the other hand is denoted by accessible and privately held 
information, relatively low transaction costs and opportunity to make alterations, 
minor or major, to the choice in case of regret.  
                                                 
24
 For some countries the increase will be more gradual and reach relatively lower levels. These include 
Australia, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, where the share of the oldest old is 
expected to increase by less than 5 percentage points between 2010 and 2050, and reach levels under 
9%. 
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Paper 1: Choice and competition in health care
25
 
Chapter two examines the choice of hospital reform introduced to the English 
National Health Service (NHS) in 2006. Choice became available to all patients 
referred for elective surgery by a GP, who, supported by the NHS Choices website, 
advised on the available options. The reforms focused on increasing patient choice 
and hospital competition and were accompanied by significant institutional changes to 
support the development of a market for hospital care for NHS-funded patients.  
 
This type of choice reform, with its emphasis on competition induced benefits, should 
result in an improvement of individual SWB which is equitably distributed. Studies 
examining the impact of competition are finding consistently strong quality effects 
(Cooper et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 2012). No studies have systematically considered 
individual well-being as an outcome variable, and the analysis of equity effects is 
constrained to small-scale studies focused on access rather than outcome measures 
(Dixon and Le Grand 2006). 
 
The paper contributes to the overall thesis through its analysis of a case that is 
denoted by constrained information availability and noticeable transaction costs. 
Choice of hospital for elective care is knowledge intensive and has a low rate of 
repetition. This is a case where choice is less likely to generate individual utility from 
the procedure of choosing, while earlier findings indicate an OU effect from quality 
improvements. The framework poses to the following research questions:  
- Does choice and competition in health care improve individual well-being?  
- Are benefits equitably distributed according to socio-economic status?  
                                                 
25
 Chapters two, three and four are presented as independent papers with individual literature reviews 
and sections outlining method and data.   
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- Does choice and competition improve patient satisfaction with health?  
The chapter uses a set of difference-in-difference (DiD) econometric models with 
treatment and control groups defined by the intensity of local competition, measured 
through a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration. The main 
sample consists of individuals who were in hospital for elective surgery in the 
previous year. To control for area effects a second DiD model comparing patients to 
non-patients identifies any difference in local area trends in SWB. Finally, sub-
groups, defined by income and education level to broadly capture the ‘middle class’, 
are used to account for any differences in the SWB effects which could inform an 
equity assessment. A set of robustness checks, including alternative dependent 
variables and lags in implementation, are used to establish the validity of the analysis.   
 
The results suggest an overall positive SWB effect, particularly among the ‘middle 
class’, which has been operationalized as groups with higher (than median) income 
and education. The effects cannot be explained by area effects or implementation 
rates, patient age or general health status. There is no evidence of procedural utility 
but rather evidence of improved objective outcomes through a positive effect on 
health status (measured as satisfaction with health).  
Paper 2: Choice in long-term care provision 
The third chapter estimates the welfare effects of user choice in the German LTC 
system introduced in 1994 (internationally one of the most extensive LTC choice 
schemes). The introduction of long-term care insurance (LTCI) meant that 
individuals, who are covered by the public system and eligible, can choose to receive 
either a cash benefit or professional care services. Care homes are a third option 
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although access is limited by need and local regulation. Quantitative studies of the 
well-being effects of policy changes in LTC are sparse; even rarer are ones which 
disentangle the effects of choice and the role of non-redundant options.  
 
Paper 2 contributes to the overall thesis through its analysis of a case that is denoted 
by accessible and privately held information, relatively low transaction costs and the 
possibility to repeat the choice in case of regret (as the choice of care structure is 
revised yearly or more frequently if needed). The case is likely to generate individual 
utility and the potential role for procedural utility is likely to be high. The framework 
leads to the following research questions:  
- Does choice in long-term care improve individual well-being?  
o Are benefits equitably distributed according to socio-economic status? 
o Are benefits equitably distributed according to the availability of 
meaningful options (such as informal carers)? 
The chapter uses survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and estimates a 
set of difference-in-difference models. The DiD approach allows for the identification 
of SWB effects of the LTCI while controlling for the availability of informal care 
providers, regional diversity and competition. Equity implications are analysed 
through sub-sample analysis. Robustness checks including alternative time periods 
and alternative dependent variables confirm the reliability of the DiD models. The 
DiD model, which accounts for the effect of the new LTC system, is complemented 
by a DDD model in which the system effect is controlled for.  This leaves the effect of 
choice as a characteristic of the LTCI system. 
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The results show a robust and strong welfare effect following the introduction of the 
LTC based system and its choice component (robust to various samples and 
identification strategies). The welfare effects are however stronger among individuals 
with higher income and education – a finding which suggests that resources facilitate 
the benefits gained from choice. The inequitable SWB effects are generally linked to 
instrumental rather than procedural benefits. Procedural benefits, on the other hand, 
are stronger among low income groups and are linked to the availability of informal 
carers. 
Paper 3: Preferences for consumer choice and privatisation 
The fourth chapter approaches the equity question from a different perspective – 
argued to be instrumental for the hypothesised benefits. The chapter examines the 
proposition by Blomqvist (2004) that the ‘well-off’ (the middle class as 
conceptualised throughout) both benefits disproportionately from, and hold special 
preferences for, choice and privatisation in public services. The chapter draws on 
theoretical arguments which view the middle class as a key constituency for welfare 
reform (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Loayza et al. 2012) with distinct preferences for 
consumer choice (Fotaki 2009). The importance of the question is supported by 
empirical evidence of SWB effects of choice among the middle class (as discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3). The aim of the chapter is to identify preferences for choice in health 
care among the middle class and further to investigate the relation with instrumental 
benefits, or outcomes, of choice.  
 
The chapter contributes to the analysis of equity effects of choice and to the 
identification of procedural benefits by contrasting preferences for choice (in and of 
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itself) with instrumental system characteristics. Based on the conceptual framework 
the following research questions are pursued:  
- Is there a middle class preference for choice in NHS type health care systems?  
o Are middle class preferences linked to choice in and of itself or is there 
a role for outcomes produced by choice schemes? 
o Are there complementarities in the provision systems under consumer 
choice compared to under privatised financing? 
The chapter reviews health care systems in three NHS countries – England, Sweden 
and Ireland – and focuses on identifying system characteristics and reform 
trajectories. The quantitative analysis of survey data (Eurobarometer 72.2) uses 
regression analysis of preferences for choice and other criteria for a quality health 
care system. The chapter finds that the middle class have a preference in favour of 
choice compared to a range of criteria for a quality health care system. The middle 
class also exhibits preferences for quick access. This can be interpreted in terms of a 
dual nature of preferences for choice; firstly, for choice in and of itself (the 
procedural) and secondly, for an outcome linked to choice (quick access). The 
preference sets are similar across the three countries – highlighting that the ways in 
which choice is accessed; through private insurance or through choice of provider in a 
public system – does not seem to influence the preferences of the middle class as a 
key constituency for choice policies.  
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Chapter 2  Competition  
 
 
Choice and competition in health care: estimating 
individual subjective well-being effects of the 2006 
English NHS reforms26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Choice and competition are popular reform strategies in European health care 
systems. Although much debated, the reforms are argued to bring greater efficiency, 
better quality and increased equity. This chapter uses individual subjective well-being 
(SWB) to assess the individual welfare effects of the 2006 ‘choice of hospital’ reform 
in the English NHS. Market concentration indexes are used to measure not only 
geographical competition but also the size of the individual’s feasible choice set. A set 
of difference-in-difference models reveals positive SWB effects of higher competition 
on a sample of individuals with recent experience of in-patient hospital stays. Sub-
sample analysis demonstrates that the positive effect is located among the relatively 
well-off in terms of income and education. The results confirm the quality 
improvements previously identified in the literature but however suggest that the 
benefits of choice are not equitably distributed.  
 
 
                                                 
26
 This chapter is based upon a paper published in CESifo Economic Studies: "Subjective Well-being 
as a Measure of Welfare and Equity: The Case of Choice Policies in Health Care." Zigante, V. (2011). 
57 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Choice policies, often coupled with quasi-market and managed competition, have 
become increasingly popular reform strategies across diverse European models of 
health care provision and financing. In the English National Health Service (NHS), 
choice and competition have been incrementally introduced since the early 1990s, 
some would argue even earlier (Greener 2009), and have over the years been heatedly 
debated. In particular, the potential realisations of expected welfare effects from 
efficiency and quality improvements, as well as the equitability of the benefits and 
utilisation of choice, have been topics of controversy (Dixon et al. 2003; Propper et al. 
2006; Le Grand 2007a). This chapter contributes to the debate by providing an 
alternative approach to analysing individual welfare effects of choice and competition 
in the English NHS through empirical measures of subjective well-being (SWB)
27
. 
This approach allows for the dual assessment of welfare effects; from improved 
outcomes following quality improvements brought about by increased competition, as 
argued in Cooper et al. (2011), and from the procedure or the intrinsic value attached 
to having a choice, as argued in Frey and Stutzer (2000). The approach also allows for 
the analysis of any potential gradient of SWB effects depending on socio-economic 
group which offers a contribution to the equity debate). 
 
An expansive literature in economics promotes choice and competition measures in 
health care as efficiency and quality enhancing. Choice is also often referred to as 
intrinsically valuable (Iyengar and Lepper 1999). Current evidence on efficiency and 
                                                 
27
 Well-being research is receiving increasing popular recognition in the UK. In November 2010 the 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron launched a new government survey to measure well-being aimed 
at increased recognition and insights into the formation of well-being and ensuing policy implications 
(see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/user-guidance/well-being/index.html).  
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quality effects is mainly based on technical indicators such as mortality or morbidity 
(see Cooper et al. 2011) and these provide important insights into the possible 
changes in health outcomes resulting from choice and competition policies. The use 
of SWB provides an opportunity for a broader assessment of welfare effects, based on 
the understanding that human welfare does not only depend on outcomes (here health 
outcomes), but also on perceptions of processes (how the individuals’ interaction with 
the health care system is perceived) and procedural values (intrinsic value attached to 
the opportunity to choose). This paper takes as its point of departure the argument that 
SWB incorporates welfare effects of improved outcomes through increased quality 
(and to some extent efficiency) as well as the procedural utility (Frey and Stutzer 
2004) gained from the procedure of choosing and any intrinsic values of choice (as 
discussed in Dowding and John 2009). The use of SWB as a measure of welfare 
further provides a novel approach to assessing the equitability of choice policies. The 
current literature on equity employs various indicators such as take-up rates (Burge et 
al. 2004 ) and waiting times (Dawson et al. 2004).
28
  
 
The chapter is guided by the following research questions:  
- Does choice and competition in health care improve individual well-being?  
- Are benefits equitably distributed according to socio-economic status? 
- Does choice and competition improve patient satisfaction with health?  
The chapter contributes to the overall framework of the thesis by focusing on a case 
that is characterised by high information requirements and potentially noticeable 
transaction costs. The amount of information needed to make an informed choice of 
hospital can be considerable and difficult to process and understand. The quality of 
                                                 
28
 For an overview see Williams and Rossiter (2004). 
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information has at times been found to be unreliable and unhelpful for patients (Trigg 
2013). Transaction costs may stem from the process of choosing (time spent searching 
and understanding information on options) and from taking up choices far from home 
(transport costs and longer time spent away from work). The character of the choice 
has implications not only for the expected benefits but also for the equitability, if 
capacity to cope with the information requirements and transaction costs are 
inequitably distributed in the population.  
 
The character of the choice situation further constrains the predicted procedural utility 
(more specifically process utility) gains from the reform. According to Frey et al. 
procedural utility can stem from both a process which the individual accepts as fair 
and from the intrinsic value of choice as an institution (2004). The former is 
comparable conceptually to ‘process quality’ which captures how services are 
delivered: waiting times, the responsiveness of hospital staff and whether the users 
felt they were treated with respect and consideration (Le Grand 2007a).
29
 The present 
analysis is based on the assumption that choice may have both effects – captured by 
the primary dependent variable, SWB. The data does not fully accommodate a 
separation of the types of procedural utility nor does it provide a definitive distinction 
from outcome effects. This limitation of the present analysis; is alleviated by the 
incorporation of health satisfaction as the second dependent variable. Health 
satisfaction has been found to be closely linked to actual health status (Mossey and 
Shapiro 1982; Idler and Benyamini 1997) and hence provides an evidence of outcome 
effects.  
 
                                                 
29
 ‘Outcome quality’ on the other hand captures whether the health services improved health outcomes 
and readmissions were low and safety of services high (Saltman 1994; Rico et al. 2003; Donnelly 
2010). 
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Choice and competition policies in health care are common across Europe, and the 
UK case was selected not only due to the richness of empirical data, particularly the 
availability of Cooper et al’s. competition index (2011), but also because the UK case 
is often presented as a role model for other European countries in reforming health 
care policy (Cabiedes and Guilleen 2001:1215). The UK can be seen as a ‘most likely 
case’ – a relatively consumerist society yet with a strong consumer influence on 
providers (Environics International 2002). In this setting we would consider 
consumerist relations between the state and the public to be beneficial. However, the 
NHS undoubtedly has a special role in the UK welfare state and society which renders 
the following analysis particularly salient. Furthermore, the UK is a mature health 
care system with a recent history of competition reforms which may have resulted in 
both providers and patients becoming accustomed to the associated institutional 
structure. As discussed below, the UK exemplifies a trend in health system 
development that is common among Beveridgean
30
 type health care systems, 
including the Scandinavian countries and Spain, where user choice has been 
continuously extended since the early 1990s.  
 
The chapter proceeds with an outline of the English NHS and European health care 
systems before moving onto a discussion of existing evidence of competition effects 
and equity implications. The empirical analysis, using the BHPS, estimates the effects 
of increased competition on individual subjective well-being (SWB) in a set of 
difference-in-difference models. Section five concludes with a discussion of the 
results and implications for further research.  
                                                 
30
 The term Beveridgean health care system is used widely and includes what is also often referred to as 
National Health Service (NHS) type system. Denoting features are tax funding and centralised 
provision, often free (or subject to a small fee) at the point of use while access to specialists is limited 
through (GP) gatekeeping (Wendt 2009). The term ‘NHS system’ and ‘Beveridgean system’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
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2.2 Background  
In this section I discuss a range of issues related to the economic evaluation of choice 
and competition in health care. I also clarify why we can expect choice and 
competition to affect individual welfare and how these questions have been 
approached in the existing literature on choice in public services. Finally, the debate 
on the equity implications of choice in health care is highlighted.  
2.2.1 The English National Health Service 
We are backing investment with reform around four key principles: First, high national 
standards and full accountability. Second, devolution to the front-line to encourage 
diversity and local creativity. Third, flexibility of employment so that staff are better able 
to deliver modern public services. Fourth, the promotion of alternative providers and 
greater choice. All four principles have one goal - to put the consumer first. We are 
making the public services user-led; not producer or bureaucracy led, allowing far greater 
freedom and incentives for services to develop as users want (Blair 2001).  
 
The focus on choice and consumerism in the UK is evident from the speech by former 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2001 and it was under New Labour that the choice-
competition nexus became truly prominent in British
31
 public services. The impetus 
for the trend can however be linked back to the Thatcher governments (1979-1990) 
and incremental growth in the marketization of the health care sector during the 
succeeding Conservative governments in the 1990s (Greener 2003). The most notable 
feature of the internal market was that it separated the providers of health care from 
the purchasers of health care (Propper et al. 2004).  Newly formed local bodies would 
consider the needs of their patient population and establish annual contracts to 
purchase a fixed number of surgical interventions from local hospitals (Le Grand et al. 
1999). The hope was that these new purchasers would purchase wisely and maximize 
                                                 
31
 As a general rule, this paper considers the developments in the English NHS. Due to the devolved 
nature of governance in the countries of the United Kingdom noticeable differences between the health 
care systems has arisen (Donnelly 2010).  
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quality for the lowest price, since both the price and quality of the services purchased 
was variable.   
 
The internal market remained in operation until 1997, when the newly elected Labour 
party dismantled most elements of it, but retained the separation between purchasers 
and providers. From January 2006 (see figure 2) patients requiring a referral to a 
specialist were to be offered a choice of four or five providers and since April 2008 
patients in England being referred to a non-urgent hospital appointment by their GP 
can choose to be treated at any hospital listed in a national directory of services, 
including NHS acute trusts, foundation trusts and independent sector providers – so-
called ‘free choice’ of provider. In 2009 the NHS Constitution made this a right for 
patients (Department of Health 2009).
32
 
Figure 2 – Timeline for the market-based reforms in the English NHS (2001-2006) 
 
Source: Cooper et al.  (2010) 
Along with choice of secondary care provider the government also introduced a new 
information system that enabled paperless referrals and appointment bookings joint 
with making available information on quality to help patients make more informed 
choices. The paperless referral and appointment system, known as ‘Choose and 
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 From 2003-2005, certain patients in London and Manchester who experienced long waiting times 
were allowed to choose to receive care at alternative facilities which had shorter waiting times (Coulter 
et al. 2005).  
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Book’, allowed patients to book hospital appointments online with their general 
practitioner (GP) or, if they preferred, by telephone (Department of health 2007). The 
booking interface gives the person booking the appointment the ability to search for 
hospitals based on geographic distance. It also allows them to see estimates of each 
hospital’s waiting times based on the last 20 appointments at each hospital. In 2007 
the government also created a website designed to provide additional quality 
information to inform patients’ choices. The hope was that providing additional 
quality information would create an environment where hospitals competed on quality 
and not price. The website currently includes information collected by the national 
hospital accreditation bodies, including risk-adjusted mortality rates and detailed 
information on waiting times, infection rates and hospital activity rates for particular 
procedures (Department of Health 2012). The website also includes patient comments 
and more detailed information on hospital accessibility, general visiting hours and 
parking arrangements. 
 
Both the reforms and the NHS as an institution have enjoyed broad and increasing 
public support during the process of implementation of the internal market and the 
choice at referral policy. Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey in table 1 
shows that individuals report increasing satisfaction with the NHS overall: rising from 
44% being ‘very’ or ‘quite’ satisfied in 2004 to 51% in 2007. Moreover, the view on 
how much choice should be given to NHS patients has increased by 13% in the same 
period (when considering the categories ‘great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’). Overall, there 
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is strong support with just over 75% of respondents stating that NHS patients should 
have ‘quite a lot’ of choice or more.33 
Table 1 – Satisfaction with the NHS and demand for choice, percentages 
How satisfied are you with NHS? 2004 2007 
Very satisfied 7.72 10.88 
Quite satisfied 36.67 40.68 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  19.04 18.39 
Quite dissatisfied 22.51 20.21 
Very dissatisfied 13.75 9.32 
Don't know 0.28 0.52 
   NHS patient should have hospital choice? 2004 2007 
A great deal 21.82 30.73 
Quite a lot 41.11 45.29 
A little 27.23 19.36 
None at all 8.85 3.96 
Don't know 0.94 0.65 
Nr of observations 4124   
Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2004 and 2007.  
Even though respondents may be unlikely to base their answer on a balanced analysis 
of the relative costs and benefits of offering choice, it is clear that very few feel that 
no choice at all is the optimal situation. The upwards shift between 2004 and 2007 
indicates increased support for choice, which is to some extent expected following 
greater public awareness that choice may be a desirable situation.
34
 
2.2.2 Choice and competition in European health care systems
35
 
The case of the English NHS represents a development common to most, and in a 
broader sense, all, Western European countries. Moreover, free competition and 
choice are broadly promoted by the EU. For example, the ‘Council Conclusions on 
                                                 
33
 The simple structure of the BSA survey questions in table 1 constrains the interpretation. The 
questions are asked in isolation; hence no implicit or explicit trade-off is incorporated in the answers. 
This exemplifies a basic form of eliciting preferences which can be critiqued for ignoring systematic 
differences in individual trade-offs which may bias the results (Dolan et al. 2003). As mentioned the 
increase found between 2004 and 2007 can be explained by other factors than a change in preferences. 
The implications of this type of measurements are further discussed in chapter 4. 
34
 Also this reasoning is followed up in chapter 4 where the ‘self-perpetuating’ nature of choice policies 
(Blomqvist 2004), essentially choice feeding demand for more choice, is further discussed.  
35
 This section draws on Costa-Font and Zigante (2013).  
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Common values and principles in European Union Health Systems’ (European Union 
2006) highlighted the aim to increase patient participation and choice as well as 
competition in health care, with particular emphasis on the option of receiving health 
care in another member state, known as cross-border mobility. In practice, choice and 
competition are widespread features of European health care systems, albeit with 
clearly dispersed reform trajectories depending on the underlying model of health 
care. The UK, along with the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy and Ireland, all of 
which have tax funded health care systems, have more recently introduced choice, 
whereas the Bismarckian (or social insurance (SI) funded) countries, for example 
Germany, France and the Netherlands, have a long tradition of choice and have 
recently introduced soft gatekeeping mechanisms for cost-containment reasons (Or et 
al. 2010). 
 
Table 2 illustrates the different reform trajectories. The Bismarckian countries are 
denoted by higher expenditure and higher reliance on private insurance. This has 
sparked the need for cost containment, alongside heavy fragmentation and a 
traditional emphasis on insurance choice. In contrast, a single payer model financed 
by national taxation denotes the Beveridgean (or tax and integrated care model) 
countries with a National Health Service consisting of generally publicly financed 
hospitals, often also publicly owned. Access to hospital specialists is typically by 
referral via a general practitioner (GP) and limited choice has been offered to patients 
while relying on GP’s as gatekeepers, guides and coordinators of health care (Saltman 
1994; Rico et al. 2003). Recently there has been a clear emphasis on increasing choice 
of hospital for elective care and the opportunities for choice more generally in the 
Beveridge type systems (Bevan and Van De Ven 2010).  In the Bismarck model 
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countries the reform trajectory is moving in the opposite direction, with free choice 
being constricted as a result of cost-containment pressures and the focus shifted to 
introducing competition in financing for the same reason (Costa-Font and Zigante 
2012). This comparative outlook illustrates why choice and competition in NHS type 
systems is promising as a way of increasing user involvement without increasing 
costs. 
 
As the discussion above illustrates, the EU choice agenda is currently very topical in 
the Beveridge model countries, which are continuously expanding user choice and 
introducing managed competition. Analysing choice policy in the UK is particularly 
valuable in terms of lessons for other countries as it is argued to be a role model for 
Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain when debating health care 
reform (Cabiedes and Guilleen 2001). The choice of the UK is an important one as 
Cabiedes and Guillen point out. The UK has become a role model partly due to the 
policy-making style, including producing white papers setting out the direction of 
policy and the overall design. This approach facilitates policy diffusion, which is 
further facilitated by the English language having become a ‘lingua franca’. It is 
further argued that Southern European countries in particular tend to look to more 
advanced EU member states for inspiration rather than other, more similar, Southern 
European countries (2001). Beyond the status of the UK as a possible source of policy 
learning, the structure of the health care system is similar to that of the other 
Beveridgean health systems, which implies that the results may be of relevance also in 
those countries.   
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Table 2 – Overview of health care systems in European countries 
    Reform trajectory 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
Public 
expenditure  
Private 
expenditure  
Private 
insurance 
% satisfied with national 
health care system 
 
Bismarckian type health care systems(SHI)      
Belgium Traditional choice. Introduced 
competition in 1990s  
11.1 66.8 25.3 4.3 88 
Germany Traditional choice. Introduced 
competition in 1990s  
10.5 76.8 23.2 9.2 54 
France Traditional choice. Little 
competition 
11.2 77.8 22.2 13.2 83 
The Netherlands Traditional choice.  2006 
competition in financing 
9.9 75.3 16.5 17.7 77 
 Beveridgean type health care systems(NHS)      
 
UK Choice introduced in 1990s. 
Choice of hospital 2006 
8.7 82.6 17.4 1.4 73 
Denmark  Choice in 1990s. Choice of 
hospital 1992.  
9.7 84.5 15.5 1.6 77 
Spain Choice of GP, pilot areas with 
hospital choice (Madrid 2006) 
9.0 72.5 27.5 5.9 77 
Sweden Choice in 1990s. Choice of 
hospital 1991.  
9.4 81.9 18.1 0.1 79 
All data from 2008, except for Denmark from 2007. Unless otherwise stated, expenditure is as % of total expenditure on health (THE). 
Sources: OECD Health Data 2010 Version: October 2010, and Gallup World Poll (% satisfied with national health care system). 
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2.2.3 Competition in health care – theory and evidence   
Traditional microeconomic theory predicts that competition will lead to more improved 
welfare outcomes. The type and extent of choice and competition, both on the supply 
and demand side of health care provision
36
, determines the expected welfare effects 
(Barr 1993). Generally choice policies are argued to exert an influence on the way 
services are run, primarily through incentives for improved performance, crucial for 
which is the presence of a complementing structure of financial incentives
37
, i.e. money 
following the patients’ choices, inducing some type of competition (Propper et al. 
2008).  
Efficiency and cost-containment are expected benefits of competition (Gerdtham et al. 
1999; Cooper et al. 2010) yet have been historically debated (Maynard 1994). Efficiency 
effects of choice and competition are often operationalised as patients’ average length of 
stay (LOS) due to the inadequacy of cost data (Jha et al. 2007; Shekelle et al. 2008).  
Interpreted as is conventional in the literature, improved efficiency is not likely to 
directly affect individual well-being. However, following the argument of Krutilla, the 
overall efficiency of the system may generate indirect effects on welfare, through the 
existence value of a well-functioning health care system (2004). Individuals perceiving 
that the health system is cost-efficient, i.e. makes the most of the taxpayers money, can 
possibly draw welfare/benefit in terms of well-being from this conviction. Apart from 
                                                 
36
 This paper is exclusively focused on the provision of health care. In countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands choice has been introduced in financing, but this is less relevant for the UK where the only 
alternative is private insurance which only covers 1.4% of health expenditure.   
37
 We can distinguish structures along two dimensions; whom the agent making the choice is; a public 
authority mediating between patients and providers or the patient individually choosing between a range 
or providers (private and public or only public), and whom the entities allowed to compete are; only 
public or private and public providers. 
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the indirect effects on welfare, efficiency arguments are less important for individual 
welfare. 
 
Quality improvements prompted by choice and competition policies on the other hand 
are argued to be brought about by the opportunity the policy gives to patients to ‘exit’ 
rather than ‘voice’ feedback to providers (Hirschman 1970). The traditional idea that 
patients would influence services through complaints, either to the health care provider 
or responsible officials, thereby relying on patient ‘voice’ alone, may not be enough to 
raise quality. ‘Voice’ in itself could also be a source of inequity between more or less 
forceful and communicative individuals (further discussed below). Instead, the 
opportunity to ‘exit’ a poor service is thought to put pressure on providers to raise their 
performance, as well as be equally available across social groups (Le Grand 1984).  
 
Quality improvements have been found to depend on the payments structure in a quasi-
market for health care provision. In the English NHS, the system has maintained a 
provider-purchaser split as part of the internal market reforms of the 1990s, in which 
initially buyers negotiated both price and quality of health care providers (Le Grand et 
al. 1999). The current system is based on centrally set prices for each treatment type, 
based on the average cost of such treatment across all hospitals (Cooper et al. 2011). 
The idea is that providers will compete on quality rather than price, which is facilitated 
by an increased the availability of quality information (Department of Health 2012). 
Evidence for the US accordingly indicates that it matters whether prices are fixed or 
variable, and hence, whether providers are competing only on quality or also on price. 
US evidence indicates better outcomes with fixed prices (Shen 2003), and that with 
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variable prices there are risks of negative impacts on quality, unless coupled with the 
appropriate reimbursement rates (Gowrisankaran and Town 2003).  
 
The latest wave of reforms (in the 2000s) was envisioned to increase the efficiency and 
quality of the health care system by introducing schemes that clearly emphasised patient 
choice combined with centrally set prices. The evidence from this phase of reform is 
generally positive: Bloom et al. found that hospital competition fostered higher 
management quality, and that higher management quality was associated with lower 
mortality from AMI
38
 (2010). Cooper et al. found that competition increased hospital 
efficiency without compromising patient outcomes (2010). Cooper et al. (2011) also 
investigated quality effects using AMI mortality as a quality indicator and found that 
mortality fell more quickly (i.e. quality improved) for patients living in more 
competitive markets after the introduction of hospital competition in the English NHS 
in 2006. The results suggest that hospital competition in markets with fixed prices can 
lead to improvements in clinical quality. Gaynor et al. (2010) in a similar approach to 
Cooper et al. moved beyond AMI mortality to a broader concept of quality. They found 
that patients in hospitals in more competitive markets had lower all-cause mortality and 
shorter length of stay. The hospitals still maintained overall expenditure. Similar results 
were found (however estimated on cross-sectional data only identifying a correlation) 
by Gravelle et al. (2012) on a selection of quality indicators. As a result, we expect that 
after 2005, clinical quality should improve more in spatial areas with more competitive 
hospital markets in England.   
 
                                                 
38
 Acute myocardial infarction, AMI mortality is a conventionally used indicator. It is useful as it is easily 
clinically identifiable and is not subject to gaming like many elective surgery procedures. For patients 
with AMI there is a clear link between appropriate treatment and clinical outcomes (Jha et al. 2007) as 
discussed in Cooper et al. (2011).  
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Improvements to choice and competition of the type found in the English NHS partly 
rely on patients actively choosing providers according to quality. It signals to poorly 
performing providers to improve in order to maintain business. However, Dixon et al. 
found no evidence that the choice policy was resulting in significant changes for the 
patient or to patient’s pathways, which suggests that it was not driving improvements in 
quality in the way that was expected (2010). Data supporting Dixon’s (2008) findings 
from the National Patient Choice Survey in figure 3 shows what factors patients 
mention as important when choosing a hospital.  
Figure 3 – Factors reported as important when choosing a hospital for elective surgery (2007) 
 
Source: National Patient Choice Survey 2007. Question 5: Which three factors, if any, would be most 
important to you when choosing a hospital? 
 
Interestingly, and to a certain extent against the assumptions of the literature on choice, 
the highest rated consideration is the location/transport and accessibility of the hospital. 
65% of individuals mentioned location and transport possibilities as a consideration 
when choosing a hospital. Reputation of hospital is mentioned as a consideration by 
20% of patients in the survey, but whether this implies an effect on hospitals is 
questionable. However, it has been argued that this does not prohibit positive effects of 
quality. Two papers surveying mainly the US literature on quality ratings and outcomes 
(Marshall et al. 2000; Shekelle et al. 2008) found studies showing that hospitals are very 
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responsive to ratings (in the US) but that the driver is not necessarily that the patients 
care about rankings. Hospitals reported that concern for public image was a key 
motivator for their quality improvement efforts (Hibbard et al. 2005). Further, hospitals 
in competitive markets were twice as likely to implement changes as those with 
monopolies. Longo et al. found in a quasi-experimental study of hospital behaviour in 
Missouri, US, that several clinical outcome indicators improved after publication 
(1997). Marshall et al. and Shekelle et al. (2000; 2008) emphasise the scant empirical 
literature on using publicly-reported performance data to improve health outcomes. 
Particularly limited is the assessment of the possibilities for public quality data to 
improving patient safety and patient-centeredness.  
 
As the literature suggests and in line with recent evidence it appears that quality 
improving signals are influencing hospitals’ behaviour for the better. This means we can 
expect quality improvements despite the limited evidence of consumer activity in 
choosing hospitals. More relevant for the empirical analysis of this chapter, however, is 
that individuals seem to resort to using heuristics to reach a decision without bearing the 
strain of dealing with ‘actual information’ in relation to their choice of hospital, as 
predicted in Longo et al. (1997) and Marmot and Wilkinson (2006). Furthermore, 
studies in health care conclude that there is a need to be selective with information in 
order to reduce the burden on consumers and to support them in making better decisions 
(Finucane et al. 2002; Peters et al. 2007).  In addition, age-related changes in cognitive 
ability and decision-making processes reinforce the need to plan the content and 
quantity of information with care (Mata et al. 2007). 
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2.2.4 Equity implications  
Choice has been promoted by governments and academics as something that is 
inherently (more) equitable. To have a choice, regardless of the individual’s social 
status or economic wealth, can be seen as a basic criterion for equity (Le Grand 1991). 
The following speech by John Reid, former Health Secretary of the Labour government 
highlights the centrality of equity: 
These choices will be there for everybody… not just for a few who know their way around 
the system. Not just for those who know someone ‘in the loop’ – but for everybody with 
every referral. That’s why our approach to increasing choice and increasing equity go hand 
in hand. We can only improve equity by equalising as far as possible the information and 
capacity to choose (Reid 2003). 
 
The idea put forward by the Labour government was that in the system where the 
‘money follows the patient’, patients are enabled to exit and switch providers, and, as a 
result, incentives for providers to treat all patients well, irrespective of a patient’s ability 
to negotiate with their provider, voice their displeasure with their care, or somehow 
manage to game the health care system (Department of Health 2003). Further, it was 
argued that that in systems without formalised choice mechanisms, choice still exists for 
the middle and upper classes that have the ability to negotiate with their providers for 
better care or pay to enter the private sector. Creating formalized choice mechanisms 
would give every patient the ability to choose irrespective of their socioeconomic status 
(Cooper and Le Grand 2008).  
 
However, extending patient choice may leave unchanged inequity due to differences in 
health beliefs (because choice does not affect these directly), due to unequal resources 
(because patients may have to travel further) and due to differences in capabilities such 
as ‘voice’ and communications (Dixon et al. 2003). Information availability and 
accessibility is a key concern for choice in health care overall but particularly for the 
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equity debate. Information is crucial for enabling patients to make choices based on 
quality but is constrained because health care is a highly individualised service and 
useful quality indicators are difficult to produce (Giuffrida et al. 1999). Information 
differentials between social groups may account for a considerable part of the 
differences in equity-indicators. There may however remain barriers for certain groups 
which threaten equity of access to care; ‘voice’ problems such as communication 
difficulties, language, literacy, assertiveness, articulation, self-confidence and ability to 
deal with professionals, cultural and health beliefs and behaviour, transport difficulties 
and travel distance, as well as the time and financial costs of travel, family or work 
commitments (Dixon et al. 2003; 2006). Flexibility and mobility is a key difference, 
which is enforced by the differing proportions of income spent, for example, on 
travelling costs (Appleby et al. 2003).   
  
The operationalisation of equity is focused on indicators of socio-economic status which 
are informed by the key constraints of equity improvements as discussed in the choice 
literature. More specifically; income indicators are used to account for the ability to 
cope with transaction costs such as travel and the added costs of taking up choice of 
hospital while education differentials are incorporated to account for communication 
and information processing as key facilitators of beneficially choosing a hospital. 
Further, prior to the introduction of the broad choice in health care policies of the 2000s, 
income was a strong determinant of the availability of choice, with only the relatively 
wealthy in a position to choose private care (Propper 1993).
39
 The choice policies have 
therefore been described as equitable since they extend choice to all income groups. 
This should in this case be evident in that lower income groups should gain at least the 
                                                 
39
 Propper however also found that health believes (any concerns over health status) and captivity 
mattered for the take-up of private insurance among the wealthy (1993). 
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same as higher income groups, or, relatively more as we assume that higher income 
groups already had a degree of choice. Level of education, meanwhile, is argued to play 
an important role in the propensity to use and appreciate choice in health care as 
individuals with higher education are more likely to be IT literate, better able to grasp 
the presented choice set, more capable of making informed choices and more confident 
in their discussions with doctors (Dixon et al. 2003). Hence it is likely that individuals 
with a higher level of education will enjoy relatively more well-being from being 
offered a choice of hospital.  
 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
The policy here used for the empirical assessment of welfare effects is the choice of 
hospital reform (‘choice at referral’) in the English NHS, introduced in 2006 (Greener 
2003). The reforms focused on increasing patient choice and hospital competition and 
were accompanied by significant institutional changes to support a market for hospital 
care for NHS-funded patients. On January 1, 2006, every patient in England became 
eligible to choose their secondary care provider as well as where to receive surgical 
care.
40
 In reality however, the choice faced by patients varies considerably depending on 
geographical location; number of options to choose from and the intensity of 
competition faced by providers. The hypothesis tested is that in more competitive 
markets, two processes are at play which should lead to an overall increase in SWB 
among patients: firstly, better quality resulting from providers’ improvements; and 
secondly, a higher number of choices – more likely to satisfy patients’ preferences (and 
                                                 
40
 Excluded patient groups are those in need of emergency and urgent services, patients with cancer, 
maternity care and mental health services. The groups were both included and excluded from the below 
empirical analysis as even though they are not offered a choice, they are likely to benefit from overall 
quality improvements brought about by competition.   
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potentially generate procedural utility from the institution of choice). A set of 
difference-in-difference models capture the effect of competition and choice in life 
satisfaction and health satisfaction.  
2.3.1 Data and Method 
The main source of data comes from individual questionnaires collected through the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
41
 for the years 2002 to 2008. As the ‘choice of 
hospital’ policy was introduced on January 1st 2006, the pre-policy data is garnered 
from 2002 to 2005 and the post-policy data is from 2007 and 2008. The main sample 
consists of individuals who were in hospital (funded by the NHS) for elective surgery in 
the previous year. BHPS fieldwork begins on the 1
st
 of September each year, ensuring 
that all individuals included in the key sample in the post-policy period had been in the 
hospital after the policy had been implemented (Taylor et al. 2010). The use of 
individuals who were hospital in-patients in the previous year maximises the probability 
that we will in fact see an effect on SWB. It has been shown that it is in the first few 
years after an adverse, or favourable, event that individuals report a change in SWB 
which then tends to revert to close to a ‘set-point’ level of SWB for the individual 
(Lucas 2004; Clark 2008). The character of the BHPS data focuses on individuals who 
experienced a recent in-patient hospital stay which means that each year of data 
includes a new sample of individuals (repeated cross-sections). As follows time 
invariant individual characteristics, essentially personality, are not incorporated into the 
models. The following analysis incorporates both cross-sectional models, difference-in-
                                                 
41
 This work was based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, Waves 9-18, 1991-2009: 
Secure Data Service Access, National Grid Reference (Easting, Northing, OSGRDIND), produced by the 
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, sponsored by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and supplied by the Secure Data Service at the UK Data 
Archive. Local authority indicators were granted access under a Special Licence/Conditional Access 
agreement with the UK Data Archive.  
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difference models and alternative dependent variables with a broad set off socio-
economic covariates to attempt to control for any biases the unobserved individual fixed 
effects may produce.  
 
Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable is self-reported life satisfaction (henceforth ‘SWB’). The 
data was collected for the BHPS through the question “How dissatisfied or satisfied are 
you with your life overall?” using a seven point scale where one equals “not satisfied at 
all” and seven “completely satisfied”. The second dependent variable, selected to more 
closely capture well-being effects gained from the in-patient hospital episode, is self-
rated satisfaction with health. Health satisfaction is a domain satisfaction (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2002), argued to reflect objective health status of the individual. Health status 
complements the main SWB variable in the sense that it more closely reflects the 
objective benefits (essentially health status) which are expected outcomes of the 
hospital in-patient stint. Life satisfaction (SWB), on the other hand, forms a broader 
measure of the individual’s well-being which is more likely to capture any procedural 
utility gained.    
 
There is a certain disagreement in the literature whether to treat this type of interval 
variable as a continuous or a categorical variable.
42
 Here z-score transformed SWB 
variables are used throughout, as the z-score conveys the underlying information in just 
                                                 
42
 OLS regressions build on assuming the SWB measure to be cardinal, implying that the SWB can be 
estimated as a continuous variable rather than a categorical variable. The cardinality assumption is 
common in psychological research, whereas in economics it is common to only assume ordinality. The 
categorical nature of the 1-7 scale violates the assumptions making OLS the most efficient estimator 
(Agresti 2012) but in practice SWB regressions tend to generate similar results when estimated with OLS, 
ordered probit and ordered logit (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
further argue in favour of a fixed effect (conditional logit or ordinary least squares regression) to account 
for personality fixed effects (2004).  
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one parameter which facilitates analysis and interpretation. The approach is common in 
labour economics, where it is often applied to job satisfaction indicators. The 
transformation includes rescaling the ordinal SWB variable into a continuous variable, 
in the shape of a unit normal distribution, by subtracting the mean of the variable from 
any given response and dividing this by the standard deviation (Freeman, 1978). In table 
3 ordered probit, OLS using the ‘raw’ SWB variable and OLS using the z-score 
transformed variable are reported, illustrating the similar results which are obtained 
from the various specifications throughout. In the following tables I show only OLS 
specifications using the z-score transformed dependent variables.  
 
Independent variable  
In order to estimate the well-being effects of a larger feasible choice set and of 
competition, I use a measure of hospital market concentration created by Cooper et al. 
(2011).
43
 The measure is based on a range of market areas calibration, many of which 
are used in the analysis below, and an HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market 
concentration) measures the degree of market concentration. I use the negative natural 
logarithm of the HHI based on hospitals’ patient shares, which is convenient because it 
increases with competition, with zero corresponding to monopoly and infinity to perfect 
competition.   
For given market area j, the competition index is given by:  
                                                            [ 1 ] 
                                                 
43
 Cooper et al. extensively discuss the challenges in measuring market structure including the possible 
endogenous relation between hospital quality and market structure (2011). Measures of market structure 
may reflect urban population density rather than the choice sets available to NHS users. Cooper et al. 
employ a range of measures of market structure to illustrate the robustness of the HHI results.  
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Here, nk is the number of procedures carried out at hospital site k within market area j 
and Nj is the total number of procedures carried out in market area j. The measure is 
centred on hospitals and based on their relative share in the activity in a particular 
market.
44
 This process was repeated for hips, knee replacements, arthroscopies and 
hernia repairs and the HHI for each hospital was based on its average HHI for all four 
procedures.  
 
As the HHI measure is centred on individual hospitals it was manually matched onto 
BHPS data at local authority level, so that each individual was assigned a HHI capturing 
the competition faced by hospitals in the local authority of residence (see appendix 4 – 
detailed data available upon request from the author). Cooper’s data is based on actual 
patient flows to 227 hospital sites providing care for AMI for patients. The basic 
hospital competition index, before the negative log transformation, is a number between 
0 and 1 for each hospital. Many local authorities have more than one hospital and, in 
most of the cases with more than one hospital, the competition index was very similar 
between the hospitals due to spatial closeness and being part of the same local market. 
15% of the LAs had more than one hospital and a difference in the HHI for each 
hospital that was larger than 0.1. In those cases the minimum, mean and maximum HHI 
for each LA was alternated in the analysis without any substantial changes in results. 
For the ambivalent cases the size of the local authority and the localisation of the 
hospitals in relation to other hospitals in the area were cross-checked to assess whether 
the approximate competition level for the local authority seemed appropriate. A few 
cases where the difference in HHI was particularly large were excluded from the 
analysis with maintained results.  
                                                 
44
 Only hospitals which perform more than 25 procedures per year were included in the measure.  
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2.3.2 Models 
In order to identify the effect of competition and a larger feasible choice-set, difference-
in-difference (DiD) models provide the most similar environment to a randomised 
control trial on a ‘natural experiment’ (Lee 2005). This paper employs a set of DiD 
models with the aim of controlling for time and area fixed effects.  
The estimation strategy is therefore built on two steps:  
- Cross-sectional: examining whether there is a relationship with market 
concentration at any point in time after the reform of 2006.  
Here OLS regressions are estimated in accordance with the following equation:  
iiji XnlhhiSWB   21   [2] 
Where jnlhhi  represents the competition index (0=monopoly,  ∞ perfect 
competition) and 
ti
X  is a vector of demographic determinants of SWB: sex, age marital 
status, employment status, income, level of education and household size. Further 
controls are also included: a set of health variables (which are especially important for 
the analysis) and a set of local authority level variables (see appendix 3) are included 
into the specifications to control for local characteristics which may interact with 
competition.   
- Difference-in-difference models: examining whether there has been more of an 
improvement in SWB among hospital in-patients in more competitive hospital 
markets compared to less competitive.  
DiD models are widely used in a non-experimental setting as a way of capturing effect 
of policy reform (Abadie 2005; Angrist and Pischke 2008).The basic approach in a DiD 
is to compare two groups over two time periods where one treatment group is exposed 
to a policy-change in the second period and the second control group is not exposed to 
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the policy in either period. Simply illustrated, the DiD coefficient is equal to the 
difference in means between the groups and the difference in the difference in means 
before and after:  
Control group (SWBpost - SWBpre) - Treatment group (SWBpost - SWBpre) 
The NHS reform does not naturally lend itself to a standard DiD as the reform was 
implemented across England at once, leaving a lack of a clear treatment and control 
group.
45
 The main approach of this chapter is to use the ‘actual’ choice faced by NHS 
patients, which had a varying intensity according to the geographical configuration of 
homes, GPs and hospital sites leaving certain options less feasible.  
iitjtji XTGTGSWB   43210         [3] 
 
The baseline DiD model based on equation 3 where 
jG equals 1 for the treatment group:  
high (>median) competition compared to the control group (
jG  equals 0) of low 
(<median) competition areas of residency. The intensity of competition used to create 
the high/low competition groups was further varied, exploring the effects of monopoly 
markets and ‘London effects’, i.e. extremely high competition. The intuition is that in 
some places, market structure permits choice to a larger extent than others, i.e. where 
there are several accessible neighbouring hospitals, with similar capacity, offering 
comparable procedures. In other English areas, hospitals operated in de facto monopoly 
markets where there is only one hospital offering a certain procedure within a 
                                                 
45
 An alternative approach, with additional challenges, is to use the other countries of the UK (Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland) as control groups as these did not implement the choice at referral policy 
simultaneously. The country comparison raise concerns over the comparability of the treatment and 
control groups as unobservable differences in the formation of SWB, economic and social conditions are 
difficult to control for (Lee 2005). The main concern is difference in trends in the dependent variable and 
the difficulty to control for coincidental exogenous shocks in any of the countries (Bertrand et al. 2000). 
Running the DiD on this set-up generated insignificant results which may be caused by unobservable 
differences not possible to control for in the econometric models and not surprising considering the weak 
theoretical underpinnings.    
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reasonable travel distance. A similar approach was used (Propper and Burgess 2008) to 
study the 1990s internal market NHS reforms.  
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive data 
The distribution of the dependent variable, SWB, tends to be skewed to the left and this 
also applies to the samples of individuals used in this chapter. Figure 4 compares the 
distribution for individuals who were hospital in-patients in the previous year to the 
general population; both distributions are, as expected, skewed to the left. The general 
population’s SWB ratings are concentrated around 5 and 6 on the 1-7 scale whereas the 
distribution of the SWB ratings for individuals who were hospital in-patients the 
distribution is somewhat more similar to a normal distribution. The distribution is as 
follows mirrored when considering the standardised SWB scores.  
Figure 4 – Distribution of SWB, samples: hospital patients (yes) and general population (no) 
 
Source: BHPS, 2007 
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The distribution of the second dependent variable is shown in table 4. The figure 
compares the distribution of satisfaction with health for individuals who were hospital 
in-patients in the previous year (after 1st September 2006) to the general population. 
The general population’s satisfaction with health is skewed to the left with a mean of 
4.87 (rating on a scale from 1-7). The distribution of health satisfaction ratings for 
individuals who were hospital in-patients is more similar to a normal distribution with 
an average of 3.83 but somewhat skewed to the right. The distribution of health 
satisfaction differs more between recent hospital in-patients and the general population 
and more closely correlated to objective health status.   
Figure 5 – Distribution of health satisfaction, samples: hospital patients and general population 
 
Source: BHPS, 2007 
The independent variable, the HHI or the average competition index varies as expect 
between the English regions as shown in figure 6.  The figure illustrates the diversity of 
competition in England, with inner and outer London having the highest levels; 
followed by the Greater Manchester area. The least competition is found in west 
Yorkshire where the market is a virtual monopoly.  
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Figure 6 – Average competition (HHI index) by English region (2007) 
 
Source: Cooper et al. 2011 merged onto BHPS year 2007  
 
A set of cross-sectional regression specifications (on year 2007 data) as shown in table 
3, further explore the determinants of SWB in the hospital sample. Demographic and 
socio-economic covariates of SWB, by now well-known from the happiness literature, 
are included as well as the competition measure (HHI). In table 3, across the three 
estimation techniques (OLS on z-score SWB variable, OLS on the ordinal raw SWB 
variable and an ordered probit), the determinants behave similar to what is usually 
found in the happiness literature. Some discrepancies are worth noting: income is 
normally a strongly significant determinant of SWB (Easterlin 2001; Fleurbaey et al. 
2012), but for this particular sample income is insignificant across the specifications. 
Instead, more ‘soft’ socio-economic characteristics dominate; health status, employment 
status and health status are key determinants. Unemployment is strongly negative – 
being employed or self-employed improves SWB to the same magnitude as going from 
‘very poor’ to ‘very good’ health status. Unemployment is also well known to influence 
long-term health status. Marital status ‘married’ is only significantly better than 
‘divorced’ in this sample, while widowhood (which normally tends to be negative) is 
insignificantly different from the reference category ‘married’.  
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Table 3 – Cross-sectional OLS (z-score SWB), OLS and probit (ordinal variable SWB), sample: 
hospital patients 
 
OLS z score 
OLS ordinal 
variable 
Ordered 
probit  
Competition  index (20.000 
metres radius)  
  0.209** 0.292**  0.229** 
Sex Male  Reference category  
  Female 0.121 0.129 0.181 0.150 
Age  
 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Excellent  Reference category 
Good  -0.177 -0.180 -0.251 -0.202 
 
Fair -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.597*** -0.536*** 
 
Poor -0.695*** -0.694*** -0.972*** -0.815*** 
 
Very poor -1.078*** -1.076*** -1.507*** -1.208*** 
Marital 
status 
Married  Reference category 
Couple 0.055 0.053 0.074 0.021 
Widowed 0.072 0.062 0.086 -0.007 
 
Divorced    -0.674*** -0.674*** -0.944*** -0.796*** 
 
Separated  -0.822 -0.788 -1.102 -0.711 
 
Never married -0.115 -0.119 -0.166 -0.214 
Job 
status 
Self- employed 1.109*** 1.097*** 1.536*** 1.270*** 
Employed 0.811*** 0.778** 1.089** 0.815*** 
 
Unemployed  Reference category 
 
Retired 0.609* 0.596* 0.834* 0.617* 
 
Maternity leave 1.161*** 1.126*** 1.576*** 1.271*** 
 
Family care 0.957*** 0.946*** 1.324*** 1.014*** 
 
In school 0.599 0.619 0.866 0.661* 
 
Sick, disabled 0.310 0.280 0.392 0.315 
 
Gvt. training 0.709 0.669 0.937 0.862 
 
Other 2.174*** 2.185*** 3.059*** 2.760** 
  Education Further degree 0.1276 0.1367 0.2245 0.1679 
A-levels 0.1297 0.1352 0.1943 0.1525 
 
Secondary school 0.607** 0.586** 0.665** 0.667** 
 
Apprenticeship/other 0.019 0.044 0.199 0.058 
 
No qualification  Reference category 
 
Still at school 0.008 0.004 -0.230 0.072 
Monthly income (log) 0.018 0.031 0.043 0.036 
Household size  1  Reference category 
 
             2 0.082 0.058 0.081 0.016 
 
             3 -0.155 -0.181 -0.253 -0.271 
 
             4 -0.151 -0.197 -0.276 -0.315 
 
             5 -0.308 -0.330 -0.462 -0.468 
 
             6 or more -0.306 -0.345 -0.483 -0.476 
Constant -0.646 -0.866 3.689***  
Nr observations 400 400 400 400 
R-square (adjusted/pseudo) 0.189 0.192 0.192 0.086 
/cut1 
 
   
-1.531* 
/cut2 
 
   
-1.049 
/cut3 
 
   
-0.506 
/cut4 
 
   
0.209 
/cut5 
 
   
1.103 
/cut6 
 
   
2.189** 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.            Standard errors clustered by PID.  
Source: BHPS for 2007, individuals in hospital after 1
st
 September 2006.  
(a) The coefficients in an ordered probit model are not directly interpretable as in OLS models. Marginal 
effects can be generated for each category of the dependent variable.  
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The competition index is positive and significant, implying that areas with higher 
competition have a higher level of SWB (in 2007). When varying the specifications (see 
appendix 5) the competition index is positive and significant throughout the four OLS 
regression specifications (on the z-score SWB variable), controlling for demographic 
covariates, individual income, health covariates (health status and disability), local 
authority (LA) characteristics (see appendix 3); average house price (adjusted for 
inflation), unemployment rate, deprivation index and implementation rate in the LA 
(what percentage can recall being offered a choice of hospital by GP). Noteworthy is 
that the introduction of health status into the equations increases the r-square 
considerably, and a higher self-rated health status is strongly positive. When the health 
variables are excluded in the second and third specification the coefficient of the 
competition index increases marginally compared to without health variables. Similarly, 
the effect of the competition index increases notably when introducing the set of local 
authority controls in the third specification. The importance of health variables for the 
individual SWB highlights the likelihood that differences in health care provision would 
influence individual welfare assessed through SWB.  
 
The effect of LA characteristics (to some extent capturing local prosperity) is in line 
with expectation. House prices are consistently insignificant, which is probably due to 
the inverse collinear relation with deprivation. Interestingly, the implementation rate 
was also insignificant, implying that SWB is unrelated to local propensity to offer a 
choice of hospital. The control variable has been kept throughout due to its theoretical 
relevance. The insignificance suggests that the benefit of the choice at referral reform 
may be linked to provider incentives (from competition) rather than individual choice. 
The coefficient of the deprivation index is positive, implying that lower deprivation is 
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linked to higher SWB, which is also in line with the literature. Finally, the overall 
explanatory power of the models, the r-square, ranges between 0.05 and 0.20 which is 
consistent with what is to be expected from SWB models. Full models with observable 
covariates of SWB explain between 8 and 20% of the variation, the rest is explained by 
unobservable variables such as personality traits and individual conditions influencing 
the SWB rating (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004).  
 
The analysis revealed a correlation between a higher local competition (and a larger 
feasible choice-set) and individual SWB. In an effort to separate the effect of 
competition from that of choice, an indicator for ‘no choice’ (monopoly market areas) 
was entered into the model. The results were insignificant, which indicates that there is 
no negative effect of a ‘no-choice’ situation as would be expected if choice drives the 
positive relation between HHI and SWB. Thus, it is conceivable that the positive effect 
of competition on SWB is more closely linked to competition effects, mainly quality, 
rather than the number of choices available. However, a competing explanation, which 
cannot be controlled for in the present empirical setting, is that people in monopoly 
markets are willing to travel further and hence has a larger perceived choice set 
compared to individuals in densely populated areas. The positive relation, albeit 
indicating that competition matters, does not capture a causal relationship, which the 
next section further explores in a set of DiD models.  
2.4.2 Difference-in-difference models 
This section reports the results of the difference in difference analysis on both the 
dependent variables. The general DiD on the SWB variable and equity analysis of SWB 
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is followed by identical analysis carried out on the second dependent variable, 
satisfaction with health.  
 
Dependent variable: life satisfaction (SWB) 
The first DiD model compares individuals in high competition areas to low competition 
areas, where high competition areas were selected if above median competition, 0.374. 
‘Treated’ in table 4 is a dummy which is ‘1’ for individuals living in a high competition 
area. As follows, the ‘treatment group (after)’ indicates that ‘treated’ is 1 and the year is 
2007 or later. Table 4 is focused on the DiD results, while each of the specifications 
include the set of covariates as shown in appendix 6. As identified above health status is 
a key determinant of SWB, and the middle column of table 4, shows how the 
competition effect remains positive and significant when health is excluded from the 
equation. Similarly the results are maintained when age and age squared are excluded. 
Age and health capture similar effects – where elderly individuals are more likely to be 
frail and are also more likely to be in hospital. The results are also robust to the 
inclusion of local authority covariates as shown in appendix 6. In fact, the effect is 
strengthened when introducing the local authority controls (deprivation index and 
unemployment rate) and year dummies to account for any time fixed effects beyond 
‘before-after’. The weak yet positive relation between SWB and LA unemployment rate 
found in the cross-sectional regressions is not upheld in the DiD model. The overall 
positive relation between more competitive areas before and after the introduction of the 
choice at referral policy indicates an overall efficiency gain.  
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Table 4 – DiD summary table (OLS z-score SWB) sample: hospital patients  
 
Full model 
Excluded health 
covariates 
Excluded age and 
age squared 
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.242** (0.151) 0.194** (0.150) 0.235** (0.146) 
After  -0.230** (0.151) -0.188**  (0.153) -0.217** (0.145) 
Treated   -0.063 (0.085) -0.072  (0.100) -0.062  (0.096) 
Individual controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.268 (0.681) -0.055 (0.696) 0.032 (0.513) 
Number of 
observations  
885 885 885 
Pseudo R square  0.192 0.150 0.190 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level         Clustered standard errors by PID in brackets  
Source: BHPS 2003-2008 
Sample: English individuals who had been in hospital in the year prior to being surveyed 
 
The second purpose of this chapter is to analyse whether this effect is equitable. In order 
to find whether any subgroups benefit more from choice the analysis was repeated on a 
set of subsamples; consisting of various calibrations of social groups. The groups are 
based on income and education level, corresponding to the theoretical argument that 
these are the key determinants of the gradient of choice benefits. As discussed above, 
income enables the individual to take up choice to a higher extent and education enables 
efficient decision making and proficiency in coping with the information required. The 
sub-group analysis is carried out both in a setting of cross-sectional OLS regression and 
in the DiD setting with comparable results.  
 
In terms of social class indicators, several imputed social group variables are available 
in the BHPS such as Goldthorpe’s class schema, but the pre-calibrated variables 
imputed from other questions in the BHPS have the problematic drawback of reducing 
the sample size reducing the efficiency of the regression models. Conversely the level of 
skill in profession can be used – which here generated insignificant results. The 
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advantage of using income and education as the social class denominators is their 
theoretical foundation as well as consistent reporting.  
 
The results are reported in table 5 with all controls included (the regressions have also 
been run with the controls excluded, without any relevant changes on the competition 
index). The effect of competition is only positive and significant for individuals with 
above median income and high education whereas the sub-samples of below median 
income earners and low education are insignificant. Individuals with higher than median 
income, and individuals with high education (defined as further education beyond A-
levels) are the only groups that significantly benefited from the higher competition and 
larger feasible choice set in their local authority.
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Table 5 – DiD OLS (z-score SWB), sample: hospital patients, by income and education 
Dependent variable: life satisfaction (scale 1-7) 
Social group 
indicator 
Above median 
income 
Below median 
income 
High education Low education 
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.340** (0.194)  -0.066 (0.234) 0.379** (0.280) 0.119 (0.170) 
After  -0.209** (0.127)  0.197 (0.159)  -0.332** (0.191) 0.115 (0.106) 
Treated   -0.265 (0.205)  -0.134 (0.242)  -0.327 (0.286)  -0.188 (0.176) 
Demographic 
covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority 
characteristics 
LA) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implementation 
rate in LA 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.552* (0.883)  -0.367 (1.421) 0.774 (1.763) 0.086 (0.661) 
Observations 372 360 481 251 
R-square 0.216 0.245 0.273 0.215 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level                     Clustered standard errors by PID                        
Source: BHPS for 2003-2008  
Sample: English individuals who had been in hospital in the year prior to being surveyed 
The results are consistent with the argument that choice policies are not primarily 
equitable. The results imply that a higher level of education and more capability to 
                                                 
46
 The differences between the HHI coefficients for high compared to low income and high compared to 
low education are estimated to be significantly different through simultaneous estimation and classic test 
of equality of coefficients.    
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make use of the choice in a way that generates welfare speaks in favour of the argument 
that an important aspect of choice policies is to understand the capability on the part of 
the individual to actually make the choice. 
 
Dependent variable: satisfaction with health status  
The second dependent variable, satisfaction with health status, is here incorporated to 
shed light on possible procedural utility effect of the increased choice for hospital in-
patients. Identifying procedural utility conclusively is a challenge with the present data. 
Approaches in the literature include those where outcomes are either rendered 
insignificant (for voting in referenda such as in Frey and Stutzer (Frey and Stutzer 
2004)) or where any outcome-improvement can be controlled for. The approach here 
resembles the latter, in replicating the above DiD models on a more outcome oriented 
dependent variable. Running the regressions as above on the satisfaction with health 
dependent variable
47
 generates positive, significant and considerably stronger results as 
seen in table 6. This firstly supports the overall hypothesis of a positive impact of 
hospital choice and competition on the welfare of individuals, but secondly provides a 
test of the hypothesis that there is a role for procedural utility from the choice.  The 
effect on satisfaction with health is considerably stronger (of the treatment group (after) 
variable); 0.40 compared to 0.20 in the SWB model above. The results do not speak in 
favour of a strong role for procedural utility. The positive effect of the choice policy is 
then more likely attributed to a positive impact on health status overall and hence to a 
higher extent an outcome indicator compared to SWB. The result conforms to Cooper et 
al.’s (2011) results of a positive impact on quality of care and health outcomes.  
                                                 
47
 Objective health status, such as the BHPS health rating (health status over last 12 months), which 
would have offered a more objective quality measure, is unfeasible as the recording period overlaps with 
the time the individual was in hospital. It is not possible to derive from the data whether the individual 
considers health before, after or an average of before and after the hospital in-patient stay.  
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Table 6 – DiD OLS (z-score health satisfaction) sample: hospital patients         
 All covariates 
Excluding 
health status 
Excluding age 
and age squared 
Treatment group (after) 0.426*** 0.334*** 0.424*** 
After 
 
-0.138** -0.067** -0.144** 
Treated  
 
-0.144 -0.164 -0.137 
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female -0.034 -0.002 -0.03 
Age  
 
-0.016 -0.045***  
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000*** 
 
Health 
status 
Excellent reference category 
Good  -0.560*** 
 
-0.572*** 
 
Fair -1.076*** 
 
-1.092*** 
 
Poor -1.598*** 
 
-1.617*** 
 
Very poor -2.009*** 
 
-2.048*** 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Living as couple -0.042 -0.03 -0.009 
Widowed -0.019 -0.043 0.013 
 
Divorced    -0.042 0.057 -0.052 
 
Separated  -0.471 -0.706*** -0.464* 
 
Never married -0.064 0.038 -0.005 
Job status Self-employed 0.809*** 0.991*** 0.766** 
 
Employed 0.724*** 0.796** 0.693** 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired 0.442* 0.280 0.422 
 
Maternity leave 1.112*** 1.359*** 1.118*** 
 
Family care 0.437* 0.475 0.414 
 
In school 0.990*** 0.969*** 1.048*** 
 
Sick, disabled 0.011 -0.300 -0.033 
 
Government training  1.116 1.215* 1.165** 
 
Other 0.445 0.575 0.437 
Education Further degree 0.103 0.227 0.107 
 
A-levels -0.051 0.3 -0.048 
 
Secondary school -0.118 0.119 -0.118 
 
Apprenticeship, other  -0.752 -0.869*** -0.763*** 
 
No qualification 
 
reference category 
 
 
Still at school 1.157* 0.629 1.231 
Monthly income (log) -0.060 -0.050 -0.060 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 -0.132 -0.087 -0.119 
 
3 -0.124 -0.074 -0.092 
 
4 -0.06 0.036 -0.031 
 
5 -0.022 0.107 0.021 
 
6 or more -0.230 -0.101 -0.199 
Implementation (% being offered 
choice) 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
House prices 0.004 0.006 0.003 
Deprivation index (LA) -0.020* -0.024* -0.022* 
Unemployment rate (LA) -0.022** -0.012** -0.021** 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant   0.970* 0.300 0.566 
Observations 731 731 731 
R-square (adjusted) 0.371 0.183 0.370 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level                                              Clustered standard errors by PID in brackets 
Source: BHPS years 2003-2008 
Sample: English individuals who had been in hospital in the year prior to being surveyed  
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Following the same strategy as above, sub-sample analysis was implemented to analyse 
any equity effect, i.e. differences between socio-economic groups. The results differ 
from the SWB analysis in table 5, in that the effect sizes are larger and the difference 
between education levels has disappeared. The results suggest that income is a stronger 
determinant of inequalities in health status than education where both ‘low’ (below A-
levels) and ‘high’ education have a positive and significant effect of living in an area 
with higher competition. The coefficients for the income groups are significantly 
different while the coefficients for the education groups are not.   
Table 7 – DiD OLS (z-score health satisfaction), sample: hospital patients by income and education  
Dependent variable: satisfaction with health (scale 1-7) 
Social group 
indicator 
Above median 
income 
Below median 
income 
High education Low education 
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.676*** (0.188) 0.134 (0.176) 0.374** (0.146) 0.430** (0.270) 
After -0.168 (0.110) -0.152 (0.132) -0.099 (0.088) -0.103 (0.178) 
Treated  -0.518** (0.211) 0.276 (0.190) -0.032 (0.149) -0.385 (0.288) 
Demographic 
covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local authority 
characteristics (LA) 
     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implementation 
rate in LA 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.666** (0.676) 1.201 (1.118) 0.839 (0.546) 0.283 (1.430) 
Observations 372 360 481 251 
R-square 
(adjusted)       0.376 0.453 0.438 0.346 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                                            Clustered standard errors by PID in brackets 
Source: BHPS for 2003-2008 
Sample: English individuals who had been in hospital in the year prior to being surveyed  
 
The results overall conform to the literature on health inequalities (Dixon and Le Grand 
2006) but the difference between the first and second dependent varible requires further 
attention. The effects of competition on health satisfaction, the variable more closely 
linked to outcomes, is different between income groups only, while the effects on SWB 
differ both by income and education groups. Assuming that SWB captures procedural 
choice benefits to a higher degree, this can be interpreted as support for the argument 
that education is a key determinant of the ability to cope with complex choice situations.  
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2.4.3 Robustness checks 
Area effects – additional control group 
A possible caveat of the analysis above is the possibility of something unrelated to 
hospital care driving the change in SWB in the high competition areas. Intense hospital 
markets are highly correlated with densely populated urban and hence the measure may 
pick up basic urban-rural differences and are not specific hospital competition 
differences. Table 8 shows results of the baseline DiD specification, but where the 
‘treated’ group is calibrated as individuals who had been in hospital in the previous year 
compared to ‘control’ which is the general population. The sample only includes 
individuals living in high competition areas (defined as above median of the 
20.000metre radius competition measure) and if the choice at referral policy had real 
effect beyond a general positive trend in high competition areas (for any other reason) 
we should see, as in table 8 a positive effect on the ‘Treatment group (after)’ coefficient. 
Table 8 – DiD OLS, (z-score SWB), sample: general population in high competition areas  
 
I II 
Treatment group (after) 0.064**  (0.010) 0.052** (0.071) 
After -0.037 (0.038) -0.048 (0.038) 
Treated  0.055 (0.070) -0.135* (0.071) 
Individual controls  Yes 
Yes, excluding  
health covariates 
Local authority controls Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Constant  0.934*** 0.488 
Number of observations  4744 4744 
R square  0.166 0.102 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level                               Clustered standard errors by PID in brackets        
Source: BHPS 2003-2008  
High competition: HHI index higher than 0.374 
The DiD coefficient is however only positive when including the full set of controls 
(time fixed effects and individuals controls). The difference (i.e. the difference between 
hospital patients and the general population in terms of difference in means before and 
95 
 
after the reform) was small but in favour of hospital patients subject to individual and 
LA level controls. This implies that the positive effect on SWB in high competition 
areas is not simply evidence of a general increase in prosperity in these areas.  
 
Delays and differences in implementation  
An aspect not captured by the data is the character of the choice experience for each 
individual. The actual interaction with the health service and whether this process is 
perceived as fair is also linked to the implementation issue. The analysis here presented 
did not directly engage with the process of choosing a hospital. However, other 
evidence indicates the process quality is good. For example, data from the National 
Patient Choice Survey, 79% claims to be “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the 
process of choosing (Dixon 2008). Further, awareness of the policy and possible 
differences in who actually gets offered a choice by the GP is a confounder for the 
above analysis 
 
On an individual level, it can be hypothesised that who gets offered or is aware of the 
choice a priori is dependent on social class and this effect is explored in the equity 
analysis. However, systematic differences between local authorities may distort the 
results in more problematic ways. The National Patient Choice Survey provides 
evidence indicative of the real implementation of choice of hospital having been slow. 
A large proportion, as much as 50% in the first year after the introduction of the policy, 
of patients do not recall being offered a choice. Early reports indicated a lag in GPs 
learning how to use the new referral software and become accustomed to providing 
patients with the opportunity to choose a secondary care provider (Rosen et al. 2007; 
Audit Commission 2008). Data from the National Patient Choice Survey was 
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introduced as a control into the all specifications above with consistent results. The 
control variable was insignificant throughout – which indicates that any systematic 
difference in implementation across local authority does not affect SWB or confound 
the competition effect. Further, London local authorities were excluded to assess 
whether the particular density of hospitals drives the positive competition effect, 
without any change in the competition – SWB relation.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
Subjective well-being, measured through individual statements of SWB, has provided 
insights into the welfare effects of choice in health care. The effect of a larger feasible 
choice set and more intense local competition faced by providers on individual welfare 
is overall positive and the results provide a strong indication in favour of choice and 
competition being welfare improving. This regardless of whether the explanation is 
improved quality or efficiency, or welfare gains from the procedure of choosing. The 
results are consistent with those of previous studies, on quality and efficiency (Cooper 
et al. 2010; 2011), which indicates that at least part of the positive SWB effect is due to 
quality improvements in hospitals facing higher competition. The positive and stronger 
effect of competition on health satisfaction, compared to the effect on SWB, indicates 
that outcome utility is an important component of the total welfare effect. Health 
satisfaction, as a domain satisfaction, is more closely linked with actual health status 
(Van Praag et al. 2003) which favours an ‘outcome oriented’ interpretation of the 
results. However, it has been shown that greater autonomy and sense of self-
determination can improve health, in and of itself (Ryan and Deci 2000), which is a 
possible explanation for the positive effect overall. The current data however offers 
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little insight into the more refined analysis of procedural utility. It can neither be refuted 
nor causally evidenced. Noteworthy is also the particular influence of common 
determinants of SWB among the sample of recent hospital in-patients. Income did not 
significantly influence SWB whereas ‘softer’ determinants mattered more; employment, 
family and so forth. Many of the ‘softer’ indicators are known to contribute to an 
overall social support for the individual. This can be particularly important for 
individual wellbeing during stressful times, such as here, an in-patient stay in the 
hospital.  
 
The analysis of equity effects suggests that more choice and competition benefit the 
already well off (primarily individuals with high education and above median income). 
Key explanations tied to the education and income effect is firstly information 
processing skills and information availability which are well known to be found more 
prominently among individuals primarily with higher education and white collar 
professions. The effect of income may link with a better ability to take-up on the variety 
of choices offered, in terms of funding travel and stays further away from area of 
residence (Robertson and Burge 2011)). Travel to hospitals is generally not funded on 
the NHS which, combined with the huge favouring of proximity as a key choice 
parameter and criteria for a quality health care system (see chapter 4, table 23), indicates 
travel as a key constraint on choice. The results indicate that the equitability of choice 
and competition policies is questionable. Qualitative research and quantitative evidence 
from more detailed survey data can help understand these effects better and identify 
cost-effective measures to support choice.  
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A competing explanation of the equity effect is that better-off individuals are more 
likely to have a good communication with their GP, and hold a more trusting 
relationship. However, in general patients did not rely on GP’s advice to a large extent 
when selecting a hospital (see figure 3). The role of the GP in the last wave of reforms 
has been strengthened, and a key component of a GP’s role is to serve explicitly as an 
agent choosing secondary care for their patients. The perception of quality on the part of 
the individual is elsewhere argued to be weak or ill-founded (Marshall et al. 2000; 
Shekelle et al. 2008). GPs have a key role as they serve as agents for different patients 
for the same set of conditions and hence are well positioned to advice patients based on 
experiences of past patients and  ‘quality ex post’. Patient may rarely attend hospitals 
for the same procedures twice while however GP’s make the same referral decisions 
repeatedly.  
 
The current data does not allow controlling for how the choice situation of each 
individual is experienced which is a clear limitation to the analysis and particularly to 
the part seeking to examine procedural (process) utility. The literature emphasises the 
character of the choice situation, but also the number of options offered and the level of 
knowledge held by the actor making the choice (generally the patient and/or patient’s 
family) are key determinants of welfare effects. The literature on individual choice 
emphasises these issues (Schwartz 2004) and it is clear from the evidence on the choice 
situation that the choice situation is often far from optimal. A directed survey, similar to 
the National Patient Choice Survey but with additional socio-economic indicators 
would provide opportunity to explore this area further.  
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Beyond the status of the UK as a possible source of policy learning, the structure of the 
health care system is similar to that of the other Beveridgean health systems discussed 
which implies a relevance of the results also in those countries. The positive well-being 
effects which have here been dominantly linked to competition and improved outcomes 
are possibly to be expected in other European NHS type systems, however, the 
particularly geographical character of England, in which we see the greatest gains in 
densely populated areas, may be less likely to be replicated in countries such as Sweden 
with a low concentration of specialist providers and extensive geographical distances. 
  
2.6 Conclusions 
The chapter finds an overall positive welfare effect of choice and competition of the 
choice at referral policy in the English NHS. However, the benefits are inequitably 
distributed – patients groups with higher income and education benefit significantly 
more than low income and education groups. The empirical analysis finds no evidence 
of procedural utility gained from the process of choosing. The effects of satisfaction 
with health are stronger compared to the SWB effects which suggests that it is outcome 
effects – i.e. improved health which drives the overall positive welfare effect. The role 
of information as an explanation for the lack of procedural utility is supported by the 
capability gradient identified through analysis of socio-economic groups.  
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Chapter 3  Choice  
 
 
Does choice improve subjective well-being? The 
case of German Long-term Care Provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Long-term care (LTC) policies are increasingly oriented towards user choice, which, 
primarily through various ‘cash-for-care’ schemes, reflects the emergence of a model of 
care focused on autonomy and personalisation. The anticipated benefits of choice in 
LTC are twofold: positive effects on individual welfare stemming from better-tailored 
care provision and cost-containment from the emphasis on less expensive home care. 
This paper estimates the welfare effects of user choice as part of the German LTC 
insurance system introduced in 1994 – internationally one of the most extensive LTC 
choice schemes. Difference-in-difference (DiD) models are estimated using survey data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The dependent variable, subjective well-
being, captures effects of improved service (outcome utility) as well as intrinsic benefits 
of choice (procedural utility). The results indicate a strong welfare effect of the 
introduction of the LTCI system, however stronger among individuals with higher 
income and education. The positive welfare effect of the choice component is equitably 
distributed, however influenced by the availability of informal carers.  
 
101 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Long-term care as a distinct social service is a recent addition to the welfare provision 
in many European countries and remains under constant reform pressure to meet 
increasing demands for care in an ageing society (Pickard et al. 2007). Ageing 
populations joint with changing social realities, constrained by cost-containment 
pressures, amount to a challenging reform environment (Fernandez et al. 2009). In this 
setting user choice schemes have become a popular reform solution. The schemes 
combine cost-containing properties (incentivising less expensive home care over 
institutionalised care) while increased autonomy and fulfilment of preferences is argued 
to improve user satisfaction. User choice in LTC is often offered in the shape of cash 
benefits or ‘cash-for-care’ (also called ‘direct payments’ in the UK). The ‘choice 
situation’ does not fit neatly within the categories discussed in chapter 1 (see Le Grand 
2007a) as it results in a care package including choice of provider, choice of service and 
choice of treatment. For example, choosing family carers (informal care) limits the 
range of services available but still allows for selecting additional services and 
treatments. These can be self-provided, such as taking part in social activities. This 
chapter argues that this holistic approach to the choice situation is crucial for modelling 
the hypothesised welfare effects.  
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on choice in long-term care 
(Ungerson 2004; Glendinning and Kemp 2006; Timonen et al. 2006; Ungerson and 
Yeandle 2007) by using a novel approach to welfare effects on a systematic scale, in 
capturing the effects of choice as a new institution in the interplay between the state, the 
market and the family. The literature on the ‘personalisation agenda’ predicts benefits of 
user choice as it brings increased autonomy and tends to result in a care solution which 
102 
 
better meets individual preferences (Glendinning and Kemp 2006). Choice of LTC 
services is denoted by ample privately held information, opportunity to reverse choices 
and low risk of an overwhelming number of options. These are conditions argued to 
lead to an improvement in individual satisfaction and well-being compared to a no-
choice situation (Schwartz et al. 2002). For health care positive quality and efficiency 
improvements have been found following choice and competition between professional 
care providers (Cooper et al. 2010; 2011). There is however less of a literature on 
competition effects in LTC, mainly generated from the US, and with variable results 
(Bishop 1988; Zinn 1994).
48
   
 
The analysis of outcomes, or welfare accrued, from long-term care policy interventions 
is currently developing and the challenges are numerous (Clark 2007; Mor 2007). 
Similarly to in the case of quality indicators in health care, confusion tend to arise 
between performance indicators and health outcomes (Giuffrida et al. 1999). A more 
holistic quality of life approach has been advocated and increasingly applied aligning 
with the increased user-orientation of the care agenda (Kane 2001). Importantly, welfare 
effects of choice, if ignoring the ‘how’ or the procedural utility, leave out a key aspect 
of the dynamics of individual autonomy whereby individuals are found to benefit from 
the intrinsic value of choice – from the act of choosing (Iyengar and Lepper 1999). This 
is a key contribution of the chapter, whereby any ‘outcome-only’ measure such as care 
hours, health status or morbidity will capture mainly, if not uniquely, the effects of the 
more appropriate care allocation and the effects this might have on health. Undoubtedly 
                                                 
48
 It should be noted that competition between providers does not necessarily imply the availability of 
private (formal) providers. Important is also that the possible effects competition in LTC provision is 
secondary to choice effects as the bulk of provision is carried out by family and relatives, i.e. informal 
providers.  
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the procedural utility of choice will also have (indirect) effects on health status, as it is 
likely that mental well-being influences objective health outcomes.  
 
The second aspect to the choice – welfare relation is the equitability of any welfare 
effect generated. Choice in public services has been argued to be inherently equitable as 
it allows poor individuals, previously restricted in their options, to choose in the same 
way as more well off individuals generally can (Austin 2011). On the other hand choice 
is thought to benefit educated and well-off individuals more due to their superior access 
to information and ability to make beneficial choices (Barr et al. 2008). There is 
however a lack of systematic empirical evidence on the welfare effects of choice and the 
equitability of choice policies, albeit intensely discussed in theory. This paper offers 
evidence of the impacts of choice on individuals’ welfare, as well as the equitability of 
the distribution of any benefits in the case of LTC in Germany.  
 
The introduction of the choice-led LTC insurance in Germany offers a natural 
experiment allowing for the analysis of welfare effects with causal interpretations 
through difference-in-difference (DiD) models. LTCI in Germany offers a significant 
emphasis on choice for the individual, in arranging a preferred care solution suitable to 
the individual’s needs and constraints. The 1994 legislation on mandatory national long-
term care insurance (see figure 7), without age limits for receiving benefits, came into 
action in April of 1995 when the two home based options were available to all, whereas 
nursing home care became available from July 1996 (Rothgang 2010). A few years 
following the formal introduction of the policy, in stages over 1995 and 1996, 88 % of 
the population was covered by the public LTC insurance plans, either as contributing 
members (51 million) or as covered family members (21 million) (Geraedts et al. 
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2000:379). The scheme, once an individual has been deemed eligible, offer a choice 
between cash benefits to fund informal carers or professional carers and benefits in kind 
– care provided by publicly employed professional carers. Institutional care is also 
offered as part of the scheme, but this does not constitute a real choice for the individual 
as nursing home care is allocated only in cases of severe need and lack of informal 
support (Heinicke and Thomsen 2010).  
 
The questions this paper seeks to answer in relation to the German LTCI’s choice of 
provision component are the following:   
- Does choice in long-term care improve individual well-being?  
- Are benefits equitably distributed according to socio-economic status? 
- Are benefits equitably distributed according to the availability of meaningful 
options (primarily informal carers)? 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the case background, 
followed by methods and descriptive statistics of the determinants of SWB among LTC 
users. The results section reports results of variations of the DiD and DDD models, 
identification strategies and samples. Finally, the discussion section draws conclusions 
and discusses potential constraints.  
 
3.2 Background 
In this section, I discuss the evolution of the German system and why choice became an 
inherent aspect of LTC provision. The considerable differences between the German 
‘lander’ (federal states) are discussed, both in terms of geographical characteristics but 
also economic situation and approach to care provision. The German case is compared 
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to European LTC systems highlighting generalisability in spite of considerable 
differences in reform trajectories.    
3.2.1 The German long-term care insurance 
The Long- Term Care Insurance Act of 1994 became the fifth building block of the 
German social insurance system, which began with Bismarck's Health Insurance Act of 
1883 and subsequently added statutory accident, pension, and unemployment insurance 
(Geraedts et al. 2000). Before the inception of the new LTC insurance system in 
Germany, 80 % of elderly Germans living in nursing homes could not afford to pay the 
full fees and charges (Heinicke and Thomsen 2010) and 69 (88) % of frail elderly 
persons living in nursing homes in Western (Eastern) Germany claimed public 
assistance transfers (Arntz et al. 2007). These nursing-home residents depended on 
public assistance and received payments from the social welfare system, which was 
funded by the German federal states and communities. A key driver of reform was the 
escalating deficits in communities resulting from extensive payments to nursing homes. 
The universality of the LTCI stems from the basic German social insurance concept: the 
‘solidarity principle,’ which stipulates that members of society are responsible for 
providing adequately for one another's well-being through collective action. Everyone 
whose income falls below the threshold ‘income limit for mandatory health and LTC 
insurance’ (in 1999, this amount was €43,466 gross income per year in Western and 
€36,818 in eastern German states) must belong to the mandatory public system and 
contribute to it and those with higher incomes have the option either to join the public 
insurance system or to buy private insurance (Schneider 1999). 
 
106 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the development of LTC coverage in the German system. The LTC 
coverage prior to the 1994 reform was close to non-existent. Individuals in need of care 
had to use own funds or apply for social benefits for LTC. The social benefits were 
means-tested, and households did not only have to spend down assets before receiving 
any help, using social benefits was also stigmatised. From 1988, restricted to cases of 
severe dependency and only to home care, a forerunner to the 1994 LTCI system was in 
operation. Restrictions on claims where severe – claimants under this system had to 
have been insured with the sickness funds for more than 15 years and still the sickness 
funds were reluctant to grant benefits for LTC. The 1988 law also experimented with a 
cash option, which was later included in the 1994 legislation on mandatory national 
long-term care insurance. With the start of compulsory dependency insurance in April 
1995, about 700,000 beneficiaries who had already been receiving a long-term care 
allowance from their sickness funds became eligible under the provisions of the new 
care funds. The two home based options were available to all from 1995 and nursing 
home care was available from July 1996. Between January 1, 1994, and April 1, 1995 
the contribution rate was 1 per cent. During this time no transfers were paid through the 
LTC insurance. The contribution rate since April 1, 1995 has been 1.7 per cent. Benefits 
for home care were granted from April 1, 1995 onwards, whereas those for nursing 
home care entered into effect on July 1, 1996. 
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Figure 7 – Reform timeline the German LTC insurance 
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A few years following the formal introduction of the policy, in stages over 1995 and 
1996, 88 % of the population was covered by the public LTC insurance plans, either as 
contributing members (51 million) or as covered family members (21 million). Around 
10 per cent of the population exempt from the compulsory social insurance because of 
high incomes and private health insurance are instead obliged by law to buy private 
LTC insurance (Geraedts et al. 2000). Some individuals who are legally entitled to join 
private LTC insurance plans instead opt into the public insurance system. Often this 
decision is due to the public system covers all family members of an insured head of 
family, in contrast to a private insurance plan, which is entitled to charge a premium for 
each family member. There is no age limit and in order to claim benefits from the 
compulsory long-term care insurance scheme an insured person must be defined as 
‘frail’. The Social Security Code (SGB, Sozialgesetzbuch XI) defines a frail person as 
“a person who requires for a minimum period of approximately six months, permanent, 
frequent or extensive help in performing a special number of ‘Activities of Daily Life’ 
(ADL) and ‘Instrumental Activities of Daily Life’ (IADL) due to physical, mental or 
psychological illness or disability” (Holdenrieder 2003). Such a person is dependent on 
assistance with personal care, nutrition, mobility and housekeeping.  
 
Table 9 illustrates the level of benefit payments for each of the care levels in 2004. 
Payments have been increased in line with inflation since the introduction of the LTCI 
(Colombo 2011:220). The benefit levels illustrate the partial support that the LTCI 
provides; for example a level III LTC user needs extensive, most likely around the clock 
care for which Euro 665 does not equate the real cost. Also the in-kind transfer to the 
value of Euro 1400 will need to be supplemented by additional private funding in order 
to cover the full care needs (Arntz et al. 2007).   
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Table 9 – German LTCI benefit levels by care types (in euro) 2004 
  Type of assistance Level I Level II Level III Hardship cases 
In-kind transfers/month 384 921 1432 1918 
Lump-sum transfers/month 205 410 665 - 
Respite care/year 1432 1432 1432 - 
Day/Night care/month 384 921 1432 - 
Short-term care/year 1432 1432 1432 - 
Nursing home care/month 1023 1279 1432 1688 
Source: Adapted from (Arntz et al. 2007), data from Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und 
soziale Sicherun (Ministry of Health and Social Security). 
 
As part of the fore-runner to the 1994 LTCI insurance from 1988, the health insurance 
scheme has paid in-kind transfers of up to 750 DM (383 euros) (or 25 visits) per month 
for professional home care for people with serious handicaps, or up to 400 DM (205 
euros) per month of lump-sum transfers for private caregivers. Home care of up to four 
weeks a year was subsidised with 1,800 DM (920 euros) to enable informal care 
providers to take a vacation and to pay for temporary professional respite provision 
(Alber 1996).  
 
The German system has continued to be under debate, and in 2008 a variety of 
proposals for reforming long-term care insurance was channelled into a new reform 
package (Pegeweiterentwicklungsgesetz) which changed a number of important aspects 
of the LTCI. Two key changes were; an adjustment of the benefits and the reduction of 
the required contribution period for eligibility of benefit receipt, from five to two years. 
With regard to respite care, the minimum duration until entitlement was reduced from 
12 to six months. Finally, it is worth noting that the federal states are responsible for the 
administration of the LTCI and investment in LTC facilities. Table 10 illustrates the 
diversity of the German federal states in terms of LTC provision and usage.  
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Table 10 – German LTCI, care provision and usage by federal state    
 
Nursing 
homes 
Individuals per 
nursing home 
(averages) 
Nursing home 
per 10.000 
needing 
Home-
care 
services 
Home-care 
services per 
10.000 
needing 
In 
nursing 
home % 
At home 
% 
Home-
care 
services 
% 
Cash 
Benefits 
% 
Baden–Württemberg 956 220.54 45.34 845 40.08 31.1 68.9 20.1 48.8 
Bayern 1,262 233.20 42.88 1,591 54.06 28 72 19.3 52.7 
Bremen 71 241.45 41.42 126 73.50 27.2 72.8 26.5 46.3 
Hamburg 164 256.10 39.05 343 81.66 32.2 67.8 27.3 40 
Hessen 614 236.88 42.22 860 59.13 25.7 74.3 20.3 54 
Nirdersachsen 1,163 179.93 55.58 926 44.25 29.3 70.7 19.3 51.4 
Nordrhein–Westfalen 1,872 248.85 40.18 2,205 47.33 28.6 71.4 20.2 51.2 
Rheinland–Pfalz 390 236.77 42.24 411 44.51 27.4 72.6 19 53.5 
Saarland 110 247.22 40.45 153 56.26 27.4 72.6 19.3 53.3 
Schleswig–Holstein 579 131.25 76.19 439 57.77 36.2 63.8 18.9 44.9 
The new federal states of Germany 1990 (former German Democratic 
Republic)        
Berlin  316 255.92 39.07 310 38.33 29.2 70.8 22.8 48 
Brandenburg  261 246.51 40.57 516 80.20 24.4 75.6 24 51.6 
Mecklenburg– 
Vorpommern 181 251.55 39.75 398 87.41 28.1 71.9 19.7 52.2 
Sachsend 439 269.08 37.16 845 71.53 26 74 25.4 48.6 
Sachsen–Anhalt 260 256.22 39.03 481 72.20 26.4 73.6 21.3 52.3 
Thüringend 219 275.15 36.34 371 61.57 23.6 76.4 20.2 56.1 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Länder 2004. From http://www.statistik-portal.de/statistik-portal/en/.  
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The federal responsibility for administration and investment in LTC has resulted in 
differences in the character of provision as highlighted in Sato (2005) offering an 
overview of the diversity of LTC provision in the German federal states. Some of the 
variation is attributed to differences in investment over time a great deal of additional 
investment has been made to support the development of the German LTCI across the 
federal states. From 1991 to 1998, the federal government spent circa €335 million for 
close to 400 different projects to fill existing gaps. In addition, the 16 states passed bills 
to promote investments in long-term care-facilities. The investment resulted in an 
increase in the number of nursing homes from 4,300 in 1992 to about 8,000 in 1997 
(Arntz et al. 2007).  
3.2.2 Choice in European long-term care systems  
The ‘choice paradigm’ is much debated and promoted both in policy circles and 
literature inspiring reforms across Europe. Several European countries have included 
cash-for-care schemes the when developing existing LTC structures, as in the case of 
among others France, Austria and the Netherlands. In countries where public investment 
in care policies is traditionally strong, and in countries where LTC as a policy issue has 
arisen more recently, cash-for-care schemes have been used to maintain or increase the 
availability of informal care, to contain costs, and to support care markets as well as 
provide choice for the individuals (Roit and Bihan 2010).
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The development of LTC policy highlights the issue of the division and understanding 
of responsibility (and power) between the individual and the state (as further discussed 
                                                 
49
 The distinction between formal (professionally provided and financially rewarded) and informal 
(family/relative provided without financial contract) care is important. Choice schemes often formalise 
informal care by allowing for a financial reward as well as in certain cases formalising the care situation 
through an employment contract.  
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in chapter 4). In many European countries the strategy has been, rather than developing 
state provision, creating structures within which to pay family members and relatives to 
care, or to incentivise private professional providers. A process of increasing 
‘commodification of care’ is argued to be taking place (Ungerson 1997; Ungerson and 
Yeandle 2007), which has implications for the understanding of the characteristic and 
reform of the welfare state. LTC policy carries further important implications for labour 
markets and employment as LTC provision is denoted by labour shortages in many 
countries. As a result, for example in Austria and Italy a large proportion of care 
workers are (sometimes illegal) immigrants (Da Roit et al. 2007). The role and 
incentives of informal carers is a crucial issue for sustainable LTC provision and for this 
cash allowances can play an important role (Lundsgaard 2005). Unpaid informal carers 
do not only forgo formal employment while caring, but are likely to face challenges in 
returning to the labour market at a later stage, particularly after a prolonged period away 
from formal work (Bittman et al. 2007). 
 
Financial pressures, both from the general cost-containment driving reform of the 
European welfare states, and from the fiscal constraints imposed by the European Union 
through the Stability and Growth Pact, has accentuated the need for reformation of the 
provision of social care. Considerable changes in the traditional support systems – 
including less care is being provided by family and relatives in a home setting – 
particularly important the Mediterranean countries, requires reform of the structure of 
care (Oesterle 2001). The focus on, and promotion of, choice and competition in public 
services in the EU predicts a further expansion of this type of public sector reform, 
which highlights the need for further assessment and understanding of the effects of this 
type of policies (Leichsenring 2004). Choice policies have been presented as a way to 
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increase user satisfaction and to allow for the often in the setting of the EU referred to: 
‘ageing in place’. By allowing for a choice between cash benefit and in kind services (as 
in Germany) the policy is intended to support family care, which is also less costly 
relative to institutional care (Lundsgaard 2005).  
 
The most prominent choice policy in LTC is the cash-for-care schemes, where the main 
idea is to allow the individual to make free choices of what combination of care he or 
she feel is most appropriate (see table 11 for an overview of European choice schemes). 
It is in terms of this type of policy the beneficial properties of choice is most debated. 
The choice is offered not only between types of care but also providers that may be 
public as well as private, non-profit and for-profit. The idea is to improve the autonomy 
among the elderly (and disabled) which is intended to result in improved wellbeing and 
satisfaction. Provider choice is also intended to bring competition into the provision of 
care, which is argued to improve the efficiency and quality of care (Kremer 2006). 
Originally it was primarily the disabled people’s organisations that acted as pressure 
groups on governments in search of more self-determination in the arrangements of care 
(Glendinning 2008). The choice policies have also been promoted under the intention of 
formalising or at least recognising previously un-paid informal care as many of the 
schemes allow payment of or even a formal employment contract for relatives that 
previously have provided informal care (Ungerson 1997). This aspect, and the 
sometimes strict regulations surrounding the schemes have strongly influenced level of 
‘commodification of care’ (Ungerson and Yeandle 2007) as well as created new forms 
of care work and informal care structures (Da Roit et al. 2007).  
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‘Cash for care’ schemes are particularly prominent in Germany, France, Austria, UK 
and partly in Belgium. The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark on the other hand, have 
a highly state oriented provision of LTC, with as evident from the table, considerably 
higher spending on LTC overall. Noteworthy is that the average satisfaction with LTC 
is not systematically higher than the countries spending considerably less. The variation 
seems to be correlated with an historic understanding of the role of the state as a 
provider of LTC. Particularly in Mediterranean countries familistic values are strong 
whereby public services are not expected to take a strong role in the provision of LTC 
(Costa-Font 2010). When needs are demanding, the regular health services step in, 
conjunctly with expectations.  
 
Table 11 suggests that there is a link between the coverage of choice schemes and the 
extent to which the country has a familistic culture. We find Italy, Spain and Germany 
at the upper end of the familism spectrum and Sweden and the Netherlands at the lower 
end – the countries varying substantially in terms of spending, extent of provision and 
type of choice offered. France is a particular case with relatively low family values 
coupled with intergenerational solidarity legislation.
50
 Again, Germany has a high level 
of familism combined with a LTC system with complete emphasis on choice for the 
individual. 
 
 
                                                 
50
 However the French LTC system has been dubbed ‘the French compromise’ and consist of a mix of 
private insurance (the largest LTCI market in the world bar the US), high reliance on formal provision yet 
with strong values attached to informal care and the duties of the family to provide for the elderly (Bihan 
and Martin 2006).  
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Table 11 – LTC choice schemes in Western European countries.51  
 
Choice Scheme 
Initial policy 
setting 
Needs/ means 
test 
Cash/ in 
kind 
Percentage 
covered * Regulation 
Size of 
benefits 
Family 
versus state 
care 
Germany 
General long-term 
care insurance 
Foundation of 
LTC policy 
Only needs 
tested (lump-
sum) 
Cash or in 
kind 
services 
11 
Freedom to spend 
benefits without 
control 
Level 1: €215 
Level 2: €420 
Level 3: €675 
Family 
France 
Allocation 
personnalis´ee 
d’autonomie (APA) 
Foundation of 
LTC policy 
Increasing co-
payment with 
income 
Cash 
7.8 (on 
population 
60+) 
Tighter regulation 
(Care package 
defined by 
professionals) 
Average 
amount: 
€494/month 
Mixed/State 
Italy 
Indennit`a di 
accompagnamento 
Core position 
within implicit 
LTC policy 
Only needs 
tested (lump-
sum) 
Cash 10 
Freedom to spend 
benefits without 
control 
Flat-rate 
payment, 
2009: €472 
Family 
Spain 
Sistema para al 
autonomía y la 
atención a la 
dependencia (SAAD) 
Foundation of 
LTC policy 
Needs tested 
Cash or in 
kind 
services 
3.3 
Tighter regulation 
(Care package 
defined by 
professionals) 
200-500 euro 
per month 
Family 
/Mixed 
Netherlands 
Attendance 
allowance 
Flexibility of 
established LTC 
policy 
Increasing co-
payment with 
income 
Cash or in 
kind 
services 
1.4 
Tighter regulation 
(Recipients must 
justify expenses) 
Average 
budget, 2006: 
€11,500/year 
State/ 
professionals 
Sweden 
Decentralised 
attendance allowance 
Flexibility of 
established LTC 
policy 
Only needs 
tested (lump-
sum) 
Cash 0.1 
Tighter regulation 
(Symbolic payment 
for informal care) 
487/month 
State/ 
professionals 
UK Individual budgets 
Flexibility of 
established LTC 
policy 
Needs tested Cash 0.5 Tighter regulation 
Depending on 
need 
Mixed/State 
Sources: ANCIEN study country reports and OECD Health data and documentation (Kraus et al. 2010).  
                                                 
51
 Table adapted from Costa Font and Zigante (2013).  
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The case of Germany and the introduction of the LTCI provide a promising empirical 
test of the welfare effects of choice compared to other European counterparts. The 
introduction of LTCI was implemented across the country but with key groups excluded 
which allows a treatments effect approach. On a European level Germany provides a 
useful case on the ‘familism’ spectrum in table 12. 
Table 12 – Familism in Western European countries, percentages  
    Best option for parent in need of care: ** 
  
Care should be 
given by relatives 
* 
Live with 
children 
Home care by 
children  
Home care by 
professionals 
Nursing home  
France 17% 18% 18% 46% 12% 
Germany 35% 25% 30% 27% 8% 
Italy 48% 28% 22% 30% 7% 
Netherlands 13% 4% 20% 52% 18% 
Spain 40% 41% 19% 16% 13% 
Sweden  7% 4% 13% 60% 20% 
United Kingdom 31% 19% 25% 35% 9% 
 
* QA8.5 For each of the following statements regarding the care of the elderly, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree. 
Care should be provided by close relatives of the dependent person, even if that means that they have to sacrifice their career to 
some extent        
** QA7a Imagine an elderly father or mother who lives alone and can no longer manage to live without regular help because of her 
or hi physical or mental health condition? In your opinion, what would be the best option for people in this situation? Firstly? 
They should live with one of their children, Public or private service providers should visit their home and provide them with 
appropriate help and care, One of their children should regularly visit their home, in order to provide them with the necessary care, 
They should move to a nursing home        
Source: 2007 Special Eurobarometer 283 “Health and Long-Term Care”   
 
The level of ‘familism’ is argued to be crucial for choice reforms as choice in LTC 
cannot be separated from the fact that any cash-for-care funded care is more than 
anything reliant on provision by informal carers (Lundsgaard 2005). Benefits are 
intensely dependent on the availability and willingness of family, relatives, friends and 
neighbours to provide care. In most systems, as evident in table 11 the cash payments 
are not sufficient as replacement for a full-time care giver (notably in Germany - the 
cash equivalent if opting for professional care is twice the amount of the cash option). 
This development has been argued to heavily depend on ‘familism’ as discussed by 
Costa-Font (2010). 
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3.2.3 The choice experience in German LTCI 
The choice experience in the German LTCI straddles the various types of choice as 
outlined by Le Grand (2007a). It is not purely a choice of provider, although this 
represents one of the choices, but further a choice of service and to some extent of 
treatment. The choice situation offered includes a holistic approach to the individual 
care situation where various components can be combined and there is room for 
multiple options within each category. More specifically, an individual having been 
deemed eligible for support under the LTCI is faced with at least four care options:  
- ‘Nursing home’: In-kind nursing home care; in practice substantial needs are 
required for eligibility (with co-payment) and hotel costs are not included. 
- ‘Family care’ (cash benefits): informal care givers must work at least 14 hours 
per week (and work less than 30 hours in employment). 
- ‘Professional home care’: in-kind, professional care provision in the home.   
- Combination of family and professional care, with nursing home care as a 
temporary option (respite care).        
The three key options are i, ii and iii, while option iv shares the potential family 
component with option ii and is considered a sub-category of no additional analytical 
value. The three options carry different scope and character of choice: an individual 
qualifying for care through the LTCI will firstly have the choice of location of care; 
whether to remain in the home or move to an institutional care facility. This choice is 
however heavily constrained by medical need, and nursing home care external to the 
LTCI is paid for privately. The general policy is one of ageing in place (Geraedts et al. 
2000); which is reflected in the options available. Following this, the main choice is 
between ‘professional home care’ and ‘family care’. This choice is technically available 
to all individuals (unless user’s condition is too severe to allow for care at home, for 
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example in the case of severe dementia), but practically choice is constrained by the 
availability of family carers. The variation in availability of choice is controlled for in 
the subsequent analysis and forms key constraints in the hypothesised benefits of 
choice.  
3.2.4 Equity implications 
The equitability of choice policies in LTC has to date been considered relatively little in 
the literature. This may stem from the fact that nearly all individuals are under- or un-
insured in many countries. This of course is less strenuous for individuals with ample 
resources to purchase private care or assistance, or for individuals who qualified for the 
(more or less) strict means-testing often present (see for example Dilnot 2011). Hence, 
in Germany, the ‘losers’ in the pre-LTCI time were the middle class who potentially 
faced catastrophic costs if in need of extended periods of LTC support (Colombo 2011). 
The previous system in Germany only provided social benefits, available to individuals 
with low incomes, which meant that anyone above the social assistance threshold had to 
spend down wealth to receive benefits (Alber 1996). The new LTCI system was 
criticized for the universal benefit levels given to low-, middle- and high-income LTC 
users exclusively depending on need. This implies an actual redistribution from low-
income LTCI users to middle- and high-income LTC users. The analysis by Schneider, 
including simulation of access to and levels of payments as part of the LTCI, confirms 
this. Schneider found that the LTCI is financially most beneficial to middle and high 
income earners, who, prior to the 1994 reform, had to shoulder the full financial strain 
of disability (1999).  
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Considering the ‘choice component’ in itself, the considerations in relation to equity are 
similar to those generally discussed in regard to health care in chapter 2. ‘Voice’ 
problems such as communication difficulties, assertiveness and ability to deal with 
professionals, cultural and health beliefs and behaviour, transport difficulties and travel 
distance, as well as the time and financial costs of travel, family or work commitments 
(Dixon et al. 2003; 2006) apply also to the take-up of choice in LTC.
52
 In health care it 
is further argued that flexibility, mobility and the ability to cope with for example 
travelling costs (Appleby et al. 2003) matters for the ability to make optimal use of 
choice by accessing preferred providers. In LTC, the actual options available to most 
individuals are constrained by external factors related to level of need and availability of 
family support rather than financial situation. These are not clearly distributed according 
to socio-economic group belonging, and imply that we need to think differently about 
equity impacts of LTC provision (Lundsgaard 2005).  
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
This paper uses the introduction of choice as a part of the German compulsory long-
term care insurance to estimate a set of DiD models based on the Germany Socio-
economic panel survey (GSOEP) in order to identify welfare effects measured through 
SWB. The analysis is structured around a set of hypothesized positive effects on SWB:    
H1. A system effect, of being part of the public system rather than the private system 
(including choice effect) 
                                                 
52
 Leece and Leece (2006) identified empirical evidence highlighting the danger that in the UK direct 
payments or individualized funding is creating a two-tiered service system where middle class users are 
more likely to get access to personalised services.  
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H2. A choice effect, as in H1 yet controlling for the previously insured public users 
(small scheme for high intensity users) to discount the ‘system’ effect 
H3. Equity and informal care availability effects of characteristics which influence 
the capacity to benefit from the LTCI 
 This section discusses the methodological considerations. 
3.3.1 Data and Method 
The main data source is the German Socio-economic panel
53
, with data available from 
1984-2009, in total about half a million observations (Extracted using Panelwhiz, see  
Haisken-DeNew and Hahn 2010).  
 
Dependent variable 
This chapter uses an indicator of subjective well-being as its main dependent variable, 
collected through the question ‘how satisfied are you with your life’, and rated by the 
respondent on a scale from 0 to 10. Subjective well-being data has been collected in the 
GSOEP every year since 1984. As in chapter 2, the ordinal life satisfaction variable 
(SWB), is transformed into a z-score, and conveys the underlying information in just 
one parameter which facilitates analysis and interpretation.
54
 All models have been run 
on alternative specifications with consistent results.  
 
Independent variable 
The key independent variables are proxies for situations where the user has ‘choice’. 
Practically, ‘choice’ is a dummy variable where ‘1’ means that the individual is being in 
                                                 
53
 Accessed with permission from the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). 
54
 The transformation includes rescaling the ordinal SWB variable into a continuous variable, in the shape 
of a unit normal distribution, by subtracting the mean of the variable from any given response and 
dividing this by the standard deviation (Freeman, 1978). 
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the receipt of public LTCI benefits once having been deemed eligible as a LTC user and 
‘0’ means that the eligible individual has private health insurance and hence is eligible 
for private LTCI payments. Private LTCI also offers choice, however as elaborated in 
relation to the DiD models, the choice offer has remained static over time whereas the 
public offer has changed. When an individual has been deemed eligible
55
 for public 
LTCI he or she is offered the choice set described in section 3.2.3.  
 
Before the LTCI reform and up until 1996 the GSOEP does not contain a specific 
question asking for whether individuals are receiving care, how it is paid for and to 
what extent. From 1996 compulsory LTCI benefits payments are recorded which were 
used to identify the ‘after’ sample. The ‘before’ sample was identified from a set of 
individual characteristics instrumenting for the need for help with IADLs (Instrumental 
activities of daily living, see Leitner 2003). This resulted in a sample approximating the 
number of eligible individuals which was then checked for consistency with the ‘after’ 
sample. The sample was matched so that it contained a similar distribution of care needs 
as the ‘after’ sample, through significance testing on key variables (‘Person Requiring 
Help Present In HH’, ‘Need help or have difficulty bathing alone’, ‘Difficulty/need help 
getting in/out bed’, ‘Need help with shopping’). The average and standard error of key 
variables are shown in table 13, illustrating the similarity of the groups.  
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 Becoming deemed as eligible can be conceived as an independent choice, where a subset of eligible 
users may not actively seek to be evaluated for LTC benefits. If this is the case, the observed sample of 
users who receive LTCI is truncated and any unobserved differences between the observed and 
unobserved sample may bias the results. Conclusions can hence only be drawn for individuals who have 
been deemed eligible, rather than the unknown sample of all individuals with LTC needs.     
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Table 13 – Descriptive statistics for the DiD and DDD groups  
Groups Income Subjective well-being Health status Nr of obs. 
Treated (public)  
21627.89   
(487.05) 
5.069   
(0.085) 
1.733   
 (0.037) 
365 
Control (private)  
23114.56   
(849.06) 
4.821   
 (0.168) 
1.574    
(0.059) 
83 
Control (public- severe 
care needs pre 1994) 
22031.9   
(535.23) 
4.764  
 (0.101) 
1.625    
(0.037) 
97 
Table is reporting mean and standard error (in brackets)  
Source: GSOEP (1990-1993) 
 
The identification strategy is due to the character of the data based on assumptions of 
correct reporting which is not endogenous to the SWB variable. Individuals with a 
negative disposition may be more likely to report more severe needs, which is also 
likely to be correlated with a higher propensity to report low SWB. This is however not 
a unique problem to the present study – any evaluation of the impact of service on LTC 
outcomes is hampered by the correlation of increased need (i.e. worse outcomes) and 
increased use of care.  
3.3.2 Models 
The introduction of the German compulsory LTC insurance in 1994 (see figure 7 for an 
overview of the reform sequence) allows for a treatment effect analysis in a DiD model. 
In simple terms, a DiD model seeks to weed out the effect of the treatment, choice, by 
taking the difference between a treatment group and a control group before and after the 
introduction of the policy (Lee 2005). The LTCI reform forms a natural experiment, 
with a ‘before-after’ distinction in that the LTC coverage prior to the 1994 reform was 
only available to the severely disabled (Schneider 1999:34; Rothgang 2010). Treatment 
and control groups which were affected by the choice component of the LTC insurance 
to varying extents through the regulation and implementation phasing of the compulsory 
LTCI can also be identified through the GSOEP.  
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The pre-reform period is (1990-1993)
56
 and after is (1996-2000), where the years 1994 
and 1995 are left out due to the lagged implementation period – the policy was only 
fully up and running, including nursing home care, by July 1996. Individual 
observations have been pooled from the pre and post periods. Few longitudinal 
observations are available over the before-after periods due to attrition in the group 
(only 4% of observations are present in 4 consecutive years of surveying). Year 
dummies are included to account for time varying effects not accounted for by the DiD 
dummy ‘after’. The following sections discuss the models employed based on the 
control group selected. 
 
H1: DiD ‘system effect’  
Previous to the LTCI, all individuals in need of care had to use own funds, alternatively 
social benefits for LTC (Schneider 1999). The benefits were means-tested, and 
households did not only have to spend down assets before receiving any help, using 
social benefits was also stigmatised (Schneider 1999). Around 10% of the population 
with private health insurance had LTC insurance included and for this group there was 
no change when the public insurance was implemented. Most individuals remained with 
their private options although the opportunity to switch was given. Hence, the 
individuals with private LTCI form a control group, similar to that of the public LTC 
users, but unaffected by the public LTCI. I estimate the following standard DiD 
equation:  
itititiit XTGTGSWB   43210                     [4] 
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 Data from the years 1990 to 2000 is selected to avoid the possible disturbance of the German 
unification which may have systematically affected SWB. Similarly, individuals in East Germany have 
been excluded from the analysis.  
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The dependent variable is as discussed SWB is measured as life satisfaction on a scale 
from 1 to 10, and 
3  
is the coefficient of the DiD estimator of SWB where G=1 (for 
publicly insured individuals) and T=1 (‘after’) interact. This is the coefficient for the 
treated group in the post-treatment period. The ‘private’ group is formed by employees 
earning more than the social security earnings ceiling for the German social insurance 
system (€3,937.50 per month in 2006). This also applies to civil-servants and self-
employed who are not covered by the social insurance system within which 
contributions are paid equally by employers and employees, calculated from gross 
income up to a social security contribution ceiling (Arntz et al. 2007). This group is 
covered by private health insurance and after 1994 private LTCI was channelled 
through the health insurance funds to provide for this group which is obliged by law to 
buy private insurance (Geraedts et al. 2000).  
 
A key concern for DiD estimation is the similarity between the treatment and control 
group, and crucially, whether there is a difference in the trend of the dependent variable 
between the groups – i.e. whether in absence of treatment the groups would have similar 
or different trends in the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2010). The GSOEP includes 
data both before and after the relevant study period which permits identification of any 
systematic divergence in trends. During the years prior to the introduction of the policy 
the trends in SWB converged and the trends were at no point after 1985 statistically 
significantly different. The group of privately insured is distinct from the publicly 
insured in terms of higher than average prevalence of self- employed and somewhat 
higher average income both controlled for in the models. It is further assumed that 
income and wealth are correlated, so that in absence of indicators of capital wealth, 
income forms a sufficient proxy. Further robustness checks are implemented; additional 
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time periods and dependent variables, to account for any possible negative impact on 
the privately insured when the public system came into effect.  
 
H2: DDD ‘choice effect’  
The DiD general model with private versus public users is expanded as suggested by 
Meyer (1957) by including an additional control group resulting in a Difference-in-
Difference-in-Difference model (DDD). The additional group consists of individuals  
who, in the 1988 forerunner to the LTCI schemes (see figure 7), were in receipt of 
benefits. This was restricted to cases of severe dependency with benefits only available 
for home care. The sickness funds where restrictive in granting benefits for LTC and 
claimants had to have been insured with the sickness funds for more than 15 years 
before receiving benefits (Schneider 1999). Hence, individuals who were severely 
handicapped prior to the introduction of the policy are likely to have benefited from the 
non-compulsory long-term care insurance and in practice the 1994 law did not imply a 
major change in how care was provided. However, the users would still benefit from 
being part of the new LTCI ‘system’57, including new institutional features and an 
expanding sector of professional care provision, but also an ‘intangible’ effect of the 
system, in and of itself. The DDD model is formalised in equation 5 where the 
coefficient of interest is 
6   
ititiii
tiiiitit
XTGCGTTGC
TGTGCGTGTGCTSWB




765
443210
        [5] 
GT is the treatment group, here public (dummy variable=1) private (0) and GC is the 
additional control group: public and severely handicapped (1).  
                                                 
57
 This assumption rests on the theory of altruism and individuals having a social self whereby a benefit 
from being included in a society wide scheme carries a benefit, both in terms of meaning and values but 
also in terms of administrative structures becoming institutionalised which tends to bring a quality 
improvement (Fehr and Fischbacher. 2003).  
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The use of two control groups as discussed above is designed to capture the dual 
welfare effect; of the ‘system’ and of the ‘choice’. Using the privately insured control 
group broadly captures the effect of the change in LTC system whereas the control 
group of severely disabled individuals captures the effect of the character of the system. 
The group of privately insured’s status did not change following the introduction of the 
compulsory LTCI and the group hence provides a control for ‘something else’ taking 
place in the German society or economy at the time. The ‘previous user’ group 
benefited from the ‘system effect’ but did not experience a change in the amount of 
choice available to them. Hence, the group provides a control for the system effect and 
what remains is the ‘choice effect’.  
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive data 
A common concern when estimating the determinants of SWB is the non-normality of 
the SWB variable. However, for the particular sample of LTC users, the distribution of 
the SWB variable is closer to the normal distribution than what generally found in 
samples made up of a more diverse population. This anomaly is partly explained by the 
poorer health status of LTC users. Figure 8 shows the distribution of self-rated health 
status, where 1 stands for “very poor” and 5 for “very good”. The difference, between 
the general population in the left-hand part and the LTC users to the right, is dramatic. 
The much higher prevalence of “very poor” self-rated health status explains the higher 
prevalence of low SWB ratings illustrated in figure 9.  
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Figure 8 – Distribution of health status, general population (0) and LTC users (1) 
 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1993 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the SWB variable (life satisfaction) for LTC 
users. The users are grouped according to insurance status; 0 indicates private and 1 
public insurance. Firstly, both distributions of the SWB variable are different from what 
we find in the general population – normally strongly skewed to the left. The 
distributions of publicly and privately insured LTC users are similar, however for the 
public users SWB distribution is somewhat more skewed to the left.  
Figure 9 – Distribution of SWB, samples: LTC users private (0) public (1)  
 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1993 
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The particular distribution of SWB among LTC users indicates that we can expect also 
the determinants of SWB to be different compared to the general population. A 
descriptive OLS regression reveals the determinants of SWB for the LTC user sample. 
The model uses a z-score transformed SWB variable which enables the application of 
continuous variable models – here OLS.58 The OLS model estimates the following 
equation:  
iii XSWB   1     [6] 
SWB is here dependent on (
iX ) a vector of individual (i) level variables; sex, age, 
marital status, employment status, income, level of education, household size and health 
status all well established in previous studies (see for an overview Dolan 2008), and   
is an error term.  
 
The determinants of SWB in the sample of LTC users (see table 14) are similar to what 
is observed in broader samples, with a few key exceptions. Health status is strongly 
positively related to life satisfaction which is expected, yet this effect outweighs the 
normally strong effect of income. When health status is excluded income becomes 
significant, albeit only weakly. This illustrates the importance of the overall health 
situation for LTC users which is the foundational assumption driving this analysis – that 
the LTC experience matters enough to impact SWB ratings. Further, being divorced or 
separated is as expected negative for SWB compared to being married, which for this 
sample may be intensified by the need for informal care (most commonly given by a 
spouse or partner) common among LTC users. Compared to ISCED 7 (Higher 
education), only ISCED 4 (Vocational) has a significantly positive effect, however only 
                                                 
58
 Alternatively, as discussed in chapter 2, the SWB variable can also be treated as categorical (using 
ordered logit/probit latent variable models).  
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when health status is not controlled for. The federal state of residence matters for SWB 
– compared to Berlin all other federal states have higher levels of SWB. Bremen in 
particular has the strongest positive effect compared to all other regions. There are 
likely unobserved geographical differences which to some extent explain the difference, 
but also LTC provision and support has been found to vary considerably across the 
regions which may account for some of the variation (Sato 2005). Relevant federal 
states level controls in relation to LTC provision are not available for the 1990s; hence 
the federal states dummies capture the full effect. 
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Table 14 – OLS (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users  
    Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Sex Male -0.083 0.093 -0.021 0.111 -0.006 0.110 -0.112 0.095 -0.048 0.093 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
0.002 0.018 -0.035* 0.023 -0.034* 0.023 0.006 0.018 -0.015 0.013 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health status Very poor reference category 
    
reference category 
Poor 0.823*** 0.087 
    
0.826*** 0.089 0.626*** 0.083 
 
Fair 1.360*** 0.112 
    
1.371*** 0.112 1.171*** 0.114 
 
Good  1.722*** 0.188 
    
1.719*** 0.191 1.519*** 0.120 
 
Very good 2.267*** 0.261 
    
2.180*** 0.265 1.780*** 0.264 
Marital status Married reference category 
Single 0.150 0.189 -0.075  0.217 -0.024 0.218 0.188 0.180      0.100  0.180 
 
Widowed -0.199   0.129 -0.278* 0.145 -0.284* 0.146   -0.177   0.127 -0.134    0.128 
 
Divorced    -0.335 0.247    -0.390  0.288    -0.287 0.273 -0.265 0.242 -0.256  0.245 
 
Separated  -0.455 0.324   -0.819**  0.333  -0.723** 0.306 -0.468 0.331 -0.326  0.329 
Job status In work 0.053 0.263 0.443** 0.215 0.436** 0.213 0.008 0.257 0.269 0.268 
 Not in work reference category 
Education 0 0.278 0.359 0.109 0.363 0.183 0.364 0.265 0.359 0.218 0.401 
ISCED 1 0.158 0.317 0.289 0.338 0.36 0.332 0.151 0.322 0.164 0.324 
 
2 -0.041 0.296 -0.087 0.303 -0.016 0.302 -0.055 0.311 -0.012 0.310 
 
3 0.029 0.292 -0.130 0.295 -0.029 0.293 0.052 0.309 -0.008 0.311 
 
4 0.51 0.365  0.855** 0.352   0.870*** 0.338 0.54 0.370    0.576** 0.367 
 
5 0.101 0.316 0.082 0.317 0.193 0.315 0.091 0.338 0.062 0.332 
 
6 reference category 
Monthly income (log) -0.109 0.099 0.13 0.107 0.119 0.109 -0.08 0.101 -0.019 0.100 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.224 0.153 0.017 0.158 0.037 0.160 0.211 0.153 0.169 0.154 
 
3 0.015 0.177 -0.181 0.207 -0.133 0.214 0.043 0.181 0.026 0.176 
 
4 0.124 0.203 0.04 0.258 0.084 0.249 0.107 0.211 0.231 0.213 
 
5 0.114 0.252 -0.192 0.302 -0.17 0.303 0.177 0.251 0.148 0.254 
 
6 or more 0.082 0.284 -0.207 0.362 -0.272 0.377 0.079 0.299 -0.042 0.297 
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Federal state Berlin                                                                   reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 
   
0.503** 0.327 0.734** 0.291 0.453** 0.290 
 
Hamburg 
    
-0.447 0.316 0.114 0.319 -0.13 0.317 
 
Lower Saxony 
   
-0.134 0.322 0.461* 0.247 0.063* 0.246 
 
Bremen 
    
0.545** 0.507 0.907** 0.373 0.835* 0.372 
 
N Rhein Westfalen 
   
0.092** 0.287 0.405** 0.202 0.126** 0.201 
 
Hessen 
    
0.480** 0.319 0.729*** 0.278 0.418** 0.275 
 
P Pfalz Saarland 
   
0.185** 0.299 0.348* 0.210 0.157** 0.207 
 
Baden Wurttemberg 
   
0.126** 0.288 0.459** 0.204 0.216** 0.206 
  Bavaria         0.089** 0.294 0.603*** 0.207 0.173** 0.206 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant   0.304 1.087 -0.193 1.264 -0.325 1.306 -0.586 1.083 0.267 1.088 
Observations 756 
 
1145   756 
 
756 
 
756 
 R-square   0.336   0.068   0.085   0.345   0.361   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level              Standard errors clustered by observation 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999
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3.4.2 Difference-in-difference specifications 
As outlined above, the DiD analysis includes separating out two main effects: the 
system effect and the choice effect.  
 
H1: DiD ‘system effect’  
The system effect is estimated through a comparison of publicly insured LTC users to 
privately insured LTC users, controlling for the set of covariates discussed above. The 
results of the DiD regressions (equation 5), indicate a positive effect on SWB, 
significant at the 1% level (see table 15) and indicates an increase in life satisfaction of 
0.322 of a standard deviation, from being in the treated group compared to the control 
group. The result is robust to inclusion of federal state and time dummies while the 
covariates match the results obtained in the descriptive model (table 14). The variable 
‘Treated’ (which is equal to 1 if the LTC user is publicly insured) has a weakly 
significant negative impact. This means that, if not taking into account the time effect, 
being publicly rather than privately insured has a negative effect on SWB. We would 
expect privately insured individuals to have a higher SWB rating overall due to higher 
income and larger proportion self-employed. This also beyond what the covariates 
included capture, due to unobserved factors correlated with the group belonging. 
Similar to the descriptive regression, health status dominates. Marital status and 
education become significant when excluding health, but at a considerable loss in the 
power of the model. Again, federal state of residence is significant.  
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Table 15 – DiD OLS (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.336** 0.233 0.312*** 0.195 0.322** 0.228 
After  
 
-0.344** 0.230 -0.252** 0.222 -0.319** 0.224 
Treated    -0.204 0.210 -0.167 0.146 -0.216 0.207 
Sex Male -0.081 0.093 -0.021 0.111 -0.109 0.095 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
0.005 0.018 0.028 0.023 0.008 0.018 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Very poor reference category 
Poor 0.823*** 0.087 
 
 
0.826*** 0.089 
 
Fair 1.363*** 0.113 
 
 
1.375*** 0.113 
 
Good  1.712*** 0.188 
 
 
1.715*** 0.190 
 
Very good 2.266*** 0.265 
 
 
2.180*** 0.271 
Caregiver 
 
  -0.287***                 0.082
 
 
  -0.287***                 0.080
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Single    0.139  0.188 -0.058 0.217    0.179  0.179 
 
Widowed -0.216* 0.130 -0.290** 0.144 -0.196 0.128 
 
Divorced    -0.356 0.247 -0.399* 0.288 -0.279 0.242 
 
Separated  -0.447 0.322 -0.802** 0.321 -0.461 0.328 
Job status In work 0.062 0.264 0.471** 0.216 0.025 0.258 
 Not in work                     reference category 
Education 0 0.293 0.353 0.121 0.358 0.281 0.355 
ISCED    1 0.159 0.311 0.288 0.337 0.154 0.317 
 
   2 -0.044 0.290 -0.084 0.299 -0.055 0.304 
 
   3 0.03 0.353 -0.129 0.291 0.06 0.302 
 
   4 0.515 0.311 0.857** 0.349 0.551 0.365 
 
   5 0.104 0.290 0.088 0.312 0.098 0.331 
 
   6 reference category 
Monthly income (log) -0.112 0.099 0.113 0.107 -0.083 0.101 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.227 0.153 0.016 0.158 0.215 0.153 
 
3 0.026 0.177 -0.155 0.207 0.053 0.182 
 
4 0.131 0.202 0.078 0.258 0.11 0.210 
 
5 0.114 0.252 -0.154 0.296 0.177 0.251 
 
6 or more 0.077 0.284 -0.18 0.370 0.076 0.299 
Federal 
state 
Berlin reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 
   
0.731** 0.293 
 
Hamburg 
    
0.116 0.320 
 
Lower Saxony 
   
0.460* 0.246 
 
Bremen 
    
0.905** 0.370 
 
N Rhein Westfalen 
   
0.408** 0.200 
 
Hessen 
    
0.734*** 0.278 
 
P Pfalz Saarland 
   
0.352* 0.210 
 
Baden Wurttemberg 
   
0.459** 0.204 
 
Bavaria 
    
0.602*** 0.206 
Year dummies   Yes    Yes   Yes    
Constant 
 
0.432 1.088 -0.213 1.278 -0.439 1.088 
Observations 524 
 
787 
 
524 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.335   0.073   0.343   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level            Standard errors in brackets, clustered by observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999  
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999 
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H2: DDD ‘choice effect’  
The DDD model (equation 5), in which an additional control group, already part of the 
public policy, is introduced to identify the effect of the character of the scheme – 
interpreted as the ‘choice effect’. This group, consisting of severely disabled individuals 
were likely to have qualified for the restrictive eligibility prior to the compulsory LTCI, 
had no change in service situation following the introduction of LTCI. We can however 
imagine that they benefit from a ‘system effect’ which in the DDD setting constitutes an 
estimate of the effect of the policy change, not of a changing care situation. The control 
group is identified through individuals self-identifying as severely disabled in the 
GSOEP, prior to the LTCI policy, limiting the strength of conclusions drawn due to 
possible over-estimation of the group.  
Table 16 – DDD OLS, (z-score SWB) sample: LTC users  
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.806*** (0.324) 0.744** (0.327) 
After -0.067** (0.219) -0.094** (0.217) 
Treated  -0.015 (0.150) -0.060  (0.144) 
Individual controls  Yes Yes 
Federal states dummies  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Constant  0.590 (1.012) 0.337 (1.046) 
Number of 
observations  
524 524 
Adjusted R square  0.328 0.318 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level                  Standard errors in brackets, clustered by observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999  
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999 
The DDD analysis in table 16 shows the positive effect of the ‘Treatment group (after)’ 
variable (equal to one for individuals who had public insurance but were not in receipt 
of care as part of the fore-runner policy). The SWB of this group is 0.744 of a standard 
deviation higher and significant at the 5% level (when introducing federal state controls, 
1% without). The effect size is larger than the 0.32 of a standard deviation in the DiD 
model including federal state controls (table 15). The DDD effect size can be compared 
to the difference in SWB from a move between the categories “very poor” and “poor” 
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health which is a modest improvement, which is however expected due to the broad 
nature of the dependent variable. Table 11 in appendix shows the full table of 
covariates. The results remain consistent when excluding health status and federal state 
dummies.  
 
Equity implications 
The hypothesis of an equity effect of the choice based policy is here tested in two steps 
following the DiD and DDD methodology in the main effects estimation. Subsamples of 
income quartiles and education levels are used to capture the equity arguments of the 
differences in capabilities and capacity to take up and benefit optimally from choice. 
Table 17 shows results of DiD estimation (equation 4) repeated on income quartiles 2 
and 3. Both are individually significant at the 5% level, and taking the two quartiles 
together generates positive results significant at the 5% level. Higher education also 
accounts for a significant (5% level) and positive effect, weaker than for income 
quartiles 2 and 3. Interpreting these effects as ‘system effects’ implies that a proportion 
of the effects stems from going from a situation where a LTC system was not in place to 
one where all users are, at least partially, provided for. Hence a certain proportion of 
this inequitable effect is attributed to the particular benefit to relatively well-off 
individuals who would under no circumstance qualify for social assistance benefits 
which was the only support available for LTC users prior to the instigation of the 
LTCI.
59
 The strongest effect size, found for the 2
nd
 quartile, is in line with expectations 
as this group previously would have been excluded from the means-tested benefits, yet 
with very little resources to cover privately financed care.  
                                                 
59
 Similar debate regarding in the UK means-tested system in which middle income earners face 
catastrophic costs of prolonged LTC usage (threshold for means-tested benefits was £23,250 in 2012) 
which was proposed to be replaced by a cap on own spending on care by the Dilnot commission (Dilnot 
2011) .   
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Repeating the equity analysis in the setting of the DDD specification instead captures 
the equity effect of the ‘choice’ character of the public LTCI. The results differ 
interestingly from the DiD analysis – the ‘treatment group’ (after) dummy is generally 
insignificant across the sub-groups higher/lower education and individual income 
quartiles. The only significant effect is found when combining income quartile 1 and 2 
(below median income). The results, albeit suffering from small sample sizes indicate 
that the benefits of choice is not primarily tied to high income.  
Table 17 – DiD OLS, (z-score SWB) sample: LTC users, by social group  
  
2nd 
quartile 
3rd quartile Q 1 + Q 2 Q 2+ Q 3 
Education >9 
years 
Treatment group 
(after) 
 0.955**  0.521**  0.285  0.670**    0.417** 
After  -0.504 -0.204 -0.283 -0.351*  -0.691** 
Treated  -0.407 -0.363 -0.034 -0.521  -0.409 
Individual controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal states 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  
 -3.271  
(4.689) 
7.879*** 
(5.876) 
 -0.959 
(1.440) 
1.843 
(2.205) 
 -2.453* 
(2.343) 
Number of 
observations  
203 147 473 403 379 
Adjusted R square  0.396 0.348 0.313 0.353 0.384 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999     *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999, standard errors in brackets, clustered by federal state 
(region). 
 
 
The role of family carers 
A key unexplored aspect of the welfare effects of choice is to what extent family care is 
available – the German LTCI offers the choice of a range of mixtures of care, and all 
but family care are fairly equally available for users. The willingness and capacity to 
care on the part of the family and relatives has been shown to matter for the type of LTC 
provision (Costa-Font 2010). The role of family carers has previously been modelled in 
terms of the intergenerational relationship between parents and children and the 
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dynamics underlying decisions to take out LTC insurance (Zweifel 1996; Zweifel and 
Strüwe 1998). They find that LTCI can crowd out care by the children and that parents 
may choose not to take out insurance as they fear it will decrease the children’s sense of 
responsibility. Zweifel argues that a major problem with introducing LTCI is that it has 
very little private demand. Insurance may reduce children’s willingness to provide 
caregiving in favour of care provided by third parties (1996). 
 
The above analysis has not directly evaluated the role of the availability of informal 
carers, but here subsample analysis based on instrumented group definitions provides 
further insights. The most common informal carers are spouse and daughter (in-law) 
(Arksey and Glendinning 2007) and table 18 illustrates the above regression models 
(DiD estimating ‘system effect’ and DDD estimating ‘choice effect’) run on sub-
samples consisting of individuals with varying probability of access to informal care. 
The data does not allow for directly identifying carers, or what type of care the 
individuals are receiving, hence an approximate selection has been made by using 
indicators of the LTC users household situation and marital status. Spouses are the most 
common carers and we can therefor assume that an LTC user who is married is more 
likely to have access to at least some informal care, and, on the other hand, a divorced 
or separated LTC user is more likely not to have access to informal care (Mentzakis et 
al. 2009). Living in a single household is a further indicator of a lower probability of 
receiving informal care (Mentzakis et al. 2009). Single household and LTC users who 
are divorced/separated still benefit from the system effect – the ‘treatment group (after)’ 
coefficient is positive and significant in the DiD model, also when controlling for time 
fixed effects. When selecting the sample of married individuals, the DiD no longer 
generates positive SWB effects. However, the group ‘married individuals’ is the only 
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subsample for which the DDD coefficient is positive and significant across 
specifications. The results indicate that the LTCI policy had an overall positive effect 
also in LTC users with limited (or low probability of support from informal carers) it 
was among individuals with a high probability of informal support that a choice effect 
(as in the DDD analysis) was present rather than the ‘system effect’. The effect sizes on 
the positive group indicators are similar to those found in the main analysis.   
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Table 18 – DiD and DDD, OLS (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users by family composition  
 
Divorced/separated Single household Married 
 
DiD DDD DiD DDD DiD DDD 
Treatment 
group (after) 
  0.884*** 
(0.263) 
   0.798*** 
(0.255) 
0.835 
(0.450) 
0.585 
(0.426) 
0.720** 
(0.363) 
0.637* 
(0.637) 
1.165** 
(0.549) 
0.650 
(0.539) 
0.051 
(0.221) 
0.015 
(0.217) 
0.55** 
(0.331) 
0.590** 
(0.354) 
After 
 -0.651** 
(0.288) 
 -0.601** 
(0.278) 
 -0.246** 
(0.412) 
0.0568** 
(0.256) 
 -0.257** 
(0.352) 
 -0.232** 
(0.358) 
 -0.01 
(0.410) 
 -0.312 
(0.390) 
 -0.172 
(0.291) 
 -0.091 
(0.273) 
 -0.091 
(0.342) 
 -0.154 
(0.318) 
Treated  
 -0.472** 
(0.189) 
 -0.411** 
(0.181) 
 -0.143 
(0.246) 
0.066 
(0.221) 
 -0.124 
(0.239) 
 -0.149 
(0.276) 
0.298 
(0.225) 
0.154 
(0.260) 
 -0.110 
(0.183) 
 -0.104 
(0.167) 
0.036 
(0.217) 
 -0.175 
(0.120) 
Individual 
controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federal states 
dummies   
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year 
dummies   
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Constant  
 -0.397 
(1.863) 
 -1.238 
(1.918) 
 -0.968 
(1.911) 
 -4.473 
(1.954) 
 -1.225 
(1.690) 
 -2.121 
(1.171) 
 -1.777 
(1.715) 
 -3.933 
(1.696) 
1.827 
(1.912) 
2.595 
(1.962) 
2.075 
(1.832) 
2.697 
(1.934) 
Number of 
observations  
400 400 400 400 247 247 247 247 345 345 345 345 
Adjusted R 
square  
0.402 0.414 0.403 0.37 0.364 0.383 0.377 0.321 0.268 0.306 0.268 0.276 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level      Standard errors in brackets, clustered by observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999 
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3.4.3 Robustness checks 
This section tests the robustness of the results of the DiD and the DDD analysis above 
following (Wooldridge 2010) and (Lee 2005). Firstly, multiple time periods are tested 
which shows that only in the real ‘before-after’ periods are the SWB estimates positive 
and significant. Secondly, a set of alternative dependent variables control for any 
unobserved change in the reporting of the life satisfaction variable or other unobserved 
effects.  
 
Multiple time periods 
A commonly implemented robustness check for DiD models is to run the model on a 
range of time periods with the assumptions that only the relevant ‘before-after’ time 
period generates a positive and significant coefficient for the relevant DiD interaction 
(Lee 2005). The test refutes the diverging trend explanation under which any difference 
between the groups can be explained through trends in the dependent variable unrelated 
to the policy change under investigation.  
Table 19 – DiD, OLS (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users, results of varying time periods  
Time variation Before After Results Significance 
1 1985-1993 1996-2009 Positive *** 
2 1990-1993 1996-1999 Positive *** 
3 1993 1996 Insignificant 
 4 1990-1993 1999-2002 Positive * 
5 2000-2003 2004-2008 Insignificant  (negative)  
6 1996-2000 2000-2004 Negative  *** 
Source: GSOEP       *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level 
 
Table 19 shows that it is only in the variations of ‘before-after’ period that positive and 
significant coefficients are estimated. Time variation 3 generates insignificant results 
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due to small sample size (number of observations: 361). The main control variation (nr. 
6) where ‘before’ is set to after the implementation period the result is negative, and, 
remarkably, significant. A possible explanation for the result is the state of continuous 
reform of the LTCI, where soon after the implementation critique was raised against 
insufficient payments and extensive eligibility criteria (Rothgang 2010).  
 
Alternative dependent variables 
The DiD and DDD models have been run with alternative dependent satisfaction 
variables: satisfaction with household income and satisfaction with health status, both 
with insignificant results. As these measures are known to be correlated with life 
satisfaction and a random effect on the life satisfaction variable would likely have been 
seen also on related satisfaction measures (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Frijters: 2004). A weakly positive effect on both alternative dependent variables 
would have been acceptable as income is likely to have improved for LTC users and we 
might expect a small improvement in health status when the care situation improves. 
Nevertheless, as the descriptive regressions (see table 14) revealed, for the sample of 
LTC users income is not a significant covariate. Health status is on the other hand a 
strongly significant predictor of life satisfaction and the insignificant effect on 
satisfaction with health indicates little improvement of health outcomes. The weak 
evidence of outcome improvements (and as follows SWB effects of outcome utility) 
indicates, as the DDD regression suggested – a role for SWB effects in terms of 
procedural utility. On the other hand, although no outcome improvements can be 
identified through the limited scope of this analysis, it is possible that objective 
circumstances (such as number of care hours or appropriateness of care) have improved. 
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No detailed care indicators are available in the GSOEP before the introduction of the 
LTCI which renders it impossible to integrate these considerations into the DiD 
modelling.  
 
The availability of formal care options 
 
The German LTCI offers a choice set (discussed in section 3.2.3) which includes formal 
care provision options in residential care facilities. The extent to which shorter or longer 
stays in care facilities, or additional (non-family) support by care professionals, is 
available depends on the local competition on the market for LTC provision. Hence, not 
all individuals choosing between family and professional home care may perceive 
professional home care and nursing homes as an option. Previous studies have found 
that the provision and particularly the development of provision over time differ 
substantially between the German federal states (Sato 2005). Sato’s analysis was carried 
out at the federal states level, which is the administrative unit, and provides the 
boundaries for allocation of care. Due to the entry barriers of the care market we cannot 
simply assume that any differences in ratios are only due to different character of 
demand in the federal states. The difference identified by Sato potentially explain some 
of the noticeable difference between the federal states in the DiD and DDD models 
above. In the DiD and DDD models federal states fixed effects account for the role of 
local service provision but does not further explore the dynamics behind the differences. 
Data on LTC provision is only available from 2003 and cannot be entered into the DiD 
and DDD as a time series control. However, running OLS regressions (equation 4) on 
pooled cross-sectional sample of data from 2003-2007 provides a test for a relationship 
between the various market characteristics and SWB. No significant effects of local care 
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availability were identified, when using a range of federal level indicators: the number 
of care homes per 1000 users, number of nursing companies, nursing home places, 
nursing companies per 1000 users, and a composite indicator of overall formal care 
availability. This implies that even though federal state of residence has a clear impact 
on SWB, the effect is not likely to be strongly dependent on the offer of formal care 
services available.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
The analysis has shown a strong positive overall welfare effect among LTC users 
following the introduction of the German compulsory long-term care insurance in 1994. 
The DiD regressions, comparing publicly insured to privately insured users, found a 
positive SWB effect after the introduction of the LTCI, capturing the outcome effect – 
or the ‘system effect’ of the new LTC system. The results are conditional on the 
approximate sample selection in the pre-policy period. Assuming that LTC user do not 
significantly under or over-report their health and care needs the results are robust to 
varying specifications, dependent variables and time periods. When introducing a 
second control group (the severely disabled users already covered by LTCI before 1994) 
in the DDD models the coefficient for the effect size increases. The DDD confirms that 
the ‘system’ effect is not the only effect and captures the change in SWB that is caused 
by the character of the system – the ‘choice effect’.  
 
The positive SWB effects of both the new system and its choice component are in line 
with the choice literature. For choice to be welfare enhancing, user access to 
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information, contained number of options and low risk of regret are important 
conditions (Schwartz et al. 2002; Schwartz 2004). LTC users have personal knowledge 
about their own care needs (which, even in cases of daily medical interventions, are 
often of low technological intensity) and the availability of informal carers for their 
specific care situation. This contributes to the interpretation of the present results as, at 
least partly, stemming from the choice component to the LTCI. Information about 
professional care options and their quality is likely to be scarcer but the number of 
distinct options are relatively few and, importantly, it is possible to change care 
allocation (between cash and in-kind) yearly (Rothgang 2010), which is known to lower 
the potential risk of regret. It is also likely that care choices are made within the family, 
decreasing the challenge of the decision procedure lowering choice aversion.  
 
The equity implications, compared to the situation of means-tested (social assistance) 
benefits of the pre-LTCI period, are mixed. The results of the ‘system effects’ 
regressions suggested significant SWB effects among middle class (middle income and 
mid to high education),
 
which is likely explained by the significant improvement in 
long-term economic situation that the LTCI brought. This group was ineligible for 
social assistance and would hence be likely to bear the full cost of also prolonged LTC 
needs. The effect of the character of the system, the ‘choice effect’ is on the other hand 
significant only in the lowest income quartile and there are no significant differences 
between education categories. This indicates an equitable ‘choice effect’ on LTC users. 
However, the ‘choice effect’ is significantly stronger among users who are married, 
compared to those in single households and those who are separated or divorced. As 
married LTC users have a significantly higher probability of receiving informal carer, 
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this in essence means that the user has a ‘real choice’ including an option beyond 
professional provision. Informal care is also the type of care which the policy is 
designed to incentivise; hence, these individuals have the opportunity to use the LTC 
payments optimally. Even though Germany is, compared to other European countries, a 
country with relatively strong family values (‘familism’ Costa-Font (2010)) the take-up 
of the cash option has been lower than expected (Rothgang 2010).  
 
The financial character of the LTC system, albeit controlled for in terms of income and 
other relevant outcome indicators such as health status, is likely to play an unobservable 
role in the regressions. The income effect of LTCI is weak due to the high co-payments 
present also when receiving LTCI, it is expected that 40% of users had to seek social 
benefits to cover care needs (Schneider 1999:58). The low rate of benefits in the LTCI 
and the high eligibility requirements lead to reform pressures coming into the 2000s 
(Heinicke and Thomsen 2010). Arguably the problems can be identified in the SWB 
data, running a DiD with ‘before’ time period set to 1998-2000 and ‘after’ to 2001-2002 
the effect is negative on the public LTCI treatment group compared to the privately 
insured in the control group. The results further confirm previously discussed variation 
(Sato 2005) in LTC provision between the German regions (federal states) with clear 
difference in SWB found both in descriptive analysis and the DiD and DDD models. 
The differences found by Sato, in family care patterns, number of professional care 
companies and care institutions may reflect varying levels of quality of LTC provision 
between the federal states provides a plausible explanation for the differences in SWB 
for the specific LTC user samples.  
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Finally, the relatively strong ‘choice effect’ suggests a role for procedural utility in the 
case of choice in LTC. The effect is stronger than the overall system effect, which as 
discussed above captures the changing outcomes for LTC users. This means that it is 
likely that LTC users gain utility from the autonomy and self-determination involved in 
‘cash-for-care’. The results indicate weak evidence of procedural utility from the 
character of the system and from having key provision options available.   
 
3.6 Conclusions  
This chapter found that the introduction of the German LTCI system improved SWB 
among users. Also the effect of the choice component, the key characteristic of the 
system, was identified as enhancing users’ SWB. The general system effect is more 
pronounced among middle income earners, as expected due to the move from a means-
tested to a universal system. The empirical analysis on the other hand suggests that the 
benefits of choice, in and of itself, are found among individuals in lower income 
segments to a higher extent than any other income group. The benefits of choice (but 
not the benefits of the system as a whole) are also found to be dependent on the 
probability of access to a key option – informal care provision.   
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Chapter 4  Privatisation 
 
 
 
Preferences for consumer choice and the link with 
privatisation in health care: evidence from England, 
Ireland and Sweden60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The middle class has, by various literatures, been identified both as a key beneficiary 
and proponent of provider choice in public services, as well as a key constituency for 
welfare reform in general. This chapter examines whether a ‘middle class preference’ 
for choice can be identified empirically, and, whether the preference is for choice in and 
of itself, or rather, characteristics and outcomes generally prevalent in choice based 
systems. The chapter compares choice available through systems of provider choice to 
systems of privatised financing hypothesising analogous preference sets. Comparative 
analysis of three tax-funded traditionally publicly provided and financed health care 
systems (UK (England), Ireland and Sweden) using official expenditure data and 
Eurobarometer survey data provides evidence. The findings indicate preferences for 
choice held by the middle class above other system characteristics, both in the systems 
of provider choice and in a privatised financing structure.  
 
                                                 
60
 This research draws on work carried out with financial support from the RECON (Reconstituting 
Democracy in Europe) project funded by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme for 
Research.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The equitability of choice policies, together with the proposition that choice reforms 
inevitably lead to, or represent, a process of marketization and privatisation, have been 
the subject of much debate. These debates, often played out in the media by political 
commentators, have theoretical underpinnings: according to Blomqvist, this process is 
linked to the demands of ‘the well-off’ (2004). Blomqvist argues that the ‘well-off’ 
benefit disproportionately from choice and privatisation and that choice reforms are 
driven by a ‘self-perpetuating’ dynamic fuelled by the demands of the ‘well-off’ (2004: 
152). The ‘well-off’, translated into various conceptions of the middle class, is in an 
extensive literature, placed at the centre of welfare reform (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Hibbard et al. 2005; Donnelly 2010). This group is argued to have a distinct preference 
for consumer choice (Fotaki 2009), to demand a specialised service, and finally to have 
a tendency to exit the public system if quality becomes an issue (Costa-Font and Jofre-
Bonet 2008). Blomqvist’s argument does not specify a clear conceptualisation of choice 
and privatisation, which in reality can take place under a range of circumstances. Le 
Grand identifies at least six categories in which choice can be implemented (2007a) and 
privatisation incorporates a variety of processes in the provision and financing of public 
services.  
 
Complementing the analysis of the preceding chapters, which found that choice in 
health care is associated with inequitable benefits, this chapter investigates the social 
class gradient of the demand for choice. The chapter empirically examines the claims of 
Blomqvist, primarily the preferences of the ‘well-off’ (or the middle class as the socio-
economic group is referred to in this thesis) for choice, and explores how the 
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preferences under private financing compare to those in universal health care systems. 
In order to do so, the chapter disentangles the range of systems of choice and 
privatisation found in NHS type countries. The chapter relies on the fact that choice for 
the individual is available to users within two distinct systems: ‘choice of provider’ and 
‘privatised financing’ (VHI). The analysis contributes to the equity analysis which is an 
overarching objective of this thesis. No previous empirical studies have considered 
preferences for choice and the relation between accessing provider choice through the 
public system compared to through the use of private insurance. The chapter explores 
the hypothesis that choice and competition reforms in universal systems do not 
necessarily encompass welfare retrenchment, but can instead function as a catalyst for 
retaining support for the universal welfare state – and in certain cases even the 
expansion of coverage.
61
 The analysis is guided by the following research questions:  
- Is there a middle class preference for choice in NHS type health care systems?  
o Are middle class preferences linked to choice in and of itself or is there a 
role for outcomes produced by choice schemes? 
o Are there complementarities in the provision systems under consumer 
choice and under privatised financing? 
The chapter is focused on health care reform
62
 but some reference is made to choice 
policies in LTC to illuminate the diversity of choice characteristics as a shift in 
responsibility from a theoretical perspective. The debate is particularly relevant to NHS 
type systems where choice is not traditionally available (social health insurance systems 
by default incorporate a range of choices available to patients – e.g. direct access to 
                                                 
61
 This argument has been made in Environics International (2002) referring to territorial choice, or the 
introduction of fiscal federalism, which is argued to prevent the privatisation of public services.  
62
 Similar reforms are common in education and employment services (Schelkle 2011) and the schematic 
approach to privatisation captures dynamics applicable also to these areas.  
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specialists of their choice). This chapter takes a comparative approach to reform 
trajectories in three NHS type countries: England (universal yet consumerist); Sweden 
(universal and state oriented); and Ireland (semi-universal and privatised).  
 
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the character of choice in health care, the role 
of the middle class and the varieties of privatisation. The institutional evidence in 4.3 
includes reform trajectories of the three countries and expenditure data illustrating the 
complementary nature of choice in provision and privatisation of financing. The 
institutional evidence is complemented by a regression analysis of stated middle class 
preferences. Finally, the results are discussed in the broader context of European 
welfare restructuring.   
 
4.2 Background   
The phenomenon of liberalisation in European welfare states is argued to be the result 
of a wider process of liberalisation in the world economy, where globalisation, 
integration of trade and movement of people have changed the relationships between 
individuals, markets and states (Korpi and Palme 2003; Clarke 2004). Such 
liberalisation includes, as discussed in previous chapters, increased user choice in a 
wide and increasing array of decisions in relation to the welfare state and competition in 
public or private markets or quasi-markets (Le Grand 2007a). Crucially, the process also 
involves, implicitly or explicitly, a privatisation in the sense that it shifts responsibility 
from the state to the individual as well as to private actors (providers) (Beerman 2000). 
One line of research argues that consumerism has become a mainstream feature of 
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modern European societies, profoundly changing the relations between individuals, the 
state bureaucracy and welfare provision. This new relationship resembles the 
interactions and processes which individuals are inherently accustomed to facing in 
private markets. It thus follows that choice in public services is a ‘natural’ progression 
of the provision of public services – if people view themselves as consumers in every 
other aspect of life then an authoritarian relationship with public services represents an 
exclusion not readily accepted (Clarke 2006).  
 
The shift from public to private sector has been legitimised in a number of ways. At the 
core was an assault on ‘bureaucratic’ inertia, inefficiency (Saltman 1994) and the view 
of markets as dynamic, innovative and flexible. Nevertheless, there was also the 
contrast between ‘monopoly providers’ and diverse provision enabling ‘consumer 
choice’, as well as a new contrast between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ interests (Rico et 
al. 2003; Jha et al. 2007). The dissolution of public sector provision has significant 
impacts on the political, economic and social relations of welfare (Shekelle et al. 2008). 
At the individual level, consumer choice is almost universally viewed as a ‘good’ or a 
welfare enhancing feature, with an intrinsic value (Dowding and John 2009). Studies 
also show that people are strongly inclined to covet choice (Botti and Iyengar 2004), but 
that the complexity, importance of the choice and information availability are key 
determinants of the extent to which choice is desired.  
 
This phenomenon has attracted attention in policy circles as well as in a wide range of 
academic fields – especially since the financial crisis of 2008 and its subsequent 
austerity pressures and increased economic uncertainty. Economic intuition states that 
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consumer choice and competition between providers (private or public) leads to higher 
service quality (‘bad’ providers are incentivised by the threat of being forced to exit the 
market) as well as to a more efficient allocation – and therefore ultimately to better and 
more affordable service (Barr 1993). However, a growing body of research indicates 
that public services are not generally perfect markets and the result is in most cases are 
various quasi-market
63
 solutions (Forder et al. 1996). The introduction of choice 
reforms leads to the portrayal of cost-containment measures as aligning with austerity 
pressures and is in turn argued to implicitly represent privatisation and retrenchment of 
the welfare state. It is often assumed that provider privatisation opens the door to the 
privatisation of the financing of the welfare state, for example through encouraging a 
more active role of private complementary insurance, and hence the privatisation of risk 
(Hacker 2004).  
 
Choice and competition policies are present to varying extent in most European welfare 
states with an important distinction between the tax funded (NHS) and social insurance 
(SI) funded health care systems (Costa-Font and Zigante 2012). In the latter, for 
example in Germany and the Netherlands, choice forms an inherent part of the system, 
with direct access to chosen specialists and substantial access to private options (Jacobs 
1998; Frank and Lamiraud 2008). In tax funded health care systems (NHS), for example 
Sweden and the UK, little choice has traditionally been available and GPs have 
functioned as gate-keepers for access to specialists (Wendt 2009). Choice and 
competition has, since the early 1990s, become common feature, often motivated by 
their propensity to increase responsiveness and quality (Le Grand 2007a; 2009). The 
                                                 
63
 Quasi-markets involve a purchaser-provider split, for example in the NHS fund holders purchased care 
from NHS trusts and District Health Authorities competing for custom (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993).  
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rise of choice and competition in NHS countries represents a distinctive qualitative 
change in the character of welfare provision which is not present in SI systems.  
4.2.1 Character of choice and the varieties of privatisation  
Broadly speaking, the literature on choice (following Le Grand 2007a), allows us to 
distinguish six choice categories of choice in health care. First, there is the choice of 
financer, which includes the option or incentive to take up private supplementary or 
complementary insurance. Second, the choice of provider determines where the 
individual is treated, for example at which hospital or primary care practice. Third, there 
is the choice of professional, includes the selection of who to be treated by for example 
which general practitioner or specialist. Fourth, there is the choice of service – for 
example choice of treatment or drug prescription and choice of what time the selected 
treatment takes place. Fifth, there can be a choice of access channel, which is generally 
face-to-face, but increasingly done through the phone or the internet and transaction 
costs have declined as a result (Le Grand 2007a). Finally, there is the choice of 
treatment, i.e. the patient or user having a say in the choice of treatment strategy, and 
potentially withholding treatment.  
 
In LTC on the other hand, a similar yet significantly different process can be observed, 
in the shape of family based privatisation or ‘familialisation’. Current reforms in LTC, 
as choice reforms in European LTC systems are dominated by cash-for-care schemes 
(for example as discussed in chapter 3 in the context of Germany). Cash-for-care 
schemes builds on the idea that care is provided in the home, coupled with incentive 
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structures for family and private carers (Lundsgaard 2005). Table 20 outlines the types 
of choices present in the provision and financing of health care and LTC.  
Table 20 – Types of choices in health and long-term care 
  Health Long-term care 
Financer 
Public (tax) D, Private health 
insurance, out-of-pocket payments 
Public (taxes, often means-tested), 
Private savings (D), LTC insurance 
Provider 
Public (D), private, 
community/voluntary 
Family (D), public, private, 
community/voluntary 
Professional GP, specialist 
Relational social care provider (family, 
friend), home care nurse 
Service  Appointment, surgery Visiting hours, daily routine 
Type of treatment 
Withholding/restricting treatment, 
non-traditional methods 
Social engagement, rehabilitation 
Access channel  Phone, internet, in person Phone, internet, in person, telecare  
Note: categories following Le Grand 2007a. (D) denotes for the most common default category in NHS 
type systems.  
 
More specifically for LTC, the set of options discussed above apply, yet due to the 
lower rate of institutionalisation of LTC systems, the choice categories have different 
implications and bring different incentive structures. There is the choice of provider, 
professional and service, similarly to in health care. A key choice policy in LTC is 
however the introduction of cash-for-care schemes (particularly dominant in SHI 
systems but increasingly in NHS type welfare states), which essentially provides the 
user with an on-going choice of how to administer his or her daily care needs through 
the option of receiving cash payments or in-kind support (Lundsgaard 2005). The cash-
for-care schemes vary considerably in level of regulation and level of benefit payment 
but regardless they are seen as a major trend in European welfare reform and are 
supported by EU policies promoting ageing in place (Lundsgaard 2005; Da Roit et al. 
2007; EC 2008; Costa-Font et al. 2009; Fernandez et al. 2009).  
 
 155 
 
Private options and liberalisation adds a new dynamic and affects the foundations of 
universal welfare provision, particularly in the tax funded systems this paper considers 
(Blomqvist 2004). However, the conceptualisation of privatisation is central to 
capturing the dynamics brought about by, or in tandem with, choice reforms. Previous 
approaches to the conceptualisation of privatisation tend to separate only the public, i.e. 
the state, from the private (business) such as in Beerman (2000). Clarke instead refers to 
‘the two privatisations’ in the remaking of the public realm (2004: 32). Firstly, there is 
the shift between the public and the private sectors, from public provision or production 
to private companies or voluntary organisations (although Clarke places the not-for-
profit sector somewhere in the middle). Secondly, there is a shift from the public to the 
private sphere (here family sphere) which Clarke argues implies a transfer of social 
responsibility and has been most visible in terms of providing long-term care (2004). 
Voluntary organisations, charities and social enterprises have varying importance across 
Europe, and play a considerable role in certain countries. Table 21 outlines the types of 
privatisation, distinguishing between financing and provision and between sector and 
sphere (following Clarke 2004) as well as deconstructing each by actor. 
Table 21 – Varieties of privatisation – sectors and spheres  
 Market (sector) Family (sphere) 
Private financing Private insurance 
Private savings, minor role for 
private insurance. (out-of-
pocket payments) 
Private provision  
For profit 
Family based 
Non-profit community based 
Source: author’s own 
Health care and LTC diverge the way in which choice policies can represent a form of 
privatisation. Firstly, choice in the financing system of health and LTC, in which 
varying cost-sharing mechanisms emphasises the option for individuals to either invest 
in voluntary health insurance to cover co-payments or to seek private care paid out of 
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pocket, is essentially a choice of how to deal with the added cost. There is also a choice 
between providers of private health insurance, assuming that the market is competitive 
and open to entry. However, the latter is often constrained as private insurance markets 
tend to favour a small number of large providers able to pool risk across a larger group 
and contain costs (Evans 1987). Secondly, regarding choice of provider, the main 
distinction is between types of providers: for profit, non-profit or the family. It is 
important to note that a proportion of choice is often offered between public providers 
to avoid waiting lists. Private for profit providers, such as private hospitals, general 
practitioners (GPs), care institutions and home care providers form a rather recent, yet 
powerful, stakeholder in welfare reform. Often companies bid for contracts in quasi-
market settings, such as in the hospital sector in England discussed in chapter two, again 
favouring large and well-established corporations. Choice may also incentivise family 
or informal provision, particularly in LTC where the level of technical difficulty and 
knowledge required when providing care is less challenging to acquire. Families as a 
general rule support health care with before and after- care, for example in relation to 
in-patient surgery. Even though this is common practice, there is little room for help 
with financing and little choice whether to take on caring duties or not. Family care 
before and after a health care incident is considered a private matter. In this way it is 
considered distinct from the care incentivised by government funding in LTC.  
 
The discussion of the varieties of privatisation in has been centred on the state as the 
‘default’ provider, meaning the provider which is the institutionalised and incentivised 
option – but importantly this is not always the case. This is generally true for 
Scandinavian counties with a history of full state provision (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
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However, from a European perspective the default is not always the ‘public’ and not 
constant across all types of public services. The default here means the type of provision 
which forms a base category from which individuals can opt out or add additional 
services. For instance, in a NHS type health care system tax funded public provision 
forms the base option. For health care, the public is today most often seen as the 
default
64
, which is however not the case for the expanding field of long-term care. 
Granted, in the Scandinavian countries, the universal financing and provision of long-
term care forms the default (Fukushima et al. 2010), but this is an exception. For long-
term care, the family has been the key provider, and is still in many countries. Even in 
countries where more recently universalist LTC systems have been introduced, such as 
Germany (1994) and the Netherlands (1968 but extended to personal budgets in 1995), 
the role of the private (market and family) is prominent in the financing and provision 
of care (Roit and Bihan 2010). 
4.2.2 The role of the middle class 
An extensive literature puts the ‘middle class’ at the centre of welfare reform (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Hibbard et al. 2005; Donnelly 2010) and, in doing so, places particular 
emphasis on choice and privatisation reform. The middle class is argued to benefit 
substantially from universally provided services and benefits, at times even more so 
than other social groups, due to their ability to manoeuvre the system as a result of their 
generally higher levels of education and societal standing (e.g. connections) (Goodin 
and Le Grand 1987). Korpi and Palme (2003) forward an argument to revive the role of 
                                                 
64
 Historically, however, the public has not been the default. In Western Europe in the nineteenth century 
the only significant forms of insurance were provided by mutual associations, employers, guilds or unions 
– on a voluntary basis. For example, 10% of Sweden's workforce was covered by voluntary private 
insurance schemes called "Friendly Societies" in 1885.  
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class when explaining the welfare state in response to Pierson’s new politics of the 
welfare state (Pierson 2001). Korpi and Palme see class as defined through 
“membership groups with which individuals identify and the specific subcultures and 
norms of such groups” (2003: 427). This is somewhat distinctive compared to the 
definition of class as categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions or 
situations in for example employment relations (Goldthorpe 2000). The chapter is based 
on the theoretical arguments in favour of the middle class as a key constituency for 
welfare reform (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Loayza et al. 2012).  
 
The middle class is argued to have a distinct preference for consumer choice (Fotaki 
2009) and this influential group demands a special service and has a tendency to exit the 
public system if quality becomes an issue (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2008). 
Blomqvist’s view of the ‘well-off’65 is well supported in various literatures, linking with 
the ideas of consumerism (Newman and Kuhlmann 2007) where it is argued that the 
relatively ‘well-off’ group demands a culturally specific service, for which choice is 
public services is a convenient fit. Several authors have attempted to make sense of this 
dynamic, its normative appeals and particularly deduce what effect it might have on the 
role and goals of the welfare state (Clarke 2006; Jones and Needham 2008; Fotaki 
2009).  
 
The particular dynamics of the influence of the middle class on choice reform is not 
explored further in this thesis. Instead the analysis follows Blomqvist’s argument that 
the ‘self-perpetuating’ nature of choice and privatisation rests on the well-off benefiting 
                                                 
65
 See also Bevan et al. (2010); Dixon and Le Grand (2006); Robertson and Burge (2011) in different 
ways discussing why more affluent individuals are likely to benefit more from choice.   
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more from choice and privatisation reforms and being in a position to influence policy 
makers towards more choice reforms (2004). Blomqvist does not deal with the historical 
dynamics and necessary factor of the initial move towards choice and privatisation in 
Sweden. Other literatures have dealt with the process of policy makers being influenced, 
actively or passively, by particular constituencies (Finseraas and Vernby 2011), and 
proceed under the hypothesis of interlinked preferences and policy outcomes in the case 
of consumer choice reform. Nevertheless, no attempt is here made to disentangle the 
dynamics with which the preferences of the well-off translate into policy change.    
 
4.3 Institutional evidence: varieties of privatisation in 
Sweden, England and Ireland 
This chapter presents evidence from Sweden, United Kingdom (England) and Ireland 
illustrating how choice can be institutionalised in different ways in similar yet highly 
distinct health care systems. The countries all conform to the National Health Service 
(NHS) model of health care financing which traditionally has offered little choice to 
patients. Financing is generally drawn from taxes and non-tax government revenues and 
coverage is universal. In difference to social health insurance systems (SHI)
66
 which 
have been more likely to contract with providers (public and private), tax-financed 
systems tend to operate publicly managed facilities. As a result the provider payment 
mechanisms in SHI systems is inclined to be more defined than those in tax-financed 
systems. Furthermore, most tax-financed systems operate a GP gatekeeper system 
                                                 
66
 This contrasts with the other ‘archetypical’ health system category; social health insurance (SHI) which 
raises revenues largely from earnings-related contributions levied largely on formal sector workers. 
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whereas in SHI systems patients have more of a choice of provider and direct access to 
specialists of choice.  
 
The cases were selected based on Wendt et al.’s clustering (2009) where Denmark, 
United Kingdom, Sweden (which are all early developed NHS countries), Italy (late 
developed NHS) and Ireland (not fully institutionalized NHS) are identified as the NHS 
cluster. A medium level of total health expenditure characterizes the cluster, the share of 
public health funding is high, and private out-of-pocket funding is moderate. Also 
access structures, the role of co-payments, regulation of provider and opportunities for 
competition are similar, which are argued to be key considerations when grouping 
health care systems (Jacobs 1998; Marmor et al. 2005). Vrangbaek et al. (2012) argues 
that we in fact see convergence of policy in Sweden and England where the countries 
are moving towards a similar rhetoric in relation to choice policies. The countries, albeit 
similar NHS type countries, exhibit considerable differences in the approach to, and 
reform trajectory of, choice and privatisation. For example, Sweden’s approach has an 
undercurrent of an overall universalistic welfare state. This model stands in stark 
contrast to the more consumerist English welfare provision. Finally, Ireland, which has 
a traditionally lower overall spending level, has managed to arrive at a situation over the 
past two decades that resembles the expenditure and services provided by that of 
Sweden and England, however based on its own, unique financing structure.  
 
The reform trajectories of the Swedish, English and Irish health care systems diverge 
mainly in terms of the financing structure. On a general scale, private health insurance 
(PHI) prevalence has proven challenging to explain on a comparative level. The OECD 
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finds that market sizes for PHI differ across Europe and are not dependent on GDP or to 
any stronger degree to health system spending (Tapay et al. 2004). This indicates that 
other explanations are of relevance, which I here explore by comparing the countries’ 
structures and developments over time with particular focus on PHI and co-payments 
using expenditure data from World Health Organisation (WHO 1996-2012). At a first 
glance, we find a discrepancy in the usage of private health insurance. The difference is 
shown in figure 10. In 2012 34.4% of the Irish health expenditure was paid through 
private insurance plans compared to less than 10% in Sweden and the England. The 
difference cannot be explained by overall size of expenditure, government expenditure 
or, at least not fully, overall private expenditure (including co-payments such as GP fee 
in Sweden of €15). Total private expenditure is higher in Ireland, much owing to steep 
fees for GP visits (McDaid et al. 2009).  
Figure 10 – Health expenditure indicators 2010 (Sweden, England, and Ireland)  
 
b) Percentage of gross domestic product c) Percentage of private expenditure on health 
d) Percentage of total expenditure on health 
  
Source: World Health Organisation 2012 (full table of statistics in appendix 14) 
Turning to changes over time, the differences between countries are mostly stable. 
Private health expenditure is trending downwards in Ireland since 1998, whereas the 
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proportion in Sweden and the England is increasing mildly over the same time period 
(see figure 11a and b). The percentage spent through private health insurance has also 
remained rather constant, except for the decrease in the percentage of total health 
expenditure in the early 2000s which coincides with the increase in the absolute level of 
health care spending in those years (Harmon and Nolan 2001).   
Figure 11a and 11b – Private expenditure and private insurance as percentage of total health 
expenditure 1996-2010 (Sweden, England, and Ireland) 
a. Private expenditure     b. Private insurance  
  
Source: World health Organisation 2012 
 
4.3.1 Reform trajectories  
Table 22 outlines the key events and focus of debate for each decade, starting from the 
1980s, when choice reforms first became an item on the agenda (Self 1990). Sweden 
and England have had a discontinuous development of liberal policies with periods of 
minor reversal or pause, after transfers of power between political parties and coalitions 
(Fotaki 2007). The trend has been one of expansion, but there seems to have been 
disagreement about ‘how far and how fast’ choice was to be implemented. Even though 
England has used Swedish reforms as inspiration, it is in England where choice has 
been made a real ‘selling point’ for welfare reform.  
Pierre writes that, by the mid-1980s,  
Both the Tory United Kingdom and Social Democratic Sweden were broadly rejecting the 
notion of the passive public service user. However, if Thatcher was courting the self-reliant 
consumer, then the Social Democrats were flirting with the discriminating client (1993:22).  
 163 
 
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the similarities between England and 
Sweden, Sweden has implemented less choice in certain areas, particularly LTC.  
Table 22 – Health system reform trajectories in Sweden, England, and Ireland.  
 
Reform trajectory 
 Pre-1990 1990-2000 2000- 
Sweden 
State dominance 
(cost-containment) 
De-centralisation, 
modernisation, choice 
and purchaser provider 
split. Choice of GP. 
Cost-containment, 2001 
stop law- ending sales of 
emergency hospitals 
England 
Key theme was the 
superior efficiency of 
the private sector, 
focus on competition 
Internal market (1991) 
(separating purchaser 
provider) (reverted 97-
2000 under labour- but 
with more focus on user 
choice) 
Increased budget, 2002 
active promotion of 
private providers. 2006 
free choice of hospital 
Ireland 
 
Decentralised system 
of mixed 
public/private funding 
and provision. Broad 
eligibility for free care 
Health Insurance Act 
(1994) competition 
between insurers. general 
hospitals, special 
hospitals and community 
care Programmes  
(voluntary sector vital) 
2001 Health Insurance 
Authority (HIA): 
facilitate the further 
development of the VHI 
market. Establishing 
central authority to 
increase accountability  
Sources: Health Systems in Transition Reports: McDaid et al. (2009), Anell et al. (2012), Boyle (2011).  
 
 
Sweden 
The general reform dynamic towards more of a liberalised welfare state in Sweden can 
be seen as stemming from a crisis of legitimacy (Pierre 1993) where improving and 
modernising the health system in response to excessive waiting times and inflexibility 
was emphasised as motivations for the reforms (Glenngård et al. 2005). During the 
1980s the then finance minister Kjell-Olof Feldt pushed for consumer orientation as the 
focus of Swedish welfare policy and in the late 1980s this was officially endorsed by the 
Social Democratic party (Blomqvist 2004: 145). The policies were accelerated under 
liberal rule which put further emphasis on private providers however later reversed by 
the Social Democrats (Bergmark 2008). Regardless of this, Blomqvist argues that the 
choice policies represented a move away from the traditional Swedish model of welfare 
 164 
 
provision (2004). Choice of GP was the first consumer choice policy in the Swedish 
NHS and was later expanded to secondary care, where it was tied to waiting times 
regulations (Burström 2009).  
 
Sweden is continuously attempting to introduce choice but the process has been 
hampered by slow or partial implementation in certain areas, due to the de-centralised 
governance of welfare and sometimes unwillingness on the part of local governments to 
support choice (Fredriksson and Winblad 2008). Privatisation has gone further, 
particularly in regards to the provision of LTC. GP choice has been the most successful 
health care consumer choice policy, whereas cash-for-care in LTC has had limited 
spread.   
 
United Kingdom (England)  
The government is attempting to reconcile the social democratic conception of a free, 
universal health service with a range of modernising strategies that draw on private sector 
investment and resources. It is seeking to secure middle class ‘buy in’ by ensuring a more 
personalised, consumer-friendly and choice-oriented service. Finally, it is struggling to 
negotiate different conceptions of equality. (Department of health 2007). 
The initial choice reforms in England
67
 where enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
by the Conservative governments, much to the critique of Labour at the time. However, 
Labour’s later ‘third way’ approach further expanded choice and competition68 and this 
has become a central tenant of UK public sector policy (6 2003). This has meant that the 
UK has since the 1980s posed as a model for and indeed exporter of public service 
reform oriented towards the market, privatisation, under the ‘New Public Management’ 
                                                 
67
 The devolved nature of UK policy making has resulted in a at times striking contrast in policies 
between the countries. ‘The choice agenda’ has mainly applied to England.   
68
 Tony Blair’s famous assertion in the 1999 party conference speech was: “I want to go to the hospital of 
my choice, on the day I want, at the time I want. And I want it to be on the NHS” 
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approach (Clarke 2006: 424). GP choice and internal market reforms (purchaser-
provider split) were the first consumer choice reforms enacted in the English health care 
sector. Extending choice to elective surgery at hospitals became a point of discussion in 
the early 2000s and from 2006; patients were given the option of to choose from at least 
four different primary care trusts free of charge.  
 
Initially the choice agenda was based on efficiency and quality arguments in favour of 
choice and competition reforms (Hamilton and Bramley-Harker 1999). However, in 
2006, a large part of the debate concerned responsiveness and the role of the individual. 
The debate portrayed the patient as a consumer and attached strong values to choice. 
Choice and competition was not primarily a matter of efficiency or cost-containment, 
but also based on political motivations (Bevan et al. 2010). On the other hand, Dawson 
et al., emphasises the role of waiting times and waiting lists as the main shortcoming of 
the English NHS and an important factor for the focus on choice. The waiting times also 
play a role for the increase in the market for voluntary health insurance, even though 
this is relatively small (2007).  
 
England is the country with the most ‘politicised’ choice policies out of the three here 
analysed. Choice has been a selling point, increasingly, since the early 1990s. England 
is also the only case where the equity of choice policies is key – where choice and 
competition is promoted as something equitable (Jacobs 1998). The politicisation of 
choice is evident particularly in the NHS (as discussed in chapter 2) and in LTC but also 
in education. 
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Ireland 
The Irish health care system is denoted by universal coverage, but with a large 
proportion of the population using voluntary health insurance (VHI). Means-tested co-
payments are applied to all except 30% (in 2007) of the population who hold Medical 
Cards (McDaid et al. 2009). VHI is used to cover some of the out-of-pocket costs 
associated with public health services (complementary) but also importantly allows 
individuals to escape waiting lists by being treated as private patients either in private 
facilities but often within public sector hospitals (supplementary). As follows, more 
than 50% of the Irish population has private health insurance (HIA 2008) and as 
insurance premiums are tax deductible the take up is supported by government 
policies.
69
  
Figure 12 – Evolution of proportion of population covered by VHI in Ireland 1979-2002 
 
Source:  Colombo and Tapay (2004) 
VHI in Ireland originally (introduced in 1957) catered to the top 15% of income earners 
who were not covered entitled to free care in public hospitals in 1957 and incrementally 
spread to lower income brackets (Harmon and Nolan 2001). The real expansion of 
                                                 
69
 HIA found that in 2005, 14% of adults with a Medical Card also had private health insurance (2008).    
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health care spending in the 1990s
70
 – the proportion of GDP spent remained stable due 
to the high levels of economic growth throughout the decade – sets Ireland apart from 
the development in Sweden and England. Private co-payments have only decreased 
marginally while the proportion taking up private VHI has still remained rather constant 
over time (see figure 12). The Irish VHI market has up until recently been dominated by 
the Voluntary Health Insurance (VHI) Board which in 2006 held 75% of the private 
insurance market. It has operated as a non-profit making, semi-state private insurance 
body but is being reformed to conform with requirements of the Third EU Non-Life 
Directive (1992), and opening the VHI  market, to competition. The market for private 
health insurance has been booming following the growing economy, the provision of 
VHI as an employment benefit, and a confidence in the value of private cover 
(Francesca and Nicole 2004).
71
   
 
Choice of provider and time of treatment was until recently exclusively available to 
private health insurance holders (McDaid et al. 2009). Choice of primary care provider 
(GP) was introduced also to individuals with Medical Cards. No such options are 
available for secondary care. Private insurance (depending on plan) offers a range of 
choices linked to secondary care whereas Medical Card holders and those without 
private insurance face limited options and considerably longer waiting times. Providers 
face incentives to offer preferential treatment and quicker access to private patients in 
public hospitals (Harmon and Nolan 2001; Francesca and Nicole 2004; Health 
Insurance Authority 2003). The Health Service Executive (HSE) provides many health 
                                                 
70
 Health expenditure increased by 59% in nominal terms between 1990 and 1996.  
71
 All health insurance schemes operate on the basis of open enrolment with lifetime cover and 
community rating, whereby everyone – regardless of age or health status – is charged the same premium 
for the same insurance package that amounts to a wide pooling of risk. 
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care services directly, but the voluntary sector, including organizations linked with the 
Church, have and will continue to play an important role in the delivery of health and 
personal social care services. These services range from running hospitals to small 
community-based projects (Barry 2010). 
 
The access to choice and private options in health care in Ireland is strongly dependent 
on holding private health insurance, which is also widespread (particularly in the higher 
income brackets). In general, countries have tended to choose solutions that fit with 
their existing method of financing health services. Nevertheless, Ireland’s health care 
financing system is unique, combining a ‘national health service’ with voluntary private 
insurance – that latter of which covers almost 50% of the population. PHI in Ireland 
forming a ‘gateway’ to choice for individuals who have a preference for a service 
different from what is provided on the NHS, or simply have a preference for being able 
to make a choice at the time of need. 
4.3.2 Summary discussion 
This section has illustrated that in England and Sweden choice is universally offered 
(subject to co-payments) between state providers, for-profit private providers, and non-
profit community-based private providers. Alternatively, in Ireland, choice is mainly 
available to those with VHI. The variation in ways which patients access choice and the 
associated benefits (primarily shorter waiting times and higher quality) between the 
three countries was above found to be to an extent historically determined, particularly 
stemming from the universalist approach of the Swedish and British system compared 
to the Irish system primarily directed towards lower income segments. Ireland has 
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maintained the continuation of the reform trajectory over time even though it increased 
spending in real terms during the economic boom, did not move to include more of the 
‘well-off’ in the public system.  
 
4.4 Quantitative analysis: the preferences of the middle 
class  
This section examines whether there is a social group gradient to the preferences for 
choice in relation to other characteristics of what individuals perceive to be a quality 
health care system. If the arguments of Blomqvist (2004) and the consumerist literature 
(Fotaki et al. 2008; Fotaki 2009) are accurate, middle class preferences for certain 
characteristics, including choice in and of itself, should be evident in survey responses 
concerning the health care system. The central hypothesis of the paper is that the middle 
class views choice as a desirable characteristic of quality health care systems. 
Furthermore, the hypothesised middle class preference for choice is expected to be 
present regardless of whether provider choice  is available in the public system (Sweden 
and England), or through private insurance (Ireland).  
4.4.1 Data and method 
The analysis utilises comparative survey data including preferences regarding the health 
care system (Eurobarometer 72.2, 2009). A list of variables used and descriptive 
statistics can be found in appendix 15.  
 
 
 170 
 
Dependent variables- definition and descriptive statistics 
- Criteria for a quality health care system  
The Eurobarometer survey asks individuals what they consider to be the most important 
criteria for quality health care (see table 23). Respondents are asked to choose three out 
of the eleven criteria (there is also an ‘other’ category).72 The most commonly selected 
criteria across the three countries are well-trained staff and effective treatment. These 
are known to be components which individuals see as important or indeed necessary for 
a positive health outcome (Propper 1990; Propper 1995; Johannesson et al. 1998; 
Dawson et al. 2007). Choice on its own (e.g. of hospital and doctor) is mentioned 
relatively rarely – albeit consistently – across the three countries. ‘No waiting lists’ and 
‘proximity’ are more commonly mentioned. These can be seen as benefits associated 
with having a choice, building on what individuals regard as important factors when 
choosing a hospital (see figure 3 and Dixon 2008 based on data from England).  
Table 23 – Health care criteria, % mentioned. Sample: Sweden, England, and Ireland (2009) 
Source: Eurobarometer 72.2 2009 
                                                 
72
 Of the following criteria, which are the three most important criteria when you think of high quality 
healthcare in your country? Proximity of hospital and doctor, Free choice of doctor, Respect of a patient’s 
dignity, Medical staff that is well trained, A clean environment at the healthcare facility, Treatment that 
works, Free choice of hospital, Healthcare that keeps you safe from harm, No waiting lists to get seen and 
treated, A welcoming and friendly environment, Modern medical equipment. Respondent may select up 
to three answers. 
 
Choice of 
doctor 
Choice of 
hospital 
No waiting 
lists 
Proximity Dignity 
Well-trained 
staff 
Ireland 16.03 12.56 44.26 36.99 25.82 46.00 
England  12.78 14.21 27.43 13.76 21.17 59.87 
Sweden 14.78 8.32 39.3 56.02 27.56 65.77 
 
Effective 
treatment 
Safety from 
harm 
Clean 
Friendly 
staff 
Modern 
equipment 
 Ireland 22.23 28.38 32.99 5.43 14.04 
 England 40.04 29.16 29.84 6.64 23.39 
 Sweden 35.32 4.48 10.65 4.78 24.38 
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Part of the variation between countries is likely to be linked to characteristics of the 
respective health care system. For example, the criteria ‘proximity’ is mentioned by 
only 13% of English respondents, whereas in Sweden it is mentioned by 56%. 
Geographical differences are a plausible explanation: Sweden’s geographical character, 
with its sparsely populated areas, stands in sharp contrast to England’s higher 
population density. Similarly, Sweden is remarkable in terms of the percentage of 
respondents who mention ‘safety from harm’, which stands at only 4% and compares to 
around 30% in both England and Ireland. The variation reveals that preferences are 
country specific, which highlights the need for country fixed effects in the regression 
models to account for baseline differences. The country dummy variables also function 
as controls for differences in payment structures in the health care system. Sweden, and 
in particular Ireland, use more extensive out-of-pocket payments compared to England.  
 
The individuals’ selection of criteria is assumed to involve an implicit evaluation of 
costs and benefits. It is however well established that individual preferences are 
influenced by individual (internal factors), time varying characteristics and perceptions, 
as well as the manner in which data is collected (external factors) (Dolan et al. 2003). 
Preferences for health care resource allocation are also known to be influenced by the 
timing of data collection: ex ante or ex post – i.e. whether the individual has (recently) 
been a patient. It further matters whether the respondent is asked for a personal or a 
social preference. The regressions control for previous experience of using the health 
care system as well as other attitudinal variables to account for a more positive or 
negative baseline view of the health care system.  
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The Eurobarometer health care quality question reflects personal preferences – what the 
individual considers to be a quality health care system – in relation to how each 
individual patient is treated. There is no reference to resource allocation, cost or the 
value attached to each of the options. This approach is appropriate in relation to tax 
funded health care systems where care is free at the point of use (apart from out of 
pocket payments) (Dolan et al. 2003). However, when selecting three of the eleven 
criteria, it is possible that the respondent considers the relative cost despite not being 
asked specifically to do so. In terms of the social class analysis it is therefore of interest 
to see whether there is a systematic difference in how various characteristics are valued 
across social classes. It is possible that middle class respondents, who are likely to pay a 
high(er) tax rate, are less likely to demand expensive policy options relative to 
respondents who pay little or no tax. If we assume that choice policies are seen as 
expensive it is conceivable that the middle class will be less favourable. The results of 
the empirical analysis are therefore unlikely to overestimate any middle class 
preferences.  
 
Independent variables 
In order to identify the middle class a range of social status indicators are used (see 
appendix 15). Firstly, a self-rated social status (‘1’ lowest and 10 ‘highest’) variable is 
used. Because national conceptions of social class are relative within each society, a 
self-rated variable means there is no need to equivalise the scale to account for cross-
country differences (Banerjee and Duflo 2008).The ordinal self-rated social status 
variable (ranging from 1 to 10) is entered into the regressions both as a z-score 
transformed variable and as individual dummies for each of the categories. Indicators 
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for education level, income, wealth (proxied through home ownership) and a self-rated 
financial status variable (‘difficulty meeting payments’) are also included. The 
reasoning is identical to that set out in chapter 2 and 3.  
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
The key relation modelled is that between preferences for choice and the social status of 
individuals. The dependent variables are binary (yes/no) which would normally imply 
the use of a logistic or probit regression model estimating probabilities or odds ratio’s 
for each of the criteria to be selected. However, the character of the question requires an 
approach which accounts for the interrelated probabilities of selecting one criterion 
dependent on the criteria already selected. The dependent variables are, as discussed 
above, responses to a multiple choice question where respondents are asked to choose 
three criteria out of eleven (see table 23). This means that a standard logistic regression 
does not fully account for the structure of the multiple choice character of the question 
(Jann 2005). Each individual equation has contemporaneous cross-equation error 
correlation – i.e. the error terms in the regression equations are correlated. A 
multivariate multiple regression model (OLS) is the standard approach used to account 
for the correlations between response options, which for a binary dependent variable is 
implemented through a seemingly unrelated estimation procedure (Greene 2011). The 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates a system of equations which 
simultaneously estimate the individual regressions (one for each criterion) (Zellner 
1962). The probability of selecting any given criterion is estimated through a probit 
model comprising a system of equations which are jointly estimated through the SUR 
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procedure.
73
 The covariates are discussed in detail below. Another approach to dealing 
with the issue of correlated errors is a poisson regression, with a dependent variable 
generated from individual counts of the questions of interest. The results are consistent 
across the estimation strategies (as reported below under ‘Robustness checks’).  
4.4.3 Results  
The results of the SUR regressions are reported in table 24. The table includes the 
results of the 11 health system criteria. However, only the criteria in the first three 
columns – choice of hospital, choice of doctor and no waiting lists – are found to have a 
significant relationship with self-rated social status. The effect size is modest yet 
significant at the 1% level for choice of hospital and at the 5% level for the two other 
criteria. Beyond the self-rated social status indicator several variables are used to 
identify the middle class; home ownership, occupation, financial difficulties and level of 
education. The variables are likely to be collinear and, as expected, difficulty meeting 
payments and home ownership (except for the ‘choice of doctor’ specification) are 
insignificant yet positive. Occupation is not found to have a strong effect in the choice 
specifications. However, compared to managers, unemployed individuals are 
consistently less likely to select any of the three criteria. The probability of selecting ‘no 
waiting lists’ has a clearer relation to occupational status, where all but self-employed, 
manual workers and house persons are less likely than managers to select it. Highly 
educated individuals are more likely to report a preference for no waiting lists and 
choice of doctor. Excluding self-rated social status extends the positive effect of 
                                                 
73
 The probit regressions assume a latent variable y* which is linearly related to the observed independent 
variables          where    is a vector of observed covariates and    is a random disturbance 
independent of the observed covariates. The observed dependent variable y equals 1 only if an 
unobserved variable y* is greater than an unobserved threshold,  . That is,    
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education to choice of hospital and also renders the effect of home ownership 
significant across the board (which illustrates the expected collinearity of the variables). 
When dividing the social status variable into quartiles we find that the relation between 
social status and preferences for choice is not obviously curve-linear as we would 
expect. There is instead an above versus below median social status division in 
preferences.  
 
A set of standard demographic covariates are included in the system of regressions: age, 
gender and marital status. Firstly, age has a negative relation with choice of hospital and 
age squared is positive, albeit with a very low effect. This is interesting because most 
hospital episodes are elective surgery dominated by higher age groups (the second 
largest group is maternity services which tend to be excluded from choice policies). 
Cohort analysis on the other hand reveals that higher social status leads to a higher 
probability that choice of doctor will be selected by the younger age group (40 years 
and younger). For respondents older than 55, individuals with a higher self-rated social 
status have a higher probability of selecting choice of hospital. The results suggest that 
age matters for the relation but does not outweigh the effect of social status on 
preferences for choice and no waitlists. Gender is generally insignificant, although men 
are more likely to select choice of doctor. Married individuals are less likely to select 
choice of hospital but are most likely to select choice of doctor (except widow(ers) who 
are most likely) and waiting lists.  
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Table 24 – Seemingly unrelated regressions, health care criteria, sample: general population  
  
Choice of 
hospital 
Choice of 
doctor 
No waiting 
lists 
Well trained 
staff 
Clean 
environment 
Effective 
treatment 
Self-rated social status 0.080*** 0.062** 0.041** -0.027 0.012 0.017 
Difficulty meeting payments 0.173 0.035 0.064 -0.083 -0.015 0.029 
Female 
 
-0.049 -0.196*** 0.018 0.171*** 0.158*** -0.142*** 
Age 
 
-0.025** -0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.015 
Age squared 
 
0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overall health 
care quality 
Very good 
  
Reference category 
  
Fairly good 0.120 0.069 0.171*** -0.148** 0.094 0.014 
Fairly bad 0.049 0.108 0.238** -0.125 0.075 0.006 
 
Very bad 0.329** -0.016 0.489*** -0.337*** 0.090 -0.038 
Experience with health care 
system 
-0.047 -0.090 0.135*** 0.044 0.078 -0.022 
Hospital care: 
probability of 
harm 
Very likely 
  
Reference category 
  
Fairly likely 0.015 -0.115 0.291*** 0.024 -0.105 -0.017 
Not very 
likely 
-0.030 -0.316*** 0.368*** 0.249*** -0.243** 0.033 
Not at all 
likely 
0.060 -0.317* 0.403*** 0.288** -0.180 0.067 
Occupational 
status 
Self-employed 0.009 -0.037 -0.006 0.120 -0.208** 0.013 
Managers 
  
Reference category 
  
 
White collar   0.147 0.245* -0.137* 0.112 -0.049 -0.025 
 
Manual 
workers 
  -0.099 0.230* -0.150 0.071 0.000 -0.049 
 
House persons 0.043 0.205 -0.084 -0.113 0.066 0.070 
 
Unemployed   -0.358* -0.498*** -0.891** 0.189 -0.361 0.104 
 
Retired  0.098 0.234 * -0.411*** 0.208 0.064 0.157 
 
Students   0.517* 0.318 -0.380 *** -0.074 0.174 0.042 
Marital  
status 
Married 
  
Reference category 
  
Cohabitating 0.444*** -0.201** -0.337*** -0.127 0.070 -0.083 
 
Single 0.375** -0.005 -0.247** -0.011 -0.051 -0.208* 
 
Divorced or 
separated 
0.506*** -0.008 -0.294** -0.220* 0.088 -0.186 
 
Widow 0.553*** 0.219** -0.265*** -0.150 -0.049 -0.185* 
 
Other 0.232 0.237 -0.443*** -0.211 0.372** 0.050 
High education (yes) 0.103 0.134** 0.103* 0.112* -0.035 0.079 
Owns home (yes) 0.026 0.140** 0.052 0.166** -0.031 0.143 ** 
Area type Large town 0.022 0.130* -0.073 0.111* 0.078 0.101 
 
Mid-sized town 0.056 0.160** -0.089 0.133 ** 0.062 0.070 
 
Rural 
  
Reference category 
  
Ireland 
 
0.068 0.014 0.065 -0.455*** 0.766*** -0.312*** 
England 
 
0.223** -0.164** -0.362 *** -0.0935 0.690*** 0.209*** 
Sweden 
   
Reference category 
  
Constant 
 
-1.104*** -1.012 -0.105 0.217 -1.151*** -0.873*** 
Number of observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 
R-square 0.037 0.034 0.039 0.049 0.071 0.071 
       The table continues on the following page 
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Patients 
dignity 
Safety 
from harm 
Doctor 
proximity 
Friendly 
environment 
Modern 
equipment Other 
Self-rated social status -0.023 -0.027 -0.021 -0.066 -0.043 -0.032 
Difficulty meeting payments -0.095 0.040 -0.026 0.127 -0.047 0.285 
Female 
 
0.298*** 0.044  -0.176*** -0.056 -0.085  -0.613** 
Age 
 
0.006 0.005 0.007  -0.025** 0.019* -0.054 
Age squared 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000** 0.000 
Overall 
health care 
quality 
Very good 
  
Reference category 
  
Fairly good -0.018 0.093 -0.106  -0.240**  -0.114* -0.034 
Fairly bad 0.054 0.003 -0.031  -0.413***  -0.348*** 0.651* 
 
Very bad -0.030 -0.061  -0.276** -0.177 -0.150 0.287 
Experience with health care 
system 
0.103* -0.057 -0.082 -0.026 -0.008 0.100 
Hospital 
care: 
probability 
of harm 
Very likely 
  
Reference category 
  
Fairly likely  -0.225** 0.091   -0.163*  -0.001 0.096 -0.250 
Not very 
likely  
-0.294*** 0.035 -0.116 0.009 0.099 0.032 
Not at all 
likely  
 -0.297** -0.155 -0.070 -0.421 -0.029 -0.342 
Occupational 
status 
Self-employed 0.029 -0.026 0.076 0.179 0.103 0.154 
 
Managers 
  
Reference category 
  
 
White collar -0.002 0.033 -0.073 0.084 0.160**  -0.616* 
 
Manual 
workers 
0.159 -0.019 0.085 -0.046 -0.001 0.056 
 
House persons  0.193* 0.067 0.173 0.087 -0.173 -0.134 
 
Unemployed  -0.528 0.327 -0.100 0.769* 0.303 (omitted) 
 
Retired  0.336** 0.049 0.014 -0.255  -0.336** -0.142 
 
Students  0.107 0.096 0.366** -0.310 -0.100 -0.241 
Marital 
status 
Married  
  
Reference category 
  
Cohabitating 0.152 0.059 0.020 0.028 -0.078 -0.518 
 
Single  -0.077 0.024 -0.046 0.109 -0.002 0.194 
 
Divorced or 
separated  
0.169 -0.079 -0.055 0.112 -0.048 -0.356 
 
Widow  0.173 0.030 -0.157 0.110 0.021 -0.125 
 
Other  0.130 -0.053 0.212 -0.232 -0.238 -0.383 
High education (yes) 0.042 0.090 -0.021 -0.033 0.117*  -0.692** 
Owns home (yes) -0.010 0.021 0.113 0.120 -0.051 0.126 
Area type Large town  -0.180*** 0.073  -0.320*** 0.077 0.028 0.821** 
 
Mid-sized 
town 
 -0.166*** 0.077  -0.263*** -0.132 0.060 0.615* 
 
Rural 
  
Reference category 
  
Ireland    -0.042** 1.134***  -0.479*** 0.001  -0.218** -0.078 
England 
 
 -0.189*** 1.171***  -1.22 *** 0.0951 0.0667  -0.816** 
Sweden       Reference category     
Constant 
 
 -0.689***  -2.020*** 0 .320        -0.759*  -1.113*** -0.442 
Number of observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 
R-square 0.028 0.109 0.132 0.042 0.029 0.236 
Source: Eurobarometer: 72.2, 2009 
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A set of variables capturing attitudes towards and experience of the health care system 
were also included. These were overall quality, experience of the health care system and 
perceived probability of harm. The variables are generally insignificant in the ‘choice of 
hospital’ regression – only very poor quality is significant and positive compared to 
very good quality. If the individual perceives that overall quality is poor then they are 
more likely to feel that choice is important. ‘Choice of doctor’ is influenced by the 
perceived risk of harm – a higher risk of harm makes individuals more likely to want to 
choose their doctor. Finally, waiting lists are strongly influenced by the health system 
variables: experience with the health care system and a perception of overall quality as 
‘very bad’ are positively linked to the selection of no waiting lists. Selecting no waiting 
lists, on the other hand, is more likely among individuals who perceive low probability 
of harm within the health care system. 
 
Running the same SUR models (including controls) on country samples generates a 
clearer insight into the preference functions within each health system. Interestingly, in 
Ireland only the positive effect of social status on the likelihood the select no waiting 
times is significant, whereas in Sweden and England only the social status – choice 
relation is significant; in England choice of hospital and in Sweden, choice of doctor. 
These results mirror the specific health system and reform trajectory of each country (as 
discussed above). In Ireland, which is dominated by VHI, social status is strongly linked 
to waiting lists (a key motivation for using VHI). In England, choice of hospital is the 
only significant relation, which reflects the strong standing of the choice at referral 
policy introduced three years before the time of the survey. The Swedish choice at 
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referral policy is considerably less developed and so choice of doctor unsurprisingly 
stands out as the preferred criterion. 
Table 25 – SUR regressions on health care criteria, by country. Samples: Sweden, England, and 
Ireland   
  Dependent variables 
Self-rated social status (1-10) Wait lists Choice of hospital Choice of doctor 
Ireland 0.0677 ** Insignificant  Insignificant 
England Insignificant 0.0719** Insignificant 
Sweden Insignificant Insignificant 0.0716** 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level       
Source: Eurobarometer 72.2 Sep- Oct 2009.   
 
4.4.4 Robustness checks 
A poisson regression model is an alternative approach to dealing with the correlated 
errors of the health system criteria equations. The individuals are asked: ‘of the 
following criteria (see table 23) which are the three most important criteria when you 
think of high quality healthcare in your country?’ The poisson model is run on a 
dependent variable which counts the number of ‘yes’ responses to the criterion of 
interest: choice of hospital, choice of doctor and no wait lists. This generates a variable 
ranging from 0-3. This is then used as the dependent variable in a poisson count model. 
Table 26 illustrates a set of regression specifications including the same set of 
covariates used in table 25.  
 
The results are consistent with the main regressions and offers evidence that the middle 
class is more likely to have a preference for the three choice and ‘quick access’ criteria. 
The poisson regression confirms the results of the SUR regressions, albeit with lower 
explanatory power and a larger number of insignificant independent variables. 
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Table 26 – Poisson count model, health care criteria, sample general population.   
Dependent variables: Wait lists, Choice of hospital, Choice of doctor 
 
  
Count of criteria Count of criteria Count of criteria 
  
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Self-rated social status 0.067*** 0.021 0.069*** 0.021 0.063*** 0.020 
Difficulty meeting payments 0.109 0.053 0.125 0.052 0.120 0.051 
Female 
 
-0.071 0.044 -0.080* 0.044 -0.061 0.042 
Age 
 
-0.013* 0.007 -0.011 0.007 -0.012* 0.007 
Age squared 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overall health 
care quality 
Very good                                    reference category 
Fairly good 0.161*** 0.056 0.169*** 0.056 
  
Fairly bad 0.197*** 0.076 0.253*** 0.075 
  
 
Very bad 0.354*** 0.089 0.433*** 0.085 
  
Experience with health care 
system 
0.031 0.041 0.018 0.041 
  
Hospital care: 
probability of 
harm 
Very likely        reference category  
Fairly likely 0.123 0.075 0.097 0.074 
  
Not very likely  0.083 0.078 0.066 0.078 
  
 
Not at all likely  0.127 0.112 0.148 0.111 
  
Occupational 
status 
Self-employed -0.268** 0.112 -0.255** 0.111 -0.250** 0.109 
Managers                                    reference category 
 
Other white collar -0.026 0.083 -0.015 0.083 -0.033 0.083 
 
Manual workers -0.031 0.072 -0.009 0.073 -0.007 0.071 
 
House persons  -0.003 0.088 0.028 0.086 0.008 0.087 
 
Unemployed  -0.116* 0.093 -0.124* 0.094 -0.121* 0.090 
 
Retired  0.049 0.082 0.051 0.081 0.067 0.081 
 
Students  -0.135 0.117 -0.113 0.117 -0.125 0.112 
Marital status Married                                   reference category 
 
Cohabitating  -0.056 0.066 -0.036 0.066 -0.052 0.065 
 
Single  -0.112* 0.061 -0.116* 0.061 -0.073 0.058 
 
Divorced/separated  -0.047 0.076 -0.063 0.076 -0.031 0.075 
 
Widow  0.066 0.081 0.062 0.081 0.066 0.080 
 
Other  -0.515 0.404 -0.493 0.388 -0.261 0.358 
High education (yes) 0.150* 0.049 0.091* 0.046 0.143* 0.048 
Owns home (yes) 0.090* 0.051 0.098* 0.051 0.093* 0.050 
Area type Rural  0.003 0.048 -0.004 0.049 0.032 0.047 
 
Mid-sized town 0.021 0.053 -0.015 0.052 0.035 0.052 
 
Large town                                       reference category 
Ireland   0.064 0.060     0.148*** 0.055 
England 
 
-0.198*** 0.058 
  
-0.179*** 0.057 
Sweden 
 
                                      reference category 
Constant   -0.252 0.242 -0.387* 0.227 -0.104 0.214 
Number of observations 2701 
 
2701 
 
2834 
 Pseudo r-square   0.013   0.010   0.011   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level 
Source: Eurobarometer: 72.2, 2009 
 
The poisson model’s interpretation is constrained by the variation in the underlying 
preference functions between the three indicators accumulated into the index. By not 
taking into account the variation between the three variables that build the index a less 
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precise measure is found. The poisson model was estimated on a dependent variable 
consisting of choice of hospital and choice of doctor (range 0-2) with comparable 
results.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter has set out to examine middle class preferences for choice and to compare 
these preferences across systems of provider choice and private health insurance as 
illustrated through institutional evidence and reform trajectories in Sweden, England 
and Ireland. Firstly, empirical evidence was found for middle class preferences for three 
health system criteria: ‘choice of doctor’, ‘choice of hospital’ and ‘no waiting lists’. The 
preferences were consistent across the three health care systems and supports 
Blomqvist’s (2004) hypothesis of a middle class demand for choice. Secondly, a middle 
class preference for quick access, defined in terms of ‘no waiting lists’, was identified 
across the three countries. Quick access is related to choice by being among the factors 
most commonly reported as important when choosing a hospital (Dixon 2008). 
Furthermore, shortening waiting times has and continues to be a rationale for choice 
reform (for example in Sweden see Fotaki 2007), with choice seen as key to improving 
the allocation of patients to hospitals with less queues. Quick access is also known to be 
a key driver of taking up or using private health insurance (Besley et al. 1999; Costa-
Font and Garcia 2003).  
 
Private health insurance offers the same set of choices in Ireland as those offered as part 
of the publicly funded choice schemes in Sweden and England. However, as the case of 
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Ireland demonstrates, choice can be implemented through private financing and through 
choice schemes. Co-payments are not significantly higher in Ireland but choice was, 
until recently, restricted to VHI holders, which is in contrast to the situation in Sweden 
and England since the 1990s. The varying reform dynamics in Sweden, England and 
Ireland indicate that provider choice forms an alternative to privatisation of financing 
and does not necessarily accelerate an overall privatisation process.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the middle classes in 
Sweden, England and Ireland have a preference for choice, in and of itself. Both choice 
of doctor and choice of hospital are more likely to be mentioned by individuals above 
median self-assessed social status. The middle classes are also more likely to mention 
quick access (‘no waiting lists’) in all three countries. Taken together, the chapter 
provides evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the middle classes prefer choice, as 
well as outcome(s) of choice as an access system. The similar preference functions of 
the middle classes across the three countries further suggest that it does not matter 
whether choice is available through choice of provider schemes or through private 
insurance. This suggests that the ‘choice leading to privatisation’ thesis needs to be 
refined to account for the proposition that provider choice schemes and private health 
insurance can be substitutive reform trajectories responding to similar underlying 
preference functions.   
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Chapter 5    Conclusion  
 
 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis was to identify potential welfare effects of 
provider choice from a perspective other than the standard cost-benefit analysis of 
welfare economics. In doing so the thesis relies on the approach of subjective well-
being – an approach which is gaining attention across literatures and policy. More 
specifically, the thesis examined the welfare effects and equity implications of choice 
and competition reforms in the cases of health care and long-term care. These reforms 
were analysed through an empirical strategy incorporating self-rated subjective well-
being to elicit extrinsic (outcome) and intrinsic (procedural) effects and stated 
preferences to capture public demand for choice. In this concluding chapter I firstly 
discuss how the results of this analysis contribute to the overarching research question. I 
then move on to a more detailed discussion of each of the papers followed by a 
discussion of equity implications and procedural utility drawing on the combined 
empirical evidence. Broader implications for policy based on the findings are then 
discussed. Study limitations and a proposed future research agenda are presented in the 
final section. 
 
5.1 Summary and discussion of results 
The conceptual framework presented in chapter one suggests that welfare effects of 
choice in public services could be modelled by expanding the traditional rational choice 
approach to include ideas from the behavioural science literature (Simon 1955; 
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Schwartz 2004) as well as the concept of procedural utility (Frey and Stutzer 2004). 
This can in turn be explored statistically using a subjective well-being approach 
(Oswald 1997; Layard 2005; Clark 2008; Diener et al. 2008). The analysis of welfare 
effects is typically carried out in a cost-benefit setting based on assumptions of rational 
actors and is focused on extrinsic (outcome) benefits. This conventional approach 
overlooks the role of intrinsic and procedural values of choice in the provision of health 
and long-term care. The most important conceptual contribution of this thesis is its 
incorporation of procedural utility into the modelling of welfare effects of choice. This 
contribution includes the analysis of equitability of welfare effects and preferences for 
choice (where the thesis illustrates the importance of acknowledging the dual sources of 
wellbeing – from instrumental and procedural values).  
  
The thesis analysed the individual welfare effects of the institutional change brought 
about by consumer choice in public services – from changing outcomes and 
institutionalised procedures. Positive well-being effects are hypothesised based on 
insights from psychology but also from economics and the rational choice approach. 
The analysis builds (by incorporating procedural utility) on the rational choice argument 
that choice is valuable only as a tool to achieve a better outcome yet is restricted by 
external and internal constraints such as information availability, processing and 
transaction costs (Simon 1955). The thesis then investigated the hypothesis of the 
rational choice approach – following psychological and sociological arguments – that 
consumer choice under certain circumstances generates disutility or inequitable utility.  
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5.1.1 Main findings 
Extending provider choice in public services affects individual welfare and equity in a 
number of ways. The thesis focused on three aspects of the choice agenda which are 
linked by their influence on the individual’s right to choose: competition between 
providers; choice of service/treatment/provider; and preferences for choice. These were 
investigated in each of the chapters respectively:  
- Chapter 2 found a consistently positive effect of choice and competition between 
providers in the English NHS. The positive SWB effect stems partly from 
improved (health) outcomes following quality improvements. The positive SWB 
effects are present among patients in higher income and education brackets thus 
suggesting an inequitable overall effect.  
- Chapter 3 found a positive SWB effect of choice in the German LTC system.  
The benefits of choice, in and of itself, did not exhibit an inequitable 
distribution. Nevertheless, the benefits appeared to be influenced by the 
availability of informal care, that is, a privately constrained key provision 
option.  
- Chapter 4 found that preferences for choice, in and of itself, as well as quick 
access (a potential outcome benefit of choice) are evident among higher socio-
economic groups. The evidence proved consistent in NHS type countries 
(England and Sweden) as well as a privatised NHS country (Ireland). This 
indicates a potential substitutivity of provider choice policies relative to 
privatised financing (VHI).       
- Each of the chapters contributed to the analysis of equity implications of choice 
reforms with mixed results. The analysis suggests that the equitability of choice 
 186 
 
is dependent on policy specific conditions. Individuals who are relatively well-
off tend to experience a more pronounced SWB effect when the choice situation 
is institutionalised within a relatively complex structure (such as in the case of 
choice of hospital). On the other hand, welfare effects are more broadly 
distributed when the choice relates to provision allocation where key 
information is privately held and where care can be privately (family) provided.  
- Each chapter also contributed to the analysis of procedural utility as a benefit of 
choice. The data did not allow for direct identification of procedural utility; 
however, an indirect approach, discounting outcome effects, did provide mixed 
evidence. In the case of choice in health care little evidence of PU was found, 
while in the case of choice in LTC the evidence indicated a welfare 
improvement which can be linked to procedural utility.  
5.1.2 Chapter 2 – Choice and competition in health care 
The second chapter explored the subjective well-being effects of choice of hospital and 
the associated equity implications. The findings suggest that competition has an 
influence on well-being improvements from choice of provider in health care. This 
chapter contributes to the health economics literature by offering a different approach to 
the measurement of quality and welfare effects. Methodologically, this study measured 
choice and competition in a treatments effects setting defined by the intensity of local 
competition (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration). The 
evidence of improved health outcomes from competition supported the conclusion that 
the positive SWB effects are more closely linked to competition (driving quality 
improvements) than choice. Individuals with higher income and education had a 
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significant SWB effect which was not the case for lower income and education brackets. 
Similarly, individuals with higher income also reported improved satisfaction with 
health (a domain satisfaction), but no such differences were found when considering 
subgroups based on education categories. The results were robust to local area 
characteristics, lags in implementation and individual level controls.  
 
This study confirms the positive results of a range of previous contemporary health 
economics studies analysing the NHS reforms of the 2000s (Propper et al. 2004; 
Propper and Burgess 2008; Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2010; Gravelle et al. 
2012). These studies tend to focus on narrow quality indicators, such as AMI mortality, 
or other objective indicators of quality or efficiency, which the positive effect on 
satisfaction with health status found in chapter 2 supports. On the other hand, the results 
of the broader SWB analysis have no clear reference point in previous health economics 
literature. Only Gravelle et al. (2012) have incorporated various measures of patient 
satisfaction as outcome variables in cross-sectional regressions of competition effects. 
These results are mixed but did not account for any longitudinal effect of the 
introduction of choice and are therefore not directly comparable to those presented in 
chapter.  
 
The unequal distribution of the positive welfare effects has no real reference in the 
happiness literature. To date there is little quantitative evidence tracing equity effects of 
a policy change in a SWB setting. Subsample analysis capturing equity effects is 
common in the happiness literature but not in a longitudinal setting. In the health policy 
literature there is mixed evidence of equity in the NHS (Dixon et al. 2003). With regard 
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to choice of hospital, Robertson and Burge (2011) found that the take-up of choice is 
not in itself inequitable, while the propensity to travel beyond the local area is related to 
social status. Individuals with higher education and income are more likely to travel 
beyond their local hospital, and this is also the group which this chapter finds enjoys a 
SWB improvement from choice and competition. However, there are no significant 
differences between education categories in terms of health satisfaction while the 
differences between income categories are consistent with the SWB regressions.   
 
One plausible explanation for the unequal effects is the character of the choice situation. 
The choice situation is denoted by high complexity and inaccessible information, 
implying that personal connections are likely to matter. The middle class has a better 
capacity to cope with the choice process under these circumstances (Dixon and Le 
Grand 2006; Robertson and Burge 2011). It has been argued that individuals tend to rely 
on heuristic approaches to decision making (Longo et al. 1997; Marmot and Wilkinson 
2006). The individual forms a private conception of quality, or simply chooses provider 
based on proximity or the views of his or her social network. Therefore, if we assume 
that level of education is particularly important for coping with a complex choice 
process, then the significant difference between education levels in terms of SWB 
effects and the insignificant difference in terms of health satisfaction is interesting. This 
suggests that the outcome effect (health satisfaction) may be linked to the improved 
quality induced by competition rather than any benefit of choice in and of itself. The 
significant difference between education categories in terms of SWB effects on the 
other hand can be linked to the choice experience and procedural utility rather than 
competition effects.  
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The second chapter contributes to the overall objective of the thesis through its analysis 
of a case which is characterised by constrained information availability and potentially 
substantial transaction costs. Choice of hospital also has a low rate of repetition which 
offers little opportunity for ‘learning’ and optimising future choice. Based on the results 
of this paper, there is scope for further exploration of the role of competition for SWB, 
particularly using data featuring more detailed measures of patient satisfaction. This 
would enable us to disentangle whether SWB is as closely related to improved health 
outcomes as the results of the chapter suggest.  
5.1.3 Chapter 3 – Choice in long-term care provision 
The third chapter is concerned with the choice that cash-for-care schemes bring to the 
provision of LTC in the German LTC system. Cash-for-care is a vehicle for increasing 
individual autonomy and control over the character and quality of care. The chapter 
questioned the SWB effects of choice, the implications for equity and the role of 
procedural utility. The methodological approach – using DiD models in an attempt to 
identify causal effects of the LTCI system and its choice component – is similar to that 
of the first chapter. The crucial distinction is the expansion in provision, inherent to the 
LTCI reform, which all else being equal should represent a welfare improvement in 
itself. The overall positive SWB effect was therefore decomposed into a ‘system’ and a 
‘choice’ effect. The overall positive effect of the choice component conforms to the 
current literature which promotes the benefits of choice (often referred to as 
personalisation) for long-term care users (Ungerson 2004; Glendinning and Kemp 2006; 
Timonen et al. 2006; Ungerson and Yeandle 2007).  
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The ‘system effect’ on SWB is stronger among individuals with higher income and 
education whereas the effect of the choice component is significantly stronger in the 
lowest income quartiles but is not differentiated between education categories. This 
means that any inequitable SWB effects are in this case linked to instrumental (outcome 
related) rather than procedural benefits. The positive SWB effect among middle income 
groups can be explained by the significant improvement in economic situation that the 
LTCI created for that group (Schneider 1999). The previous eligibility criteria for social 
assistance meant that not even an extensive period of care needs resulted in state-funded 
care becoming available to middle class users (Geraedts et al. 2000). Even though the 
regressions controlled for income, the current year income does not capture the effect of 
more long-term strain on the economic situation.  
 
The analysis finally identified mixed SWB ‘system’ and ‘choice’ effects depending on 
probability of access to informal family carers. Informal care is a key option, especially 
incentivised in ‘cash-for-care’ schemes. This suggests that the character of the choice 
situation and the choice-set available are important which supports previous evidence 
(Schwartz 2004, Botti and Iyengar 2006). A high probability of having an informal 
carer led to a positive SWB effect of choice, whereas groups less likely to have informal 
carers benefited from the system effect. Users without informal carers also benefit from 
the system of LTCI but the choice effect bolstered by availability of informal carers 
supports previous arguments in the literature (Da Roit et al. 2007; Pavolini and Ranci 
2008; Fernandez et al. 2009). The results also have equity implications; however, the 
current literature offers mixed evidence on the effects of income and labour market 
status on the propensity to provide informal care (Colombo 2011). 
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The chapter contributes to the thesis through the analysis of a case in which the choice 
situation is denoted by privately held information, relatively low transaction costs and 
the opportunity to continuously revise the elected choice-set. This is a setting in which 
lessons from the psychology literature indicate that benefits of choice should be 
expected (Botti 2004; Iyengar 2010).  
5.1.4 Chapter 4 – Preferences for consumer choice and privatisation  
The fourth chapter approached the equity argument from the demand side and 
incorporated the analysis of socio-economic class dependent preferences for consumer 
choice. The chapter examined the proposition by Blomqvist (2004) that the ‘well-off’ 
(the middle class) not only benefit disproportionately from choice reforms but also have 
a particular preference for the type of service offered in such systems. The chapter is 
based on theoretical arguments which view the middle class as a key constituency for 
welfare reform (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Loayza et al. 2012) and as having a distinct 
preference for consumer choice (Fotaki 2009). The findings from chapters two and three 
– that the middle class benefits more from choice and competition reforms – support the 
relevance of the question.   
 
The chapter draws on evidence from a comparative review of system characteristics of 
three tax-funded health care systems: England, Sweden and Ireland. The system 
characteristics and reform trajectories formed benchmarks for the quantitative analysis 
of survey data (Eurobarometer 72.2). Findings suggested middle class preferences for 
choice of provider and choice of doctor before a range of other health system 
characteristics. The results support the arguments of the consumerist literature (Long 
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1999; Clarke 2006; Jones and Needham 2008; Fotaki 2009). More specifically, that 
‘consumer citizens’ and particularly the middle class enjoy choice also in relation to 
public services. Furthermore, middle class preferences included ‘no waiting lists’ as a 
criterion for a quality health care system. The preference estimates were robust to the 
inclusion of country dummies and were similar across the three countries despite their 
differing access systems. Choice of provider is available to the patient either through 
provider choice schemes in England and Sweden or through private health insurance in 
Ireland. ‘No waiting lists’, or quick access, plays a similar role in the provider choice 
systems as it does in the Irish system (which is reliant on private insurance). This 
supports the previous literature: firstly, quick access is a well-known driver for 
individuals to seek private care (Propper 1993; Besley et al. 1999; Costa-Font and 
Garcia 2003; Costa-Font and Garcia-Villar 2009); and secondly, it is a key motivation 
when selecting a hospital through provider choice schemes (Dixon 2008 – see figure 3). 
The finding of middle class preferences for both choice (of hospital and doctor) and 
quick access has further significance in that preference for choice can be understood as 
signalling the presence of procedural benefits and the preference for quick access as 
signalling the presence of an outcome benefit.  
 
The chapter contributes to the thesis by examining the evidence of a middle class 
preference for choice in health care. The similar preference structures (higher 
preferences among individuals who are better off) for choice (in and of itself) and ‘no 
waiting lists’ suggests that the middle class demands an accessible system to a similar 
extent that it demands choice.   
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5.1.5 Equity implications and procedural utility   
The thesis considered two key questions across the three papers: the equity implications 
of choice reforms and the role of procedural utility. These questions were not only of 
empirical interest but were also a key motivation for the thesis. Informed by the 
literature on institutional economics and (constraints to) rational choice, this section 
discusses these questions further.  
 
Equity implications 
The three chapters identified mixed evidence of equity implications. Relatively well-off 
individuals tend to experience a more pronounced SWB effect in the case of choice of 
hospital, while choice (in and of itself) in LTC seems to bring benefits more equally 
across the social status distribution. Building on the divergent character of the two 
cases, this suggests that welfare effects are more equally distributed when the choice 
relates to a provision allocation which is privately (family in LTC) oriented and where 
key information is privately held than when the choice situation is institutionalised 
within a relatively complex structure. Chapter 4 further identified that preferences for 
both choice (in and of itself) and service characteristics (‘no waiting times’) are more 
likely to be held by individuals in higher (self-rated) social status categories. 
 
Inequitable SWB effects are identified in relation to the choice reforms considered in 
both health care and LTC; however, the results suggest that this is largely due to 
outcomes effects. Firstly, in LTC the inequitable ‘system effects’ are present when 
estimating the overall effect of the reform, rather than the pre-reform situation. The 
introduction of the LTCI implied an overall improvement, in terms of income as well as 
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care situation, for eligible individuals. Controlling for current year income only partly 
captures the benefit drawn from long-term financial prospects which the LTCI 
influenced. The improvement was most noticeable for individuals in higher income 
categories, who in the previous system were excluded from social benefits (Geraedts et 
al. 2000). This explanation is supported by the significant difference in SWB effects 
depending on income and the absence of difference depending on education. As a result, 
the inequitable effect in the case of LTC cannot be directly linked to choice effects, in 
and of itself.  
 
Secondly, in health care, the SWB effect can be explained by quality improvements 
leading to outcome effects. In light of previous evidence of inequitable take-up of 
choice, this implies that patients with more resources reap the benefits of choice by 
making an active choice and selecting better facilities. In the case of health care this 
suggests that choice reproduces existing health differentials depending on social status 
(Braveman and Gruskin 2003). The ability of the middle class to make ‘better choices’ 
has in the literature been explained in different ways. The economics literature 
highlights (as in this thesis) education and income which enable individuals to make 
more informed and costly choices (Dixon et al. 2003). The sociological literature 
meanwhile focuses on theories of social capital (Bourdieu 2008). The concept of social 
capital claims that individuals are socialised into certain habits which are then enforced 
though learning from the social group that the individuals belongs to. Individuals in 
similar social groups assimilate into behaving in a certain way; in this context, to make 
active and ‘good’ choices (Bourdieu 2008). Belonging to the ‘middle class group’ is 
also more likely to give direct or indirect access to professionals who have insights into 
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the organisational and institutional structures governing the process of making a choice 
of, for example, provider.  
 
In the case of health care the middle class benefited more in terms of health outcomes 
whereas in LTC the outcome effects were more likely to be explained by an improved 
overall economic situation compared to the pre-reform situation. The results indicate 
that any benefit reaped by the middle class is instrumental and linked to higher capacity 
to cope with the information requirements and transaction costs rather than a stronger 
preference for choice. The inequitable effects are not directly linked to choice – 
suggested by the finding that ‘lower’ classes benefit more from the procedure of 
choosing (found in the case of LTC).  
 
The role of procedural utility 
The empirical evidence of this thesis (overall positive SWB effects) supports the 
hypothesis that choice generates procedural utility. This assertion rests however on 
indirect evidence rather than a conclusive empirical test. Nonetheless, Frey and 
colleagues argue that there is a value to jointly assessing outcome and procedural utility, 
which SWB allows us to do, even if separating the two is not possible (2004). At the 
very least, the positive SWB effect indicates that any potential disutility from the 
procedure (or process) does not outweigh the outcome benefits (which are conclusively 
supported). 
  
The first strategy to identify PU throughout the thesis rests on controlling for outcomes, 
so that any effect can be attributed to the procedure, wherever possible. Health status is 
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a key outcome indicator, particularly in chapter two. The approach is supported by 
evidence that self-reported health status is closely aligned with physician diagnoses as 
well as a strong predictor of future mortality (Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Idler and 
Benyamini 1997). In LTC, outcomes are more challenging to control for as individuals 
with chronic diseases tend to have a relatively constant health status (with little 
expectation of dramatic improvements). Care outcomes – such as care hours or 
technical aides are – not necessarily included in the cash benefits commonly opted for in 
the German LTC. The LTC choice reforms are therefore about something procedural – 
either PU from the institution of choice or process utility (in the health economics 
interpretation – process quality). The positive SWB effect provides evidence which 
suggests a procedural utility effect.  
 
The second strategy to identify procedural utility is based on an analytical comparison 
of the results of chapter 2 and 3 (in light of the psychological literature on choice). 
These conclusions on procedural utility are based on the underlying policy structure and 
suggest that choice is sometimes a good thing in and of itself while at other times it is 
only (or mainly) an instrument to achieve a better outcome. In the case of choice of 
hospital the PU effect is likely to be constrained by the character of the choice of 
hospital. It is information and knowledge intensive; there is low probability of repetition 
of choice, potentially high transaction costs and possible deficiencies in the quality of 
information and the way that choice is communicated to patients. This indicates that 
patients may not perceive the procedure as fair and as meeting their needs.  On the other 
hand, in the case of LTC, information is privately held (the individual is often well 
aware of his or her needs and the optimal treatment) and choices can be altered and 
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repeated if necessary. Transaction costs can be an issue; however, these are only 
indirectly related to the choice making itself. LTC provision in the home may require 
investment in technical aid which can pose a challenge and increase the stress of 
choosing. Nevertheless, LTC provision under systems of ‘cash-for-care’ is likely to 
produce PU, as indicated in numerous satisfaction studies (see Colombo 2011).  
 
The findings support the arguments in the literature that procedural utility stems from 
procedures which are perceived to be fair by the individuals involved (Frey and Stutzer 
2004). This thesis provides evidence that procedural utility is more likely to be gained 
when the individual choosing has ‘enough’ information and when ‘key’ choices are 
available. ‘Enough’ information, as suggested in the psychology literature, is when the 
choice is likely to provide the individual with a sense of autonomy and independence 
(Dworkin 1988; Timonen et al. 2006). The role of ‘key’ choices means that benefits do 
not necessarily depend on having the highest number of options but rather having a real 
choice between options which are equally incentivised (Dowding 1992). The two choice 
situations considered in this thesis – choice of hospital and choice of service in LTC – 
illustrate this distinction. In sum, the evidence supports the arguments that procedural 
utility is gained where the individual choosing has sufficient information, where actual 
options are available and where the chooser is not in an a priori substandard position in 
terms of outcomes. The latter point can be understood as outcome utility taking 
precedence over procedural utility where outcome deficiencies exist and the individuals’ 
needs are not sufficiently met.  
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5.2 Policy implications 
The rise of the consumer choice agenda as an important pan-European reform trend 
stresses the need to formulate an agenda within which (equitable) welfare effects can be 
obtained. This thesis informs such an agenda by examining the well-being effects of 
choice, which is a unit of measurement increasingly valued by policy makers and 
scholars alike. The findings of this thesis have a number of implications for policy.  
 
Overarching recommendation 
The thesis supports the view that, even though the welfare effect of the consumer choice 
policies considered in the empirical analysis is positive, attention must be paid to their 
equity implications (Barr et al. 2008; Bevan et al. 2010). This applies equally to 
inequalities between socio-economic groups as it does to inequalities determined by 
circumstances related to individual availability of options amounting to a genuine 
opportunity to choose. This goes beyond differences in the individuals’ availability of 
information and associated transaction costs to include geographical differences and 
limitations to the support offered by family and relatives.  
 
The change for different social groups brought about by the respective policies varies 
considerably. In health care the status quo in a public system is generally found to 
include inequalities in terms of access, health outcomes and utilisation (Braveman and 
Gruskin 2003; Braveman 2006; Braveman et al. 2011). In LTC systems such as 
Germany, on the other hand, choice systems are preceded by a means-tested system of 
benefits – a system often based on social assistance rather than recognising LTC needs 
as a unique social risk (Geraedts et al. 2000). The move from a means-tested system to a 
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more universal system featuring choice has a particularly strong effect on the middle 
class. It is middle income earners who stand to lose the most under means-testing as 
they are forced to either spend down wealth in order to become eligible for social 
assistance or fund care privately (Dilnot 2011). Finally, a choice is only a useful choice 
if genuine options are available. Policy makers considering choice based policies should 
consider the available options and the extent to which they are constrained by individual 
circumstances if an equitable policy is to be created. The thesis finally argues that 
measures of SWB and other domain satisfaction should be routinely incorporated into 
the analysis of reform  
 
Specific recommendations:  
- Information and transaction costs  
The thesis has used system wide information and potential transaction costs as 
benchmarks on which to differentiate the cases. The inequity discussed in the literature 
can be explained as the capability to make other choices than the default (e.g. transport 
costs and the availability of appropriate transport such as own car). The cost of making 
the choice should be set against the cost associated with taking up (more costly) options. 
Information processing and ‘costly’ choice making is not necessarily a massive 
constraint unless the choice is challenging to the point where it generates damaging 
stress for the individual. In health care, making an informed choice of a hospital for 
surgery depends on in-depth understanding of performance and available surgeons. 
Hospital ratings have also been found to be suboptimal vehicles for communicating 
quality to patients and users (Marshall et al. 2000; Hibbard et al. 2005). This thesis 
considers this type of choice situation as one where information is ‘professionally held’, 
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particularly information about quality and specifics of the service provided. Transaction 
costs related to taking up options, such as travel to and extended stays at or near distant 
provider locations, are perceivable in relation to hospital choice. The choice of service 
in LTC is centred on the individual which in practice means that even though choice 
making may be subject to considerable transaction costs (in terms of selecting a non-
standard care package and the regulations and bureaucracy involved), transaction costs 
in relation to taking up the choice are less likely to be prohibitive. 
 
- Personalisation and links with labour markets 
The evidence of this thesis supports the impetus for further cash-for-care policies. This 
is particularly relevant in light of the agenda of ‘ageing in place’ and formalising 
informal care seen in many European countries. We can here envision links between 
choice policies and for example employment policy for potential informal carers. The 
EU and many European counties strongly promote ageing in place and informal care as 
the best and most cost-efficient way of caring for the elderly and the disabled. As 
further discussed below, the SWB of informal carers was not incorporated into the 
analysis, but is thought to play an important role for the outcomes of choice policies. 
 
5.3 Limitations and future research agenda 
This section outlines the limitations of the thesis as a whole (topic specific limitations 
are found within each of the chapters). I then move on to discuss a possible future 
research agenda.  
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5.3.1 Limitations of the study 
Limitations fall under three broad categories: data availability; measurement; and 
methods/conceptual framework.  
 
Data availability  
In order to make the analysis of large scale choice and competition reforms possible the 
analysis relied on data already available through large-scale socio-economic surveys. 
Data from before and after the reforms was used in order to endeavour a causal 
interpretation. The longitudinal survey data used in chapters 2 (BHPS) and 3 (GSOEP) 
allows for groups of individuals to be followed over time. However, due to the 
particular samples; individuals who had been in hospital in the past year and individuals 
using LTC services, the longitudinal aspect of the data was almost completely lost. 
Neither of the groups tend to be recorded in the relevant status (hospital in-patient or 
LTC user) in the surveys over the course of several years. LTC users may become too 
frail to take part in the survey and ultimately have a higher mortality rate than the 
general population. Moreover, individuals, unless suffering from chronic conditions or 
multi-morbidity, rarely become hospital in-patients on repeated occasions. Repeated 
cross-sectional data was used throughout.  
 
Different samples, treatment and control groups were identified to attempt to alleviate 
the potential bias that the data limitations entail. Personality (Diener and Lucas 1999; 
Fujita 2005) and genetics (De Neve 2011) have been found to matter for SWB ratings – 
which statistically can be captured through individual fixed effects models (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters: 2004). The lack of a longitudinal sample is also here a problem. 
 202 
 
The regression analysis included a broad variety of socio-economic and area level 
controls in an attempt to eliminate bias from the set-point SWB (Lucas 2004) of the 
various samples. The determinants of SWB were in line with what is normally found in 
the literature and stable across specifications which indicate that set-point bias was not a 
major issue.  
 
Measurement 
A second limitation is that the analysis almost exclusive relies on individuals’ 
subjective answers to questions about demographic information, health, family and 
household circumstances – something which may lead to bias (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2001). Bias can easily affect responses to questions about wealth, 
satisfaction, attitudes etc. A particularly important variable for this thesis is self-
reported health. Respondents are asked for an overall evaluation of their health status or 
specific symptoms and the perceived severity (not confirmed by a physician in GSOEP 
and BHPS). Sutton et al (1990) argue that individual perceptions of health measure 
‘something different’ to actual health, such that using self-reported health increases the 
chance of measurement error. In one empirical study Blaxter (1995) found that 20% of 
self-reports on chronic illnesses did not match that of physician records. However, 
Andersen (1998:3) argues that modelling of health behaviour should consider how 
people view their own general health, and how they experience symptoms of illness, 
pain and worries about their health and when they judge their symptoms to be severe 
enough to seek care. Empirical evidence suggest that self-reported health status is 
closely aligned with physician diagnoses as well as being a strong predictor of future 
mortality (Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Idler and Benyamini 1997). All this suggests that 
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individuals are good evaluators of their own health status. However, given that the 
present study aims to capture individual subjective well-being effects – a subjective 
assessment in itself – bias arising from self-reported health is less of an issue than for 
studies aiming to capture health utilisation and behaviour. SWB is formed around the 
perceptions an individual has of a particular situation and hence it is the perceived 
health status which is relevant to control for (Brief et al. 1993).
74
  
 
Conceptual framework and methodological approach  
In addition to the measurement issues discussed above, the SWB approach has 
conceptual limitations. Questions on individual satisfaction with life or with domains of 
life are driven by subjective assessments including personal preferences, expectations, 
perceptions of the objective situation and circumstance experienced (Sitzia and Wood 
1997; Van Praag et al. 2003). Additionally, social desirability bias (reluctance to 
express dissatisfaction) may affect answers. However, in the long-running well-
established surveys (BHPS and GSOEP) used in this thesis, interviewers are trained to 
make clear to the respondent that all answers are confidential and anonymous so as to 
reduce bias.   
 
Bias of a similar kind is inherent to the SWB measure and well-known in the happiness 
literature. Adaptation, expectations and social comparisons all affect individuals’ 
evaluation of their satisfaction with life (Diener and Lucas 1999). These effects are 
inherent to the measure and are difficult to control for. Using SWB as a tool for 
                                                 
74
 Recent developments in data availability whereby survey data is increasingly linked to patient records 
and will allow for controlling more in detail for the difference between subjective health status and 
‘objective’. There are however concerns over self-selection in giving consent for linking (Knies et al. 
2011). 
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evaluating policy, which is a broad contribution of this thesis, rests on a normative 
judgement of the importance of SWB as a measure of welfare (Layard 1980; Layard 
2006). Economists often disagree with the exclusive use of SWB as a measurement, 
partly due to the interpretation of the effects. Similarly, we know from the happiness 
literature that even large and important life events only affect well-being to a minor 
extent and that effects tend to return close to ‘normal’ after a few years (Lucas 2004; 
Fujita 2005).The finding that choice reforms impact on SWB, controlling for individual 
and societal variables in treatments effects models is, in itself, a contribution both to the 
choice literature and to the happiness literature where studies evaluating reforms in a 
treatments effects setting are few. 
 
The choice situation 
The analysis was further limited by a lack of data for capturing the circumstances 
surrounding the choice (both in chapters 2 and 3). The thesis only takes into account 
‘policy-wide’ information availability and transaction costs as the data does not allow 
for a more detailed modelling of the choice situation of each individual. Firstly, the 
identification of whether an individual was actually faced with the choice situation, and 
perceived themselves to have been offered a choice, is not exclusively based on the 
individuals own statement. This limits the analysis and causal identification of one 
aspect of procedural utility, which relies on the individual’s perception of an appropriate 
and fair process of choosing. The identification of procedural utility generated from 
choice as an institution is however not restrained in the same way. It does not rely on 
the circumstances of the choice but on the ‘idea’ of choice as ‘the rules of the game’ 
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(North 1995) of the health or long-term care system. This overlaps with the intrinsic 
value of choice.  
5.3.2 Avenues for future research 
The evidence in this thesis invites a number of diverse extensions: the role and 
dynamics of individual choice for competition, the politics of middle class preferences, 
the choice in itself and the availability of options; and finally, extending a similar 
examination to other cases.  
 
Choice and competition 
The issues in the literature regarding the choice situation and perceptions of quality of 
care can offer insight for the dynamic of the incentives behind the competition effects of 
choice in public services (Cooper et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 2012). In theory it is patient 
choice that drives providers to improve quality since ‘money follows patients’ choices 
in a quasi-market setting. If patients, as indicated by the data, do not choose based on 
quality and view proximity as a major consideration (Dixon 2008), how will this in the 
long-run affect competition? There is still a potential for real competition effects in 
urban areas, such as London, where patients have ‘easy’ access to several providers. If 
patients in fact strive to use quality as a background for choice then they will encounter 
further difficulties. Quality varies not only between providers but between professionals 
and these differences are largely hidden to patients. It has further been found that 
quality ratings are relatively under-used when choosing provider, but that user ratings 
are increasingly discussed as a complement to official ratings. Individuals tend to rely 
on the views of their peers over official ratings (Marshall et al. 2000). Likewise, online 
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forums, particularly in areas such as maternity care, are increasingly being used. The 
potential for non-typical ways of making quality ratings accessible needs to be further 
explored (see literature review Trigg 2013).  
 
The politics of the middle class as a driver of CCP reform 
This thesis has provided evidence in support of the elsewhere hypothesised correlation 
between middle class preferences for choice, competition and privatisation and national 
reform trajectories. It may be that a priori middle class preferences for choice – as 
argued in the consumerism literature – lead politicians to move towards CCP reforms. It 
may also be that policy-makers move towards CCP reforms expecting the middle class 
to appreciate the reforms once they are in place, regardless of prior concerns over 
investment costs related to institutional change. It may also be that there is a role for the 
private provider lobby to ‘sell’ the idea of choice and private options to both policy 
makers and the middle class. The above forms a refined version of Blomqvist’s general 
argument that the direction of causality is not crucial. Blomqvist instead argues that it is 
a self-perpetuating dynamic which denotes the increasing role of choice reforms: choice 
feeds demands for more choice which is enforced by the middle class’s inherent 
preference for consumer choice. Whether there is a generalisable direction of causality 
can be identified through process tracing of reform trajectories in relevant countries. 
The dynamic, if at all present, is likely to vary between funding systems (social health 
insurance compared to national health service) and between the regime types of Esping-
Andersen (1990).    
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Beyond Western Europe  
The thesis argued that the universal welfare states of Western Europe are a particularly 
relevant case for the analysis of the welfare effects of choice. This is because of the 
qualitative change CCP reforms constitute in mature welfare states which are 
traditionally characterised by little choice for the individual. The analysis could be 
applied to choice reforms in other countries and, similar to the case of LTC, to cases 
where the pre-reform situation places responsibility exclusively on the individual to 
arrange and fund care privately. Eastern Europe is in this respect an interesting 
extension. As part of the enlarged European Union, policy transfer is increasingly 
impacting on the institutions and structures of the welfare states, which is in turn driving 
CCP reforms (Kornai and Eggleston. 2001). The recent transition from varying degrees 
of communist economic rule has led to a change in how citizens view the state and 
public services. The communist rule was denoted by minimal choice for users of 
welfare services, hence CCP reforms result in a considerable break with previous 
traditions and is embedded within increasing individualisation and consumerism. This is 
reflected in the determinants of SWB which are strongly focused on individual factors 
such as income (Zigante 2008). Similarly, Iyengar argues that choice should matter 
everywhere, but that a predisposition to benefit from choice varies between cultures 
(Iyengar and Lepper 1999). This is likely to apply also within the countries of Western 
Europe. The analysis of chapters 2 and 3 can offer insights into this by repeating the 
analysis for different ethnic groups, religions and migrant statuses. These indicators are 
also increasingly linked to inequalities beyond those solely dependent on economic 
situation and education (as focused on in this thesis).  
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How individuals experience the choice situation 
This thesis emphasised the role of information, transaction costs and preferences as 
determinants of the SWB effects of choice. The more specific characteristics of the 
choice situation can provide further policy relevant evidence with more detail than in 
this thesis.  
 
The role of actors in the choice process was left out of the present analysis. This applies 
to both the health care case (the GP) and LTC case (family and advisors) – where actors 
advising in the process are important. However, data limitations did not allow for a 
detailed analysis of the character of the choice situation (which limited the examination 
of PU effects for the individual). This limited opportunities for an analysis of whether 
there was a ‘real’ choice for the individual. In LTC, for example, chapter 3 found a 
SWB effect of choice among individuals with informal carers available, but not among 
individuals with a lower probability of available informal carers. In LTC the role of 
informal carers and ‘when’ and ‘how’ family carers actually provide care is largely 
unexplored. In LTC, this availability is not only constrained by intra-family relations, 
employment conditions and other caring responsibilities, but is also intimately 
intertwined with the development of public funding. Germany, a forerunner in the LTC 
choice agenda, exemplifies this clearly.  The fact that the cash option is used less than 
expected highlights the relevance of constraints beyond financing (Rothgang 2012).  
 
A more detailed account of the character of the choice situation may further provide 
evidence of procedural utility, which was not conclusively identified in this thesis. This 
thesis discussed the evidence in favour of quality improvements brought about by 
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competition in hospital markets (Bloom et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 
2012) – which is here found to improve individual well-being, mainly due to better 
health outcomes. However, the idea that choice and individual autonomy can generate 
utility, beyond what is gained from outcomes, was a key motivation for the approach of 
this thesis. Psychological research (see for example Botti and Iyengar 2004) indicates 
that the gains from choice depend on the situation and at times the predisposition of the 
person choosing. Therefore, the growing literature on procedural, or process, utility can 
benefit from an expanded methodological approach. Survey data can beneficially be 
combined with qualitative evidence and experiments on the effects of the choice 
situation and how the procedure can be improved in order to generate well-being 
effects. The mapping and understanding of the role of procedural utility is a crucial 
endeavour for providing public services efficiently and with high quality, particularly in 
an age of fiscal austerity.  
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Chapter 1 
Appendix 1 – Overview of research questions  
Question Subset Question What do we know already?  Main method Answer Key contribution 
1 Does competition 
and choice in health 
care improve 
individual well-
being?  
Emerging evidence of 
quality improvements from 
choice and competition in 
the English NHS.  
DiD models (OLS), main 
independent variable is a 
concentration index of 
hospital competition 
SWB effects of competition 
are positive and not 
explained by individual or 
local characteristics.  
Supporting the positive 
quality effect of 
competition – also on 
SWB. 
1 a Are benefits 
equitably 
distributed 
according to socio-
economic status? 
Mainly empirical evidence, 
of take-up but little/nothing 
on how this transforms into 
outcomes and welfare 
effects.  
Sub-group analysis using 
income and education as 
indicators of capability to 
benefit from choice.  
SWB effects found among 
individuals with higher 
income and education. 
The results support the 
argument that individuals 
who are better off benefit 
more from choice.  
1 b Does choice and 
competition 
improve patient 
satisfaction with 
health? 
Health economics studies 
have found quality 
improvements measured as 
AMI mortality.  
DiD models, dependent 
variable satisfaction with 
health and independent; 
competition index 
Positive effect on 
satisfaction with health.  
Confirming the positive 
effect of competition, 
also on satisfaction with 
health. Indicates less of a 
role for procedural utility 
2 Does choice in 
long-term care 
improve individual 
well-being?  
Qualitative studies have 
found positive effects of 
increased autonomy.  
DiD and DDD models 
based on groups of public 
users, privately insured 
and severely disabled.  
SWB effects are positive 
overall and not explained by 
individual or local 
characteristics. 
Systematic and 
considerable effect on 
SWB both in terms of a 
system effect and a 
choice effect.  
2 a Are benefits 
equitably 
distributed 
according to socio-
economic status?  
Scattered empirical 
evidence of equity impacts. 
US evidence focused on 
race and ethnicity. Inter-
generational equity in 
relation to financing.   
Sub-group analysis using 
income and education and 
as indicators of ability. 
SWB effects are significant 
among higher income 
groups and education 
(system effect) whereas the 
effects of choice are present 
among lower income groups 
The LTC system benefit 
those who previously 
were most disfavoured 
(the middle class) 
whereas choice in and of 
itself is not inequitable.  
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2 b Are benefits 
equitably distributed 
according to the 
availability of 
meaningful options 
(such as informal 
carers)? 
Studies have found 
familism (as a value) to be 
crucial for informal 
provision of care 
Sub-group analysis of 
individuals with varying 
probability of having 
available informal carers 
‘System effect’ for users 
with low probability of 
informal care provision. 
‘choice effect’ among 
those with high probability 
of availability of informal 
carers 
Choice (more and broader 
choice set) i.e. having 
informal carers available 
matters for SWB effects 
(outcome and procedure) 
3 Is there a middle 
class preference for 
choice in NHS type 
health care systems? 
Consumerist: procedural 
preference for choice 
('likes to choose') and/or 
benefits more of choice 
due to better resources --> 
instrumental preferences 
Seemingly unrelated 
regression of criteria for a 
quality health care system- 
by socio-economic social 
status.  
 
Higher socio-economic 
status (no evidence of 
curve-linear relationship) 
is linked to preferences for 
choice of doctor and 
hospital and no waiting 
times 
The evidence supports the 
theoretical propositions of 
middle class support for 
choice and privatisation. 
3 a Are middle class 
preferences linked to 
choice in and of 
itself or is there a 
role for outcomes 
produced by choice 
schemes? 
Middle class argued to 
have stronger preferences 
for a quick and specialised 
service. Waiting lists is 
key factor for take-up of 
private insurance.   
Higher socio-economic 
status (no evidence of 
curve-linear relationship) 
is linked to preferences for 
quick access (no waiting 
times)  
3 b Are there 
complementarities in 
the provision 
systems under 
consumer choice and 
privatised funding? 
Theories of a succession of 
the wealthy - people turn 
to the private system - 
removing support for the 
public among influential 
members of society.  
Comparative analysis of 
reform trajectories, 
institutional structures and 
quantitative evidence of 
middle class preferences.  
Similar support structures 
in England, Sweden and 
Ireland, despite distinct 
system characteristics.  
The results contradicts the 
existing literature in that 
the findings indicate that 
choice and privatisation 
are substitutive reform 
trajectories rather than as 
previously argued, 
complementary. 
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Chapter 2 
Appendix 2 – Summary table of variables for Paper 1 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Detail/coding 
Life 
satisfaction 
9492 5.173 1.243 1 7 
[0] not satisfied at all, [7] completely 
satisfied 
Period 9492 0.333 0.471 0 1 [1] after, [0] before 
Treated 9492 0.506 0.500 0 1 
[1] high competition area [0] low 
competition area 
Post*treated 9492 0.170 0.376 0 1 [1] after*treated, [0]  otherwise 
Sex 9492 0.557 0.497 0 1 [0] male, [1] female 
Age  9492 47.397 16.600 16 93 Age in years 
Age square 9492 2522 1675.5 256 8649 Age squared 
Health status 9490 2.230 0.928 1 5 
[1] excellent, good, fair, poor, [5] very 
poor 
Marital status 9492 2.232 1.833 1 7 
[1] Married, Living as couple,  
Widowed, Divorced,  Separated, Never 
married, [7] Civil partnership 
Job status 9492 3.058 1.838 1 10 
[1] Self- employed, Employed, 
Unemployed, Retired, Maternity leave, 
Family care, In school, Sick, disabld, 
Gvt trng scheme, [10] Other 
Education 9364 2.182 1.513 1 6 
[1] higher degree, first degree, teaching 
qf, other higher qf, nursing qf, [2] gce a 
levels, gce o levels or equiv, 
commercial qf, no o levels, [3] cse 
grade 2-5,scot grade 4-5, [4] 
apprenticeship, other qf, [5] still at 
school, [6] no qf 
Household 
income 
9492 1365.6 1201.5 0 16142 Equivalised household income  
Household 
size 
9492 2.796 1.266 1 6 
Nr of individuals in household (6 or 
above is coded as 6) 
Hospital stay 
private 
9492 0.008 0.089 0 1 [1] private [0] NHS 
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Appendix 3 – Description of local authority level variables 
LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
00AA City of London 482572 . 12.84 39 52 
00AB 
Barking and 
Dagenham 193314 8.9 34.49 56 42 
00AC Barnet 382813 4.6 21.16 48 46 
00AD Bexley 225114 5.1 16.21 47 48 
00AE Brent 322262 6.9 29.22 49 43 
00AF Bromley 316593 2.8 14.36 58 39 
00AG Camden 562202 6.5 28.62 46 49 
00AH Croydon 248198 4.8 21.31 37 57 
00AJ Ealing 329094 5.8 25.1 45 47 
00AK Enfield 268757 7.2 26.19 56 40 
00AL Greenwich 260663 7.1 33.94 45 47 
00AM Hackney 314839 10.3 46.1 39 52 
00AN 
Hammersmith and 
Fulham 535017 8.6 28.07 48 45 
00AP Haringey 353426 8 35.73 43 49 
00AQ Harrow 320818 5.7 15.59 56 40 
00AR Havering 246926 3.9 16.07 49 49 
00AS Hillingdon 271896 5.7 18.56 38 57 
00AT Hounslow 311968 3.5 23.2 42 51 
00AU Islington 438910 5.9 38.96 50 45 
00AW 
Kensington and 
Chelsea 1033470 3.9 23.51 57 38 
00AX 
Kingston upon 
Thames 348152 4 13.1 28 66 
00AY Lambeth 341899 8.8 34.94 48 47 
00AZ Lewisham 248615 9.1 31.04 48 48 
00BA Merton 372802 4.1 14.62 39 57 
00BB Newham 232094 10 42.95 40 53 
00BC Redbridge 282666 7.8 20.36 41 54 
00BD 
Richmond upon 
Thames 512207 4.4 9.55 53 41 
00BE Southwark 333658 8.4 33.33 43 52 
00BF Sutton 261675 5.3 13.98 39 57 
00BG Tower Hamlets 335427 11.1 44.64 32 59 
00BH Waltham Forest 246567 6.4 33.19 50 44 
00BJ Wandsworth 456837 5.8 20.34 54 42 
00BK Westminster 687828 7 26.3 41 54 
00BL Bolton 140978 5.5 29.67 41 55 
00BM Bury 150301 5.9 21.42 53 40 
00BN Manchester 156290 10.3 44.5 44 49 
00BP Oldham 131092 9.7 30.82 75 22 
00BQ Rochdale 132108 7.1 33.89 59 37 
00BR Salford 143164 5.3 36.51 53 44 
00BS Stockport 195665 3.8 18.06 47 50 
00BT Tameside 137731 6.8 28.78 57 41 
00BU Trafford 247458 4.8 17.33 51 44 
00BW Wigan 132076 6.4 26.91 42 57 
00BX Knowsley 125322 8.8 43.2 48 48 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
00BZ St. Helens 136016 7.6 29.82 50 48 
00CA Sefton 171933 5.6 25.13 32 63 
00CB Wirral 161351 7 27.9 61 35 
00CC Barnsley 129827 6.3 30.48 56 40 
00CE Doncaster 131955 7.3 30.84 48 48 
00CF Rotherham 137348 6.3 26.71 57 39 
00CG Sheffield 155835 5.8 27.84 37 60 
00CH Gateshead 134601 5.9 29.52 47 49 
00CJ 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 169822 7.5 31.36 26 70 
00CK North Tyneside 150005 6.6 23.51 40 58 
00CL South Tyneside 134606 6.1 31.16 42 54 
00CM Sunderland 129874 7.8 31.79 48 48 
00CN Birmingham 162383 9.2 38.67 63 34 
00CQ Coventry 147215 7.3 27.85 52 45 
00CR Dudley 151989 6.6 23.68 26 71 
00CS Sandwell 132461 9.2 37.03 56 40 
00CT Solihull 244897 5.9 16.16 60 40 
00CU Walsall 147546 8.3 30.14 50 47 
00CW Wolverhampton 138322 9.9 33.02 39 57 
00CX Bradford 147265 6.4 32 33 63 
00CY Calderdale 148777 4.6 23.01 53 43 
00CZ Kirklees 153514 5.6 25.23 42 54 
00DA Leeds 171077 6.5 25.07 30 66 
00DB Wakefield 145967 5.8 27.07 48 49 
00EB Hartlepool 123388 11.3 34.1 56 41 
00EC Middlesbrough 118821 9 38.94 63 34 
00EE 
Redcar and 
Cleveland 130638 6.9 29.69 53 44 
00EF Stockton-on-Tees 151487 6 23.8 53 44 
00EH Darlington 141345 5.3 24.1 57 43 
00EJ Durham 126910 6.2 
 
54 44 
00EM Northumberland 178371 4.8 
 
38 58 
00EQ Cheshire East 229938 3.6 
 
58 38 
00ET Halton 134195 6.8 32.61 50 48 
00EU Warrington 179827 3.7 17.89 29 66 
00EW 
Cheshire West and 
Chester 197044 3.3 
 
47 48 
00EX 
Blackburn with 
Darwen 118730 6.5 35.83 43 53 
00EY Blackpool 127588 5.7 37.66 64 34 
00FA 
Kingston upon 
Hull, City of 100898 9.1 38.31 41 55 
00FB 
East Riding of 
Yorkshire 174462 3.1 14.17 35 62 
00FC 
North East 
Lincolnshire 119775 6.8 29.73 48 50 
00FD North Lincolnshire 137541 5.3 20.88 57 39 
00FF York 210942 3.6 13.4 41 56 
00FK Derby 150977 4.8 26.64 37 63 
00FN Leicester 145422 11.4 34.68 36 60 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
00FP Rutland 268411 1.2 7.49 43 53 
00FY Nottingham 129407 7.6 37.46 57 40 
00GA Herefordshire 222073 3.9 17.58 35 62 
00GF 
Telford and 
Wrekin 155575 5.6 22.35 67 29 
00GG Shropshire 213622 4.4 36.03 45 49 
00GL Stoke-on-Trent 103518 6.2 11.47 60 37 
00HA 
Bath and North 
East Somerset 287970 3.6 27.76 74 24 
00HB Bristol, City of 209340 3.6 15.01 41 54 
00HC North Somerset 220723 2.5 9.58 42 55 
00HD 
South 
Gloucestershire 212854 3 
 
44 51 
00HE Cornwall 232366 5.4 
 
72 26 
00HF Isles of Scilly 392476 .. 
 
72 26 
00HG Plymouth 167241 6.2 26.11 72 24 
00HH Torbay 197503 6.2 26.42 47 50 
00HN Bournemouth 222187 4.9 22.99 45 50 
00HP Poole 288760 2.8 14.93 45 50 
00HX Swindon 175184 4.1 16.94 35 60 
00HY Wiltshire 242074 3.9 
 
48 49 
00JA Peterborough 163401 7.1 24.49 26 68 
00KA Luton 166540 9 24.73 28 68 
00KB Bedford 207555 4.7 
 
43 54 
00KC 
Central 
Bedfordshire 221204 3 
 
43 54 
00KF Southend-on-Sea 203898 5.5 22.47 37 61 
00KG Thurrock 185127 4.3 21.31 44 53 
00LC Medway 175662 6.9 19.55 56 38 
00MA Bracknell Forest 257468 3.9 8.75 52 43 
00MB West Berkshire 293148 3.3 8.19 54 39 
00MC Reading 228308 4 19.3 54 39 
00MD Slough 204407 5.2 22.31 54 39 
00ME 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead 408749 2.7 8.51 52 43 
00MF Wokingham 319657 2.2 5.36 54 39 
00MG Milton Keynes 197906 3.9 15.32 45 52 
00ML Brighton and Hove 265716 5.6 25.56 33 62 
00MR Portsmouth 173322 5.7 24.21 43 54 
00MS Southampton 176605 6.1 24.31 30 67 
00MW Isle of Wight 204528 6.4 20.67 25 70 
11UB Aylesbury Vale 267937 3.3 8.76 35 61 
11UC Chiltern 440483 5.8 7.02 35 61 
11UE South Bucks 524748 5.2 8.35 35 61 
11UF Wycombe 318275 5.8 10.65 35 61 
12UB Cambridge 297835 2.8 
 
35 61 
12UC 
East 
Cambridgeshire 215760 2.5 
 
35 61 
12UD Fenland 153684 6.7 
 
35 61 
12UE Huntingdonshire 208275 3.4 
 
35 61 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
 
12UG 
South 
Cambridgeshire 278654 2.6 
 
35 61 
16UB Allerdale 166062 2 
 
57 38 
16UC Barrow-in-Furness 113383 5.3 
 
53 44 
16UD Carlisle 146557 2.1 
 
57 39 
16UE Copeland 130208 4.8 
 
57 38 
16UF Eden 211450 . 14.64 57 38 
16UG South Lakeland 243653 5.5 11.67 57 38 
17UB Amber Valley 166426 1.7 18.12 61 35 
17UC Bolsover 131220 8.3 28.93 61 35 
17UD Chesterfield 147108 6 25.75 61 35 
17UF Derbyshire Dales 257600 4.1 12.53 61 35 
17UG Erewash 145730 3.9 17.98 45 52 
17UH High Peak 184385 5.3 15.34 61 35 
17UJ 
North East 
Derbyshire 168580 5.2 17.37 61 35 
17UK South Derbyshire 174790 2.9 13.93 61 35 
18UB East Devon 259267 2.4 13.69 48 49 
18UC Exeter 207360 3.6 20.27 48 49 
18UD Mid Devon 223474 4 17.34 48 49 
18UE North Devon 235952 2.8 19.97 48 49 
18UG South Hams 315432 2.6 14.31 48 49 
18UH Teignbridge 232965 2.4 17.29 48 49 
18UK Torridge 216871 10.9 21.13 48 49 
18UL West Devon 255595 . 17.08 48 49 
19UC Christchurch 279655 8.9 14.68 57 39 
19UD East Dorset 298697 2.1 8.46 57 39 
19UE North Dorset 247302 2.4 13.02 57 39 
19UG Purbeck 262652 4.4 13.49 57 39 
19UH West Dorset 267236 1.8 15.51 57 39 
19UJ 
Weymouth and 
Portland 217312 . 21.19 57 39 
21UC Eastbourne 204195 6 23.36 41 56 
21UD Hastings 165109 6.2 32.21 34 61 
21UF Lewes 264953 . 14.79 41 56 
21UG Rother 245118 5.2 17.85 34 61 
21UH Wealden 282406 3.8 10.86 41 56 
22UB Basildon 212899 4.6 20.58 44 53 
22UC Braintree 222930 5.2 13.61 30 65 
22UD Brentwood 328266 . 9.18 44 53 
22UE Castle Point 216586 . 12.9 37 61 
22UF Chelmsford 253957 3.4 9.26 30 65 
22UG Colchester 205812 6 14.59 47 50 
22UH Epping Forest 338477 4.5 14.33 30 65 
22UJ Harlow 184748 10.6 21.44 32 64 
22UK Maldon 252052 4.2 12.26 30 65 
22UL Rochford 241841 4.4 9.22 37 61 
22UN Tendring 184812 8.2 23.45 47 50 
22UQ Uttlesford 302442 . 6.94 32 64 
23UB Cheltenham 232250 5.9 15.92 50 47 
23UC Cotswold 328707 . 10.22 50 47 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
23UD Forest of Dean 212658 . 16 50 47 
23UE Gloucester 169839 4.3 21.64 50 47 
23UF Stroud 246976 . 11.14 50 47 
23UG Tewkesbury 233397 . 11.23 50 47 
24UB 
Basingstoke and 
Deane 254088 3.4 9.84 50 46 
24UC East Hampshire 312691 2.4 8.06 50 46 
24UD Eastleigh 232426 . 9.24 50 46 
24UE Fareham 233838 3.4 7.28 50 46 
24UF Gosport 167433 6.5 17.8 50 46 
24UG Hart 316509 3 4.13 50 46 
24UH Havant 212166 2.2 21.28 50 46 
24UJ New Forest 291949 2.8 10.16 50 46 
24UL Rushmoor 211984 5.6 11.62 50 46 
24UN Test Valley 285376 2.9 8.88 50 46 
24UP Winchester 345596 3.3 7.16 50 46 
26UB Broxbourne 241281 3 16.22 41 55 
26UC Dacorum 294141 3.1 10.73 41 55 
26UD East Hertfordshire 304064 3.1 7.41 41 55 
26UE Hertsmere 343230 5.7 12.86 41 55 
26UF 
North 
Hertfordshire 256769 5.2 10.69 41 55 
26UG St Albans 384084 2.3 8.88 41 55 
26UH Stevenage 189951 5.3 16.42 41 55 
26UJ Three Rivers 371106 3.3 10.74 41 55 
26UK Watford 247025 4 15.81 41 55 
26UL Welwyn Hatfield 273769 3.4 14.18 41 55 
29UB Ashford 235575 4.9 14.37 49 48 
29UC Canterbury 223933 7.4 16.17 49 48 
29UD Dartford 213549 8.1 16.65 39 58 
29UE Dover 196009 2.5 19.12 49 48 
29UG Gravesham 203245 8.8 20.37 39 58 
29UH Maidstone 239703 2.8 12.99 49 48 
29UK Sevenoaks 363328 4.5 10.34 39 58 
29UL Shepway 208158 6.7 21.35 49 48 
29UM Swale 183725 6.2 22.1 49 48 
29UN Thanet 183955 7.8 27.61 49 48 
29UP 
Tonbridge and 
Malling 280648 6.3 10.95 39 58 
29UQ Tunbridge Wells 305299 4.5 11.45 39 58 
30UD Burnley 96410 8.7 34.61 73 23 
30UE Chorley 165297 3.8 16.56 56 41 
30UF Fylde 204833 4.1 12.86 63 34 
30UG Hyndburn 108354 10.4 30.91 50 46 
30UH Lancaster 158136 4.5 21.94 63 34 
30UJ Pendle 115829 9.4 30.24 44 53 
30UK Preston 150018 6.7 29.78 73 23 
30UL Ribble Valley 230464 3.1 10.07 56 41 
30UM Rossendale 132985 8.8 24.23 50 46 
30UN South Ribble 167039 4.8 14.1 56 41 
30UP West Lancashire 191903 2.9 20.4 56 41 
30UQ Wyre 172664 3.5 17.7 63 34 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
31UB Blaby 184971 2.7 8.41 43 53 
31UC Charnwood 190675 4.8 11.95 43 53 
31UD Harborough 239714 3.2 7.08 43 53 
31UE 
Hinckley and 
Bosworth 185492 3 10.9 43 53 
31UG Melton 207573 . 10.43 43 53 
31UH 
North West 
Leicestershire 178348 6.5 14.73 43 53 
31UJ 
Oadby and 
Wigston 178218 4.6 10.51 43 53 
32UB Boston 142130 5.1 22.75 48 48 
32UC East Lindsey 163672 4.8 24.61 48 48 
32UD Lincoln 138285 12.5 26.56 48 48 
32UE North Kesteven 175194 2.7 10.26 48 48 
32UF South Holland 164618 3.3 16.21 48 48 
32UG South Kesteven 188652 5.1 11.49 48 48 
32UH West Lindsey 162036 7.7 16.75 48 48 
33UB Breckland 185609 4.5 15.3 43 52 
33UC Broadland 209501 2.7 10.09 43 52 
33UD Great Yarmouth 156684 10.5 28.35 60 38 
33UE 
King's Lynn and 
West Norfolk 184684 3.4 20.58 43 52 
33UF North Norfolk 207749 6 18.06 43 52 
33UG Norwich 178028 3.2 27.84 43 52 
33UH South Norfolk 216184 2.2 10.84 43 52 
34UB Corby 146271 4.6 26.16 61 35 
34UC Daventry 233841 6.7 10.61 61 35 
34UD 
East 
Northamptonshire 186179 4.7 11.78 61 35 
34UE Kettering 162845 5.8 15.09 61 35 
34UF Northampton 165604 3.1 21.15 61 35 
34UG 
South 
Northamptonshire 255635 2 6.46 61 35 
34UH Wellingborough 161272 3.2 17.79 61 35 
36UB Craven 216546 . 11.59 41 56 
36UC Hambleton 238830 . 9.84 41 56 
36UD Harrogate 273167 . 9.49 41 56 
36UE Richmondshire 228666 3.4 10.94 53 41 
36UF Ryedale 238917 7.9 14.49 41 56 
36UG Scarborough 168124 5.1 24.06 41 56 
36UH Selby 199404 2.3 12.17 41 56 
37UB Ashfield 125970 8 25.26 63 35 
37UC Bassetlaw 151007 . 24.11 62 35 
37UD Broxtowe 162196 6.3 14.41 63 35 
37UE Gedling 159148 3.9 15.54 63 35 
37UF Mansfield 124681 7.3 31.8 63 35 
37UG 
Newark and 
Sherwood 176994 8.9 18.03 63 35 
37UJ Rushcliffe 228159 6.4 8.13 63 35 
38UB Cherwell 235213 4.9 11.3 58 40 
38UC Oxford 305915 5.8 18.8 58 40 
38UD South Oxfordshire 347372 3.2 7.75 58 40 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
38UE 
Vale of White 
Horse 293808 . 7.23 58 40 
38UF West Oxfordshire 275104 2.9 6.67 58 40 
40UB Mendip 221989 3.3 14.83 74 25 
40UC Sedgemoor 204423 6.7 17.76 74 25 
40UD South Somerset 216562 2.7 13.86 74 25 
40UE Taunton Deane 220738 2.3 15.65 74 25 
40UF West Somerset 239067 . 23.16 74 25 
41UB Cannock Chase 151298 7.1 20.64 48 49 
41UC East Staffordshire 166207 3.9 18.44 59 39 
41UD Lichfield 226993 4 12.12 48 49 
41UE 
Newcastle-under-
Lyme 144864 7.1 19.27 26 70 
41UF South Staffordshire 220304 5.5 11.62 48 49 
41UG Stafford 187495 1.9 12.71 48 49 
41UH 
Staffordshire 
Moorlands 168185 1.8 16.36 59 39 
41UK Tamworth 156383 3.5 19.76 48 49 
42UB Babergh 238263 2.5 11.3 32 64 
42UC Forest Heath 184358 6.4 11.9 32 64 
42UD Ipswich 160162 3.2 23.75 32 64 
42UE Mid Suffolk 224396 . 9.79 32 64 
42UF St Edmundsbury 222682 2.7 12.06 32 64 
42UG Suffolk Coastal 237658 5.7 11.33 32 64 
42UH Waveney 170404 2.3 22.32 60 38 
43UB Elmbridge 533975 2.7 7.12 45 52 
43UC Epsom and Ewell 333429 5 7.43 
  43UD Guildford 372604 2.2 8.2 45 52 
43UE Mole Valley 385841 . 7.25 45 52 
43UF 
Reigate and 
Banstead 322031 2.9 8.59 45 52 
43UG Runnymede 384553 3.1 8.33 45 52 
43UH Spelthorne 273764 5.6 12.18 45 52 
43UJ Surrey Heath 342412 . 5.75 45 52 
43UK Tandridge 341846 7.2 8.49 45 52 
43UL Waverley 397898 2.6 6.86 45 52 
43UM Woking 329300 . 8.7 45 52 
44UB 
North 
Warwickshire 181148 7.4 16.18 51 46 
44UC 
Nuneaton and 
Bedworth 147164 7.2 22.41 51 46 
44UD Rugby 185784 3.6 13.08 51 46 
44UE Stratford-on-Avon 275812 4 9.63 51 46 
44UF Warwick 237305 4.5 11.97 51 46 
45UB Adur 224030 4.5 20.55 44 53 
45UC Arun 236566 3.2 16.64 44 53 
45UD Chichester 328481 3.1 12.08 44 53 
45UE Crawley 211764 5.1 15.55 44 53 
45UF Horsham 312429 1.7 7.38 44 53 
45UG Mid Sussex 289701 2.8 6.94 32 64 
45UH Worthing 216156 6.3 17.48 44 53 
47UB Bromsgrove 237599 4.6 10.2 41 56 
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LA 
code LA name 
House 
prices 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Deprivation 
index 
Offered 
choice 
%Yes 
Offered 
choice 
%No 
47UC Malvern Hills 266234 4.1 13.59 41 56 
47UD Redditch 169867 4.8 21.05 41 56 
47UE Worcester 188401 . 18.03 41 56 
47UF Wychavon 250211 3.3 11.99 41 56 
47UG Wyre Forest 182808 4.6 19.09 41 56 
 
Note: Source and derivation of LA variables, all from 2007.  
House prices: Price Indicators for All Dwellings; Mean 
Unemployment Rate: Unemployment Rate; Aged 16-64 (Males); 16-59 (Females) 
Deprivation index: Deprivation index: Average Score  
Offered choice:  Yes/No: National Patient Choice Survey, % of individuals recalling having been offered 
a choice by GP. 2007  
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Appendix 4 – HHI competition index, by LA 
LA code LA name 
HHI 20.000 
metres  
00AA City of London 0.052372 
00AC Barnet 0.072337 
00AC Barnet 0.077615 
00AD Bexley 0.103495 
00AE Brent 0.065552 
00AE Brent 0.051361 
00AF Bromley 0.117797 
00AF Bromley 0.12864 
00AG Camden 0.049479 
00AG Camden 0.056621 
00AH Croydon 0.071401 
00AJ Ealing 0.064091 
00AK Enfield 0.070591 
00AK Enfield 0.072805 
00AL Greenwich 0.047845 
00AM Hackney 0.044914 
00AN Hammersmith and Fulham 0.056804 
00AP Haringey 0.074499 
00AQ Harrow 0.064372 
00AR Havering 0.152678 
00AS Hillingdon 0.102169 
00AS Hillingdon 0.101534 
00AT Hounslow 0.060738 
00AU Islington 0.058604 
00AU Islington 0.04352 
00AW Kensington and Chelsea 0.059692 
00AX Kingston upon Thames 0.071938 
00AY Lambeth 0.055862 
00AY Lambeth 0.0551 
00AZ Lewisham 0.04332 
00BB Newham 0.046977 
00BC Redbridge 0.071097 
00BE Southwark 0.040984 
00BF Sutton 0.075133 
00BF Sutton 0.080407 
00BG Tower Hamlets 0.042234 
00BG Tower Hamlets 0.065964 
00BH Waltham Forest 0.073654 
00BJ Wandsworth 0.067982 
00BK Westminster 0.068828 
00BK Westminster 0.043801 
00BL Bolton 0.231471 
00BM Bury 0.10475 
00BN Manchester 0.224939 
00BN Manchester 0.089775 
00BN Manchester 0.089253 
00BN Manchester 0.114626 
00BN Manchester 0.098446 
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00BN Manchester 0.09102 
00BN Manchester 0.084009 
00BP Oldham 0.237989 
00BR Salford 0.077508 
00BR Salford 0.089654 
00BS Stockport 0.217525 
00BT Tameside 0.113727 
00BW Wigan 0.216575 
00BW Wigan 0.096133 
00BX Knowsley 0.150522 
00BY Liverpool 0.100764 
00BY Liverpool 0.159452 
00BY Liverpool 0.219033 
00BY Liverpool 0.214286 
00BY Liverpool 0.151858 
00BZ St. Helens 0.172382 
00CA Sefton 0.380448 
00CA Sefton 0.385485 
00CB Wirral 0.326177 
00CB Wirral 0.192256 
00CC Barnsley 0.219118 
00CE Doncaster 0.785633 
00CE Doncaster 0.270952 
00CF Rotherham 0.258317 
00CG Sheffield 0.264141 
00CG Sheffield 0.255695 
00CH Gateshead 0.213612 
00CK North Tyneside 0.130806 
00CK North Tyneside 0.171465 
00CL South Tyneside 0.202781 
00CM Sunderland 0.502121 
00CM Sunderland 0.18409 
00CN Birmingham 0.08434 
00CN Birmingham 0.140698 
00CN Birmingham 0.14196 
00CN Birmingham 0.139812 
00CN Birmingham 0.14979 
00CN Birmingham 0.145095 
00CN Birmingham 0.169786 
00CN Birmingham 0.12459 
00CQ Coventry 0.33572 
00CR Dudley 0.158855 
00CR Dudley 0.134333 
00CR Dudley 0.18021 
00CS Sandwell 0.120784 
00CU Walsall 0.132196 
00CW Wolverhampton 0.152554 
00CX, Bradford 0.146939 
00CX, Bradford 0.470398 
00CX, Bradford 0.20383 
00CY Calderdale 0.262684 
00CZ Kirklees 0.262456 
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00CZ Kirklees 0.182317 
00DA Leeds 0.220989 
00DA Leeds 0.253088 
00DA Leeds 0.23994 
00DA Leeds 0.277801 
00DB Wakefield 0.310119 
00DB Wakefield 0.318566 
00DB Wakefield 0.61632 
00EE Redcar and Cleveland 1 
00EF Stockton-on-Tees 0.331936 
00EH Darlington 0.769426 
00EJ County Durham 0.79212 
00EJ County Durham 0.29789 
00EM Northumberland 1 
00EM Northumberland 0.498634 
00EM Northumberland 1 
00EQ Cheshire East 1 
00EQ Cheshire East 0.408078 
00ET Halton 0.172416 
00ET Halton 0.284647 
00EU Warrington 0.28046 
00EW Cheshire West and Chester 0.744212 
00EX Blackburn with Darwen 0.381787 
00EY Blackpool 1 
00FA Kingston upon Hull, City of 0.393766 
00FA Kingston upon Hull, City of 0.447171 
00FA Kingston upon Hull, City of 0.872629 
00FB East Riding of Yorkshire 0.545985 
00FB East Riding of Yorkshire 0.45159 
00FB East Riding of Yorkshire 1 
00FC North East Lincolnshire 1 
00FD North Lincolnshire 0.544128 
00FF York 0.519679 
00FF York 0.810291 
00FK Derby 0.37309 
00FK Derby 0.350649 
00FN Leicester 0.90626 
00FN Leicester 0.435702 
00FN Leicester 0.446524 
00FN Leicester 0.469995 
00FY Nottingham 0.341563 
00FY Nottingham 0.460182 
00GA Herefordshire, County of 1 
00GF Telford and Wrekin 0.7626 
00GG Shropshire 1 
00GG Shropshire 0.655539 
00GL Stoke-on-Trent 1 
00HA 
Bath and North East 
Somerset 
0.524873 
00HB Bristol, City of 0.453438 
00HB Bristol, City of 0.646234 
00HB Bristol, City of 0.37045 
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00HB Bristol, City of 0.316866 
00HC North Somerset 1 
00HD South Gloucestershire 0.343682 
00HE Cornwall 1 
00HE Cornwall 1 
00HE Cornwall 1 
00HE Cornwall 1 
00HG Plymouth 1 
00HG Plymouth 0.508688 
00HG Plymouth 0.63187 
00HH Torbay 0.940644 
00HN Bournemouth 0.932997 
00HP Poole 0.648611 
00HX Swindon 1 
00HY Wiltshire 0.790941 
00HY Wiltshire 0.534386 
00JA Peterborough 0.838001 
00JA Peterborough 0.7155 
00KA Luton 0.405864 
00KB Bedford 0.834821 
00KF Southend-on-Sea 0.823067 
00KG Thurrock 0.18096 
00LC Medway 0.402642 
00LC Medway 0.375733 
00MB West Berkshire 0.629813 
00MC Reading 0.648767 
00MC Reading 0.692605 
00MD Slough 0.115825 
00ME Windsor and Maidenhead 0.145328 
00ME Windsor and Maidenhead 0.163223 
00MG Milton Keynes 0.366947 
00MG Milton Keynes 0.869405 
00ML Brighton and Hove 0.200976 
00ML Brighton and Hove 0.263253 
00ML Brighton and Hove 0.501666 
00MR Portsmouth 0.518848 
00MR Portsmouth 0.617354 
00MR Portsmouth 0.809276 
00MS Southampton 0.383435 
00MS Southampton 0.618492 
11UB Aylesbury Vale 0.602301 
11UF Wycombe 0.495397 
12UB Cambridge 1 
12UD Fenland 1 
12UE Huntingdonshire 1 
16UC Barrow-in-Furness 1 
16UD Carlisle 1 
16UE Copeland 1 
17UC Bolsover 0.200782 
17UD Chesterfield 0.324868 
18UB East Devon 0.601989 
18UB East Devon 1 
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18UB East Devon 0.384693 
18UC Exeter 0.6566 
18UC Exeter 0.917214 
18UD Mid Devon 1 
18UE North Devon 1 
18UH Teignbridge 0.418825 
19UE North Dorset  1 
19UH West Dorset 0.956902 
19UJ 
Weymouth and Portland 
Borough Council 
0.689349 
21UC Eastbourne 0.893763 
21UD Hastings 0.897855 
21UG Rother 0.344561 
21UH Wealden 0.530345 
22UB Basildon 0.2998 
22UF Chelmsford 1 
22UG Colchester 0.923624 
22UG Colchester 0.9978 
22UJ Harlow 0.410149 
23UB Cheltenham 0.59899 
23UC Cotswold 0.501236 
23UD Forest of Dean 1 
23UE Gloucester 0.480027 
23UE Gloucester 0.587284 
23UF Stroud 0.331763 
23UG Tewkesbury 0.646996 
24UB Basingstoke and Deane 0.730581 
24UN Test Valley 1 
24UP Winchester 0.55541 
26UC Dacorum 0.187938 
26UE Hertsmere 0.112271 
26UG St Albans 0.17257 
26UH Stevenage 0.351528 
26UK Watford 0.109496 
26UL Welwyn Hatfield 0.190822 
29UB Ashford 0.702104 
29UC Canterbury 0.578676 
29UD Dartford 0.10949 
29UH Maidstone 0.508516 
29UN Thanet 1 
29UQ Tunbridge Wells 0.558195 
29UQ Tunbridge Wells 0.886017 
30UD Burnley 0.546166 
30UE Chorley 0.241739 
30UH Lancaster 1 
30UK Preston 0.551934 
30UK Preston 0.651163 
30UP West Lancashire 0.18708 
30UP West Lancashire 0.258142 
31UJ Oadby and Wigston 0.484889 
32UB Boston 0.564142 
32UB Boston 0.957102 
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32UC East Lindsey 1 
32UD Lincoln 1 
32UG South Kesteven 1 
32UG South Kesteven 0.559983 
32UG South Kesteven 0.517244 
32UH West Lindsey 1 
33UD Great Yarmouth 1 
33UE 
King's Lynn and West 
Norfolk 
1 
33UF North Norfolk 1 
33UG Norwich 1 
34UE Kettering 1 
34UF Northampton 1 
36UC Hambleton 1 
36UD Harrogate 0.421197 
36UF Ryedale 1 
36UG Scarborough 1 
36UG Scarborough 1 
37UB Ashfield 0.418596 
37UC Bassetlaw 0.514904 
37UG Newark and Sherwood 0.54468 
38UB Cherwell 1 
38UB Cherwell 1 
38UC Oxford 0.89427 
38UC Oxford 0.552029 
38UC Oxford 0.975774 
40UB Mendip 1 
40UD South Somerset 1 
40UE Taunton Deane 1 
41UB Cannock Chase 0.237793 
41UC East Staffordshire 0.535934 
41UE Newcastle-under-Lyme 0.491643 
41UE Newcastle-under-Lyme 0.20668 
41UE Newcastle-under-Lyme 0.213794 
41UG Stafford 0.94289 
42UD Ipswich 1 
42UF St Edmundsbury 1 
43UC Epsom and Ewell 0.210837 
43UD Guildford 0.277425 
43UF Reigate and Banstead 0.306222 
43UG Runnymede 0.130228 
43UH Spelthorne 0.117054 
43UJ Surrey Heath 0.241617 
43UM Woking 0.190973 
44UC Nuneaton and Bedworth 0.55289 
44UD Rugby 0.585627 
44UF Warwick 0.355743 
45UB Adur 0.679132 
45UD Chichester 1 
45UE Crawley 0.316469 
45UG Mid Sussex 0.407507 
45UG Mid Sussex 0.495331 
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45UH Worthing 0.481101 
47UB Bromsgrove 0.118414 
47UD Redditch 0.357077 
47UD Redditch 0.234755 
47UE Worcester 1 
47UG Wyre Forest 0.469605 
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Appendix 5 – Cross-sectional OLS (z-score SWB), LA covariates  
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level        Clustered standard errors by PID  
Source: BHPS for 2007. 
 
  
Competition  index (20.000 
metres radius)  
  0.208** 0.221** 0.308** 0.296**   
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female 0.129 0.072 0.096 0.149 0.139 
 
Age  -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 
 
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Excellent reference category 
Good  -0.176 
  
-0.223 -0.203 
Fair -0.426*** 
  
-0.446*** -0.430*** 
 
Poor -0.694*** 
  
-0.705*** -0.689*** 
 
Very poor -1.076*** 
  
-1.081*** -1.074*** 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Living as couple  0.053  0.014 0.008 0.042 0.057 
 
Widowed  0.061  0.138 0.098 0.028 0.036 
 
Divorced    -0.674*** -0.698*** -0.693*** -0.667*** -0.660*** 
 
Separated  -0.786 -0.765 -0.692 -0.744 -0.785 
 
Never married -0.118 -0.036 -0.053 -0.126 -0.103 
Job status Self- employed 1.097*** 1.112*** 1.078*** 1.068*** 1.055*** 
Employed 0.778** 0.774** 0.828** 0.830*** 0.827*** 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired 0.596* 0.486 0.560 0.662* 0.620* 
 
Maternity leave 1.126*** 1.310*** 1.374*** 1.184*** 1.187*** 
 
Family care 0.946*** 0.989*** 1.020*** 0.975*** 0.955*** 
 
In school 0.618 0.555 0.729* 0.753* 0.706* 
 
Sick, disabled 0.280 -0.051 -0.019 0.293 0.287 
 
Government tr  0.669 0.665 0.629 0.649 0.654 
 
Other 2.185*** 2.123*** 2.052*** 2.135*** 2.104*** 
Education Further degree 0.204 0.498 0.439 0.152 0.105 
A-levels 0.238 0.334 0.359 0.267 0.259 
Secondary school 0.562** 0.812*** 0.928*** 0.657*** 0.584** 
 
Apprenticeship  0.115 0.166 0.193 0.142 0.131 
 
No qualification reference category 
 
Still at school    0.168 0.206 0.260 0.218 0.194 
Monthly income (log) 0.030 0.049 0.026 0.012 0.002 
Household 
size 
1     reference category 
2 0.058 0.068 0.044 0.037 0.064 
 
3 -0.180 -0.140 -0.145 -0.183 -0.155 
 
4 -0.196 -0.167 -0.218 -0.237 -0.176 
 
5 -0.330 -0.316 -0.300 -0.313 -0.274 
 
6 or more -0.344 -0.373 -0.432 -0.390 -0.340 
Implementation rate 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 
House prices 
  
0.002 0.002 0.001 
Unemployment rate 
  
0.011* 0.009* 0.007* 
Deprivation index 
  
-0.013* -0.009* -0.012* 
Constant   -0.863 -1.314 -1.336 -0.920 -0.429 
Observations   405   405   405   405   405 
R-square (adjusted/pseudo) 0.192 0.133 0.141 0.197 0.192 
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Appendix 6 – DiD OLS (z-score SWB), sample: hospital patients.  
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 0.242** 0.151 0.194** 0.150 0.235** 0.146 
After 
 
-0.230** -0.151 -0.188** 0.153 -0.217** 0.147 
Treated  
 
-0.063 0.085 -0.072 0.100 -0.062 0.097 
Sex Male reference category 
 Female 0.011 0.100 0.028 0.105 -0.001 0.098 
Age  
 
-0.016 0.015 -0.029** 0.015 
  
Age2 
 
0.002 0.000 0.003** 0.000 
  
Health 
status 
Excellent reference category 
Good  -0.242 0.147 
  
-0.250* 0.149 
 Fair -0.523*** 0.157 
  
-0.536*** 0.158 
 Poor -0.727*** 0.172 
  
-0.750*** 0.172 
 Very poor -0.952*** 0.221 
  
-1.000*** 0.219 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Living as couple -0.084 0.127 -0.078 0.131 -0.078 0.120 
 Widowed -0.562** 0.232 -0.577** 0.243 -0.495** 0.223 
 Divorced    -0.397* 0.213 -0.350 0.216 -0.422** 0.211 
 Separated  -0.605** 0.259 -0.719*** 0.252 -0.591** 0.263 
 Never married -0.498*** 0.191 -0.448** 0.205 -0.489*** 0.174 
Job status Self- employed 0.762** 0.362 0.855** 0.375 0.727** 0.365 
Employed 0.721** 0.292 0.763** 0.308 0.698** 0.296 
 Unemployed reference category 
 Retired 0.631** 0.320 0.565* 0.338 0.726** 0.313 
 Maternity leave 1.220*** 0.322 1.344*** 0.334 1.217*** 0.323 
 Family care 0.484 0.317 0.51 0.335 0.472 0.322 
 In school 1.007** 0.448 1.005** 0.466 1.050** 0.448 
 Sick, disabled 0.119 0.319 -0.018 0.336 0.104 0.323 
 Gvt. training 0.611 0.597 0.658 0.701 0.614 0.587 
 Other 0.922* 0.497 0.991* 0.506 0.942* 0.517 
Education Further degree -0.078 0.157 -0.039 0.306 -0.102 0.275 
A-levels -0.111 0.123 -0.097 0.166 -0.116 0.156 
 Secondary school 0.206 0.226 0.181 0.411 0.197 0.420 
 Apprenticeship/other 0.124 0.154 0.201 0.128 0.121 0.123 
 No qualification reference category 
 Still at school 1.486 0.14 1.227 0.282 1.51 0.293 
Monthly income (log) 0.022 0.039 0.027 0.041 0.02 0.039 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 -0.071 0.209 -0.049 0.216 -0.073 0.205 
 3 -0.181 0.222 -0.158 0.230 -0.195 0.212 
 4 -0.395* 0.220 -0.346 0.224 -0.418** 0.211 
 5 -0.443 0.270 -0.383 0.279 -0.467* 0.257 
 6 or more -0.231 0.287 -0.163 0.296 -0.254 0.279 
Implementation (% being 
offered choice) 
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 
Deprivation index (LA) -0.011*** 0.008 -0.009** 0.005 -0.007* 0.007 
Unemployment rate (LA) -0.013* 0.004 -0.009 0.003 -0.012* 0.006 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Constant   0.268 0.681 -0.054 0.696 0.032 0.513 
Observations 885 
 
885 
 
885 
 
R-square (adjusted) 0.193 
 
0.15 
 
0.19 
 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level                                          Clustered standard errors by PID 
Source: BHPS for 2003-2008        
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Appendix 7 – DiD OLS (z-score SWB), sample: hospital patients, by socio-
economic groups 
  
Above median income Below median income 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 0.340** 0.194 -0.066 0.234 
After   -0.209 0.127 0.197 0.159 
Treated    -0.265 0.205 -0.134 0.242 
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female -0.105 0.146 0.097 0.153 
Age  
 
-0.035* 0.021 -0.016 0.023 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Excellent reference category 
Good  -0.283 0.239 -0.242 0.188 
 
Fair -0.609** 0.248 -0.470** 0.204 
 
Poor -0.837*** 0.267 -0.608*** 0.217 
 
Very poor -0.984*** 0.316 -0.936*** 0.346 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Living as couple -0.058 0.186 -0.097 0.190 
 
Widowed -0.864** 0.345 -0.387 0.278 
 
Divorced    -0.637*** 0.219 -0.153 0.381 
 
Separated  -0.858*** 0.212 -0.504* 0.304 
 
Never married -0.625** 0.261 -0.449 0.292 
Job status Self- employed 0.449 0.428 1.074 0.840 
 
Employed 0.770*** 0.288 0.781 0.772 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired 0.839** 0.330 0.256 0.836 
 
Maternity leave 1.198*** 0.360 1.325* 0.801 
 
Family care 0.557* 0.297 0.541 0.807 
 
In school 0.864* 0.452 2.868*** 0.864 
 
Sick, disabled 0.298 0.316 0.011 0.829 
 
Gvt. training  0.286 0.570 0.132 0.436 
 
Other 0.939* 0.483 0.654* 0.332 
Education Further degree 0.388** 0.191 0.233 0.372 
 
A-levels -0.322 0.559 -0.087 0.279 
 
Secondary school -0.082 0.144 -0.312 0.565 
 
Apprenticeship, other  0.559 0.783 -0.122 0.246 
 
No qualification reference category 
 
Still at school -1.526*** 0.206 1.410*** 0.401 
Household size   1 reference category 
 
2 -0.295 0.263 0.085 0.309 
 
3 -0.577** 0.292 0.070 0.301 
 
4 -0.667** 0.280 -0.181 0.312 
 
5 -0.892** 0.387 -0.034 0.365 
 
6 or more -0.641* 0.361 0.331 0.459 
Implementation (% being offered 
choice) 
0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Deprivation index (LA) -0.009*** 0.008 -0.014*** 0.009 
Unemployment rate (LA)  -0.097* 0.004  -0.013* 0.005 
Time dummies Yes   Yes   
Constant   1.552* 0.883 -0.367 1.422 
Observations 372 
 
360 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.216   0.245   
                                                        Table continues on the following page 
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  High Education Low education 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 0.379** 0.280 0.119 0.170 
After   -0.332* 0.191 0.115 0.106 
Treated    -0.327 0.286 -0.188 0.176 
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female 0.090 0.209 0.009 0.110 
Age  
 
-0.006 0.036 -0.020 0.017 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health status Very good reference category 
 
Good  0.126 0.496 -0.319** 0.151 
 
Fair -0.429 0.501 -0.485*** 0.158 
 
Poor -0.547 0.525 -0.756*** 0.181 
 
Very poor -0.657 0.580 -1.100*** 0.246 
Marital status Married reference category 
 
Living as couple -0.563* 0.316 0.026 0.135 
 
Widowed -0.912* 0.483 -0.506** 0.255 
 
Divorced    -0.876 0.539 -0.301 0.198 
 
Separated  -0.647** 0.311 -0.367 0.358 
 
Never married -0.767* 0.420 -0.478** 0.201 
Job status Self- employed 0.697 0.811 1.023*** 0.323 
 
Employed -0.426 0.677 1.161*** 0.237 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired -0.719 0.700 1.229*** 0.288 
 
Maternity leave 0.285 0.816 1.607*** 0.278 
 
Family care -0.404 0.651 0.809*** 0.296 
 
In school -1.225* 0.671 1.362*** 0.411 
 
Sick, disabled -0.119 0.813 0.757** 0.306 
 
Gvt training 0.689 0.886 0.368 0.333 
 
Other 0.864** 0.423 1.202** 0.522 
Monthly income (log) 0.173 0.141 -0.021 0.038 
Household size  1 reference category 
 
2 -0.443 0.427 0.027 0.218 
 
3 -0.685 0.468 -0.022 0.225 
 
4 -1.268** 0.494 -0.154 0.219 
 
5 -1.154** 0.562 -0.265 0.282 
 
6 or more -1.041** 0.488 0.217 0.346 
Implementation (% being offered 
choice) 
0.003 0.006 0.004 0.005 
Deprivation index (LA)   0.009*** 0.008    0.012*** 0.007 
Unemployment rate (LA) -0.011* 0.004 -0.014* 0.003 
Time dummies Yes   Yes   
Constant   0.774 1.764 0.086 0.662 
Observations 481 
 
251 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.273   0.215   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                               Clustered standard errors by PID                     
Source: BHPS for 2003-2008 
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Appendix 8 – DiD OLS (z-score health satisfaction), sample: hospital 
patients, by socio-economic groups 
  
Above median income Below median income 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 0.676*** 0.189 0.134 0.176 
After 
 
-0.168 0.110 -0.152 0.132 
Treated  
 
-0.518** 0.211 0.276 0.190 
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female -0.155 0.122 -0.046 0.121 
Age  
 
-0.024 0.017 -0.021 0.020 
Age2 
 
0. 000 0.000 0. 000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Excellent reference category 
Good  -0.652*** 0.246 -0.556*** 0.139 
 
Fair -1.220*** 0.258 -1.042*** 0.160 
 
Poor -1.745*** 0.264 -1.563*** 0.174 
 
Very poor -2.067*** 0.316 -2.114*** 0.285 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Couple -0.191 0.137 0.106 0.162 
 
Widowed -0.372 0.254 0.489* 0.266 
 
Divorced    -0.189 0.167 0.148 0.287 
 
Separated  -0.766 0.514 -0.258 0.275 
 
Never married -0.330** 0.163 0.141 0.220 
Job status Self-employed 0.570 0.351 1.138*** 0.398 
Employed 0.706** 0.306 0.861*** 0.294 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired 0.425 0.346 0.266 0.396 
 
Maternity leave 1.104*** 0.361 1.282*** 0.354 
 
Family care 0.386 0.312 0.691* 0.356 
 
In school 1.042*** 0.377 1.513*** 0.442 
 
Sick, disabled 0.072 0.335 -0.202 0.347 
 
Gvt. training 0.775* 0.453 -0.139 
 
 
Other 0.38 0.532 -0.431* 
 Education Further degree 0.199 0.324 -0.527 0.298 
 
A-levels 0.306 0.219 -0.503*** 0.234 
 
Secondary school 0.101 0.473 -0.294 0.436 
 
Apprenticeship/other  0.370** 0.130 -0.492* 0.188 
 
No qualification reference category 
 
Still at school -0.592*** 0.171 -0.673* 0.188 
Monthly income (log) omitted 
Household size   1 reference category 
 
       2 -0.340* 0.186 0.219 0.226 
 
       3 -0.452** 0.219 0.274 0.242 
 
       4 -0.363* 0.207 0.244 0.261 
 
       5 -0.510** 0.259 0.504 0.313 
 
       6 or more -0.647** 0.252 0.342 0.323 
Implementation (% being offered 
choice) 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Deprivation index (LA) -0.008*** 0.008 -0.015*** 0.009 
Unemployment rate (LA) -0.093* 0.004 -0.012* 0.005 
Time dummies Yes   Yes   
Constant   1.666** 0.676 1.201 1.118 
Observations 372 
 
360 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.376   0.453   
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High education Low education 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 0.374** 0.146 0.43 0.270 
After   -0.099 0.088 -0.103 0.178 
Treated    -0.032 0.149 -0.385 0.288 
Sex Male reference category 
 
Female -0.004 0.091 -0.036 0.169 
Age  
 
-0.029* 0.015 0.025 0.031 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health status Very good reference category 
 
Good  -0.638*** 0.118 0.06 0.497 
 
Fair -1.163*** 0.123 -0.401 0.511 
 
Poor -1.693*** 0.136 -0.977* 0.516 
 
Very poor -2.201*** 0.214 -1.292** 0.558 
Marital 
status 
Married reference category 
Living as couple 0.009 0.107 0.141 0.346 
 
Widowed 0.265 0.219 -0.646* 0.341 
 
Divorced    0.179 0.159 -0.825*** 0.287 
 
Separated  -0.218 0.336 -0.514 0.537 
 
Never married -0.036 0.150 -0.163 0.310 
Job status Self-employed 1.114*** 0.274 0.274 0.701 
 
Employed 1.094*** 0.237 -0.312 0.612 
 
Unemployed reference category 
 
Retired 1.045*** 0.287 -0.976 0.648 
 
Maternity leave 1.451*** 0.283 0.213 0.671 
 
Family care 0.841*** 0.269 -0.614 0.612 
 
In school 1.226*** 0.304 -1.294** 0.644 
 
Sick, disabled 0.419 0.261 0.647 0.633 
 
Gvt. training 0.893*** 0.292 0.894 0.830 
 
Other 0.628 0.482 
  Education 
 
omitted 
Monthly income (log) -0.080** 0.038 0.053 0.126 
Household size      1 reference category 
 
     2 -0.027 0.167 -0.574* 0.322 
 
     3 -0.031 0.182 -0.636* 0.363 
 
     4 0.082 0.183 -0.684* 0.392 
 
     5 -0.001 0.229 -0.212 0.356 
 
     6 or more -0.076 0.248 -0.762* 0.388 
Implementation (% being offered 
choice) 
0.006 0.011 0.002 0.014 
Deprivation index (LA) -0.009*** 0.008    -0.014*** 0.009 
Unemployment rate (LA)  -0.072* 0.004  -0.016* 0.003 
Time dummies   Yes   Yes   
Constant   0.839 0.546 0.283 1.430 
Observations 
 
480 
 
251 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.438   0.346   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                        Clustered standard errors by PID  
Source: BHPS for 2003-2008 
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Chapter 3 
Appendix 9 – Germany: economic and demographic structure by federal state (land)   
Land (Federal State)  
Population 
1000 Area (km2) 
Revenue 
million Euro Unemployment % 
Population 65 
years % 
Needing care 
(persons) 
Baden–Württemberg 10,475.90 35,751.64 41,422 4.9 15.5 210,837 
Bayern 12,155.00 70,549.32 49,071 5.3 16 294,294 
Berlin 3,386.70 891.75 11,378 16.1 14.2 80,871 
Brandenburg 2,601.20 29,476.67 26,962 17.4 14.9 64,340 
Bremen 663.1 404.28 7,931 12.4 18.1 17,143 
Hamburg 1,704.70 755.26 27,170 8.3 16.7 42,001 
Hessen 6,052.00 21,114.88 67,149 6.6 16.2 145,445 
Mecklenburg– Vorpommernd 1,789.30 23,173.46 14,413 18.3 14.5 45,531 
Nirdersachsen 7,898.80 47,617.97 4,190 9.1 16.6 209,257 
Nordrhein–Westfalen 17,999.80 34,082.76 18,775 8.8 16.6 465,850 
Rheinland–Pfalz 4,030.80 19,846.91 11,198 6.8 17 92,340 
Saarland 1,071.50 2,568.53 10,442 9 17.8 27,194 
Sachsend 4,459.70 18,413.29 10,412 17.5 18 118,124 
Sachsen–Anhalt 2,648.70 20,445.72 17,339 19.7 16.9 66,616 
Schleswig–Holstein 2,777.30 15,762.90 3,883 8.4 16.4 75,991 
Thüringend 2,449.10 16,172.21 8,141 15.3 16.3 60,257 
Source: Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Länder 2004. (http://www.statistik-portal.de/statistik-portal/en/)  
Note: East and West German federal states are included. Only West German residents are included in the empirical analysis.  
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Appendix 10 – Summary table of variables for paper 2  
Variable         Detail   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Coding 
SWB 
Satisfaction 
with life 
889 4.945 2.636 0 10 
[0] Completely 
dissatisfied, [10] 
Completely satisfied 
Treataft 
Treated 
group*after 
914 0.442 0.497 0 1 
[1] after*treat, [0]  
otherwise 
After 
Year 1996-
1999 
917 0.531 0.499 0 1 [1] after, [0] before 
Treat 
Treated 
group  
914 0.791 0.407 0 1 
[1] public [0] private 
LTCI 
Sex Male/female 917 0.365 0.482 0 1 [1] male, [0] female 
Age Age in years 917 69 18.72 17 98  
Age2 Age squared 917 5112.5 2239.2 289 9604 Age*age 
Health 
status 
Self-rated 
health status 
894 2.59 2.59 1 5 
[1] Very good, Good, 
Satisfactory, Poor, 
[5] Bad 
Marital 
status  
 917 2.14 1.03 1 5 
[1]  Married, Single,  
Widowed, Divorced,  
[5] Separated 
Household income  917 23938.8 15378.9 1374.5 101160.5 Equivalised 
household income 
(after tax and 
benefits) 
Lninc 
Log postgov 
income 
917 9.81 0.68 7.22 11.52 
Job 
status 
In work 917 0.03 0.16 0 1 
[1] in work, [0] not 
in work 
Carer 
Informal 
caregiver 
917 0.53 0.50 0 1 
[1] providing 
informal care, [0] no 
care provided  
ISCED 
Education 
categories 
917 2.46 1.24 0 6 
[0]  In School, 
Inadequately, 
General Elementary, 
Middle Vocational, 
Vocational, Higher 
Vocational, [6]  
Higher Education 
HHsize 
Nr. of 
individuals 
in household 
917 2.33 1.33 1 6 
6 or above is coded 
as 6.  
Land 
State of 
residence 
917 0.02 0.15 0 9 
Berlin (west), 
Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hamburg, Lower 
Saxony, Bremen,  
North-Rhine-
Westfalia, Hessen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz, 
Baden Wurttemberg, 
Bavaria 
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Appendix 11 – DDD (z-score SWB), sample LTC users 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group 
(after) 
0.806** 0.324 0.862** 0.397 0.744** 0.327 
After  
 
-0.067 0.219 0.005 0.274 -0.094 0.217 
Treated    -0.015 0.150 -0.009 0.193 -0.06 0.144 
Disabled  
 
0.387* 0.217 0.551** 0.249 0.338 0.215 
Disabled after  -0.607** 0.302 -0.670* 0.376 -0.560* 0.302 
Treated after 0.049 0.201 0.015 0.245 0.059 0.199 
Sex Male -0.032 0.082 -0.021 0.111 -0.109 0.083 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
-0.017 0.016 -0.022 0.023 -0.013 0.016 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Very poor reference category 
Poor 0.798*** 0.087 
 
 
0.805*** 0.089 
 
Fair 1.322*** 0.113 
 
 
1.339*** 0.113 
 
Good  1.684*** 0.188 
 
 
1.681*** 0.190 
 
Very good 2.183*** 0.265 
 
 
2.103*** 0.271 
Marital 
status 
Married -0.149 0.119 -0.266* 0.143 -0.152 0.119 
Single -0.014 0.177 0.023 0.214 0.033 0.181 
 
Widowed reference category 
 
Divorced    -0.319 0.224 -0.386 0.290 -0.249 0.222 
 
Separated  -0.474 0.297 -0.794** 0.324 -0.442 0.283 
Job status In work 0.337* 0.180 0.378* 0.214 0.332* 0.189 
Education 0 0.133 0.315 0.093 0.365 0.167 0.325 
ISCED 1 0.109 0.251 0.251 0.338 0.136 0.254 
 
2 -0.084 0.228 -0.128 0.305 -0.051 0.235 
 
3 -0.101 0.225 -0.15 0.297 -0.027 0.231 
 
4 0.585* 0.322 0.783** 0.346 0.567** 0.283 
 
5 0.003 0.251 0.054 0.324 0.075 0.254 
 
6 reference category 
Monthly income (log) -0.024 0.093 0.117 0.109 -0.022 0.094 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.102 0.128 0.026 0.155 0.107 0.132 
 
3 -0.072 0.164 -0.183 0.209 -0.027 0.172 
 
4 0.164 0.209 0.058 0.259 0.19 0.206 
 
5 0.009 0.229 -0.219 0.289 0.046 0.229 
 
6 or more -0.121 0.305 -0.213 0.342 -0.137 0.307 
Federal 
state 
Berlin                                                                        reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 
   
0.466* 0.263 
 
Hamburg 
    
-0.165 0.283 
 
Lower Saxony 
   
-0.006 0.261 
 
Bremen 
    
0.805 0.505 
 
N Rhein Westfalen 
   
0.083 0.230 
 
Hessen 
    
0.334 0.259 
 
P Pfalz Saarland 
   
0.081 0.246 
 
Baden Wurttemberg 
   
0.151 0.231 
 
Bavaria 
    
0.077 0.238 
Year dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes   
Constant   0.59 1.012 -0.529 1.278 0.337 1.046 
Observations 587 
 
887 
 
587 
 R-square (adjusted) 0.344   0.085   0.351   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level            Standard errors in brackets, clustered by observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999  
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Appendix 12 – DiD (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users by income and education  
  
2nd quartile 3rd quartile Q 1 + Q 2 Q 2+ Q 3 Education >9 years 
  
Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Treatment group (after) 1.107*** 0.298  0.521*  0.312 0.285 0.224 0.580*** 0.206 0.417** 0.298 
After  
 
-0.674* 0.365 -0.260 0.373 -0.213 0.248 -0.542** 0.242 -0.466 0.365 
Treated  
 
-0.601 0.220 -0.354* 0.189 -0.055 0.150 -0.350** 0.148 0.014 0.220 
Sex Male -0.118 0.133 0.064 0.154 0.004 0.112 -0.102 0.109 -0.084 0.133 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
0.051 0.033 -0.071** 0.029 0.014 0.022 0.002 0.024 0.034 0.033 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health 
status 
Very poor reference category 
Poor 0.761*** 0.194 0.910*** 0.233 0.778*** 0.119 0.804*** 0.141 0.761*** 0.194 
 
Fair 1.076*** 0.250 1.252*** 0.297 1.377*** 0.138 1.166*** 0.182 1.076*** 0.250 
 
Good  1.386*** 0.370 1.958*** 0.350 1.664*** 0.292 1.591*** 0.299 1.386*** 0.370 
 
Very good 1.903*** 0.420 2.884*** 0.650 1.951*** 0.334 2.042*** 0.335 1.903*** 0.420 
Marital 
status 
Married -0.263 0.225 -0.202 0.163 -0.074 0.166 -0.242* 0.136 -0.196 0.225 
Single -0.106 0.259 -0.085 0.445 0.093 0.200 0.103 0.246 0.213 0.259 
 
Widowed reference category 
 
Divorced    -1.443*** 0.370 -0.529 0.530 -0.191 0.237 -1.111*** 0.299  -1.225** 0.370 
 
Separated  -0.944** 0.248 0.168 0.397 -0.836*** 0.272 -0.746** 0.345   -1.287** 0.248 
Job status in work -0.081 0.395 -0.073 0.433 0.297 0.285 0.552** 0.268 0.081* 0.395 
Education 0 0.136 0.544 0.044 0.515 0.024 0.634 0.269 0.415 0.487 0.544 
ISCED 1 -0.29 0.460 -0.019 0.456 -0.062 0.535 -0.020 0.330 0.118 0.460 
 
2 -0.315 0.403 0.226 0.393 -0.217 0.511 -0.004 0.285 0.185 0.403 
 
3 -0.593 0.440 0.177 0.377 -0.284 0.518 -0.214 0.277 -0.187 0.440 
 
4 -0.323 0.607 0.955* 0.551 0.448 0.564 0.457 0.400 0.560 0.607 
 
5 -0.202 0.285 -0.001 0.503 -0.019 0.530 0.027 0.340 0.306 0.285 
 
6 
   
reference category 
    Monthly income (log) 0.216 0.579 -1.518*** 0.569 0.040 0.131 -0.157 0.201 0.216 0.579 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.233 0.195 0.072 0.277 -0.007 0.161 0.024 0.151 -0.049 0.195 
3 0.099 0.232 -0.309 0.309 0.066 0.220 -0.197 0.194 -0.023 0.232 
 
4 -0.405 0.290 0.340 0.337 -0.530 0.335 0.061 0.213 -0.484 0.290 
 
5 0.719* 0.447 -0.015 0.337 0.609 0.378 0.133 0.270 0.287 0.447 
 
6 or more no obs 
 
-0.056 0.562 no obs 
 
-0.128 0.532 no obs 
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Federal 
state 
Berlin reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.318 0.419 -0.524 0.675 0.61 0.399 -0.018 0.287 -0.272 0.419 
 
Hamburg 0.229 0.679 -0.479 0.491 0.056 0.382 -0.377 0.357 -0.213 0.679 
 
Lower Saxony 0.454 0.380 -0.268 0.458 0.172 0.361 -0.002 0.259 -0.184 0.380 
 
Bremen 1.211* 0.767 No obs. No obs. 1.032* 0.542 0.834 0.579 0.873 0.767 
 
N Rhein Westfalen 0.341 0.356 -0.524 0.374 0.177 0.328 -0.089 0.231 -0.198 0.356 
 
Hessen -0.575 0.540 -0.113 0.793 0.519 0.369 0.200 0.422 -0.080 0.540 
 
P Pfalz Saarland -0.11 0.586 -0.28 0.385 0.218 0.354 0.038 0.265 -0.100 0.586 
 
Baden Wurttemberg 0.243 0.381 -0.663* 0.398 0.358 0.332 -0.023 0.234 -0.121 0.381 
 Bavaria 0.575 0.377 -0.548 0.405 0.227 0.336 -0.005 0.258 -0.186 0.377 
Year dummies  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Constant   -3.271 4.689 17.879*** 5.876 -0.959 1.440 1.843 2.205 -2.453 2.343 
Observations 203 
 
147 
 
473 
 
403 
 
379 
 
R-square (adjusted) 0.396   0.348   0.313   0.353   0.384   
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level        Standard errors in brackets, clustered by observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999      
 265 
 
Appendix 13 – DiD and DDD (z-score SWB), sample: LTC users by 
availability of informal carers  
Part 1: DiD models 
  
Divorced/separated Single household Married 
Treatment group (after) 
0.884*** 
(0.263) 
0.798*** 
(0.255) 
0.720** 
(0.363) 
0.637* 
(0.637) 
0.051 
(0.221) 
0.015 
(0.217) 
After  
 
-0.651** 
(0.288) 
-0.601** 
(0.278) 
-0.257 
(0.352) 
-0.232 
(0.358) 
-0.172 
(0.291) 
-0.091 
(0.273) 
Treated  
  
-0.472** 
(0.189) 
-0.411** 
(0.181) 
-0.124 
(0.239) 
-0.149 
(0.276) 
-0.110 
(0.183) 
-0.104 
(0.167) 
Sex Male -0.064 -0.04 -0.088 -0.005 -0.002 -0.043 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
-0.007 -0.010 0.018 0.011 -0.062** -0.068** 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 
Health 
status 
Very poor reference category 
Poor 0.805*** 0.798*** 0.479*** 0.599*** 0.805*** 0.798*** 
Fair 1.339*** 1.322*** 1.122*** 1.246*** 1.339*** 1.322*** 
 
Good  1.681*** 1.684*** 1.570*** 1.854*** 1.681*** 1.684*** 
 
Very good 2.103*** 2.183*** 1.234*** 1.491*** 2.103*** 2.183*** 
Job status in work -0.534* -0.386  -0.536* -0.677 0.343 0.337 
Education 0 -0.275 -0.698** -0.558 -0.793 0.099 0.176 
ISCED 1 0.221 -0.205 0.334 0.124 0.273 0.258 
 
2 0.261 -0.11 -0.03 -0.191 -0.103 -0.078 
 
3 0.228 -0.126 -0.067 -0.24 -0.082 -0.074 
 
4 1.128** 0.648 0.847 0.743 0.765 0.36 
 
5 0.746* 0.397 0.305 0.146 -0.286 -0.157 
 
6 reference category 
Monthly income (log) 0.001 0.028 -0.001 0.074 0.013 -0.001 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.13 0.197 0.14 0.193 -0.191 -0.164 
 
3 -0.114 -0.091 -0.112 -0.093 -0.560** -0.482* 
 
4 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.023 -0.083 -0.083 
 
5 0.063 0.097 0.066 0.091 -0.248 -0.26 
 
6 or more 0.097 -0.009 0.094 -0.005 -1.204*** -1.114*** 
Federal 
state 
Berlin reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Hamburg 
Lower Saxony 
Bremen 
N. Rhein & Westfalen 
Hessen 
P Pfalz Saarland 
Baden Wurttemberg 
Bavaria 
1.206*** 
 
0.800 
 
-0.047 
 
1.041*** 
 
0.766* 
 
-1.057*** 
 
0.877** 
 
0.925* 
 
-0.592* 
 
1.223** 
 
1.350** 
 
1.110** 
 
0.858*** 
 
0.495 
 
-0.342 
 
1.321*** 
 
1.019** 
 
-0.377 
 
1.000*** 
 
0.730* 
 
-0.536* 
 
0.847*** 
 
0.596 
 
-0.459* 
 0.921*** 
 
0.748* 
 
-0.782*** 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
  
 -0.397 
(1.863) 
 -1.238 
(1.918) 
 -1.225 
(1.690) 
 -2.121 
(1.171) 
1.827 
(1.912) 
2.595 
(1.962) 
Observations 400 400 247 247 345 345 
R-square (adjusted) 0.402 0.414 0.364 0.383 0.268 0.306 
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Part 2: DDD models 
  
Divorced/separated Single household Married 
Treatment group (after) 
0.835 
(0.450) 
0.585 
(0.426) 
1.165** 
(0.549) 
0.650 
(0.539) 
0.55** 
(0.331) 
0.590** 
(0.354) 
After  
 
 -0.246 
(0.412) 
0.056 
(0.256) 
 -0.01 
(0.410) 
 -0.312 
(0.390) 
 -0.091 
(0.342) 
 -0.154 
(0.318) 
Treated  
  
 -0.143 
(0.246) 
0.066 
(0.221) 
0.298 
(0.225) 
0.154 
(0.260) 
0.036 
(0.217) 
 -0.175 
(0.120) 
Sex Male -0.070 0.087 -0.069 -0.033 -0.001 0.004 
 
Female reference category 
Age  
 
-0.003 0.052 0.019 0.041 -0.073** -0.061 
Age2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001* 
Health 
status 
Very poor reference category 
Poor 0.726*** 0.726*** 0.479*** 0.599*** 0.794*** 0.897*** 
Fair 1.385*** 1.385*** 1.124*** 1.244*** 1.231*** 1.198*** 
 
Good  1.714*** 1.714*** 1.550*** 1.750*** 1.572*** 1.164*** 
 
Very good 1.213*** 1.213*** 1.004*** 1.019*** 2.243*** 2.916*** 
Job status in work  -0.556* -0.423   -0.542* -0.623 0.381* 0.195 
Education 0 -0.201 -0.415 -0.322 -0.846 0.182 0.322 
ISCED 1 0.284 0.145 0.478 0.278 0.334 0.27 
 
2 0.304 -0.05 0.107 -0.167 -0.065 0.066 
 
3 0.266 -0.036 0.041 -0.232 -0.044 0.104 
 
4 1.150*** 1.630*** 0.921 0.554 0.811 0.231 
 
5 0.803** 0.34 0.469 -0.044 -0.268 0.221 
 
6 reference category 
Monthly income (log) 0.017 0.067 0.024 0.152 -0.003 -0.145 
Household 
size 
1 reference category 
2 0.125 0.354* 0.22 0.124 -0.091 (base) 
 
3 -0.125 -0.132 -0.121 -0.134 -0.425 -0.102 
 
4 -0.015 -0.308 0.025 0.014 0.079 0.717** 
 
5 0.004 -0.067 0.122 0.005 -0.206 -0.448 
 
6 or more 0.041 -0.298 -0.006 0.048 -1.119*** -0.678** 
Federal 
state 
Berlin reference category 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Hamburg 
Lower Saxony 
Bremen 
N. Rhein & Westfalen 
Hessen 
P Pfalz Saarland 
Baden Wurttemberg 
Bavaria 
1.228*** 
 
0.800 
 
-0.077 
 
0.752* 
 
0.666* 
 
-1.037*** 
 
0.908** 
 
0.525* 
 
-0.892* 
 
1.141* 
 
1.150** 
 
1.410** 
 
0.610 
 
0.695 
 
-0.242 
 
1.367*** 
 
1.032** 
 
-0.176 
 
0.854** 
 
0.520* 
 
-0.436* 
 
0.688* 
 
0.597 
 
-0.532* 
 0.998*** 
 
0.758* 
 
-0.612*** 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
  
 -0.968 
(1.911) 
 -4.473 
(1.954) 
 -1.777 
(1.715) 
 -3.933 
(1.696) 
2.075 
(1.832) 
2.697 
(1.934) 
Observations 400 400 247 247 345 345 
R-square (adjusted) 0.403 0.37 0.377 0.321 0.268 0.276 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level               Standard errors in brackets, clustered by 
observation 
Years: ‘Before’ 1990-1993, ‘After’ 1996-1999 
Source: GSOEP 1990-1999  
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Chapter 4  
Appendix 14 – Health expenditure indicators 2010 (Sweden, UK, Ireland)  
 
Per capita government 
expenditure on health (a) 
Total expenditure 
on health (b) 
Private prepaid 
plans (C)  
Private expenditure 
on health (d) 
 
   
 Ireland 3940 9.7 34.4 20.4 
Sweden 3690 9.8 1.2 16.6 
UK  3399 9.4 6.7 16.4 
     a)  at average exchange rate (US$) c) Percentage of private expenditure on health 
b) Percentage of gross domestic product d) Percentage of total expenditure on health 
 
Source: World Health Organisation 2012  
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Appendix 15 – Summary table of variables for Paper 3  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Detail 
Self-rated social 
status 
2844 6.18 1.54 1 10 
[1] lowest level in society, [10] 
highest level in society  
Difficulty 
meeting payments 
3020 0.26 0.44 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Sex 3020 0.52 0.50 0 1 [1] Female, [0] Male 
Age  3020 50.36 18.88 15 97 Age in years 
Age squared  3020 2892.36 1929.64 225 9409 Age squared 
Overall health 
care quality 
2976 2.04 0.81 1 4 
[1] Very good, Fairly good, Fairly 
bad, [4] Very bad  
Experience with 
health care 
system 
3020 0.41 0.49 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Hospital care: 
probability of 
harm 
2880 2.45 0.75 1 4 
[1] Very likely, Fairly likely, Not 
very likely, [4] Not at all likely  
Occupational 
status 
3020 4.85 2.11 1 8 
[1] Self-employed, Managers, 
Other white collars, Manual 
workers, House persons, 
Unemployed, [8] Retired, 
Students 
Marital status 3011 2.23 1.38 1 6 
[1] (Re-)Married, Single living 
with a partner, Single, Divorced 
or separated, Widow, [6] Other  
High education 
(yes) 
3020 0.58 0.49 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Access to IT 
(yes) 
3020 0.71 0.45 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Owns home 
(yes) 
3020 0.31 0.46 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Area type 3017 2.03 0.83 1 3 
[1] rural, [2] small/middle town, 
[3] large town 
Ireland 3020 0.32 0.47 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
UK 3020 0.34 0.48 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Sweden 3020 0.33 0.47 0 1 [1] Yes [0] No 
Health system criteria 
     
Doctor 
proximity  
3020 0.353311 0.478078 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Choice of 
doctor 
3020 0.141722 0.348822 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Patient dignity 3020 0.248013 0.431931 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Well-trained 
staff 
3020 0.57351 0.494649 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Clean 
environment 
3020 0.244702 0.429982 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Effective 
treatment 
3020 0.327152 0.469251 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
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Choice of 
hospital 
3020 0.116887 0.321339 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Safety from 
harm 
3020 0.206954 0.405189 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
No waiting lists 3020 0.368212 0.482399 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Friendly 
environment 
3020 0.056291 0.230522 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Modern 
equipment 
3020 0.206954 0.405189 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
other 3020 0.003642 0.060252 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
Don’t know 3020 0.01457 0.119842 0 1 [1] Mentioned [0] Not mentioned 
 
  
